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ABSTRACT 
 
THE MESSY NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE:  
USING FUZZY COGNITIVE MAPPING TO EXPLORE PLAUSIBLE NUCLEAR 
DISARMAMENT SCENARIOS 
 
Ryan M. Nixon 
Old Dominion University, 2019 
Director: Dr. Jesse Richman 
Nuclear weapons are seemingly permanent fixtures in international relations. Although 
nuclear abolitionists and actors within the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have taken significant steps towards designing a world without 
nuclear weapons, the longstanding realist logic that suggests nuclear disarmament is nonviable 
has born more fruit. On the other hand, some proponents of realism have suggested global 
nuclear disarmament is feasible, given that certain international instabilities are stabilized and 
that special care is taken during diplomatic negotiations. This presents an opportunity to test 
these predictions using fuzzy cognitive mapping, a computational modeling technique that 
identifies problems, their stakeholders, and stakeholders’ components in order to determine 
scenarios that solve complex disputes in ways that benefit the system as a whole. This study 
identifies two problems regarding nuclear disarmament. First, nuclear weapon states are resistant 
to giving up nuclear weapons, despite agreements to disarm. This problem follows realist logic. 
Second, the role that the IAEA plays in safeguarding special nuclear materials while 
guaranteeing states’ rights to nuclear technology is contrasted by states’ interest in maintaining 
levels of secrecy. These two problems constitute a “mess” that this study analyzes. Synthesis 
between the problems requires that solving one does not make the other worse. Therefore, this 
study tests various scenarios and finds that, given present-day international instabilities are 
stabilized, nuclear disarmament is feasible if three conditions are met: First, a global 
 
 
 
disarmament agreement must not unreasonably affect states’ sovereign rights outside of the 
agreement. Second, states outlying the NPT must be brought into the negotiations. Finally, 
present states with nuclear arsenals adopt the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 
with the Additional Protocol as a measure of good faith. A final factor suggests states’ rights to 
the technology inevitably means states should have an ability to re-proliferate in the event of 
future international instability that threatens global security. Once these steps are taken and 
technological rights guaranteed, this model suggests global nuclear disarmament is possible. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Mess Articulation 
Problems do not exist in vacuums. Solving one problem might exacerbate one or more 
related problems, despite our best intentions. Industrial and technological modernization comes 
to mind. While modernization leads to increased life quality and expectancy, it displaces 
indigenous species, pollutes waterways, and contributes to rising global temperatures. The short-
term benefits of industrialization and modernization outweigh the short-term costs, but the 
overall costs might prove too costly for future societies. The balance between industrialization 
and environmentalism is highly contentious, and many stakeholders are firmly and squarely on 
one extreme end or the other. Solving these problems requires, in a non-dictatorial world, 
something more holistic than simple political debate in legislatures and democratic elections. 
While useful, these institutions have thus far proven incapable of solving the problem. The 
various stakeholders, each with independent influence, can slow or stop problem resolution. 
Therefore, it might be more feasible to approach problems at this magnitude with a methodology 
that attempts to satisfy, or at least satisfice, all relevant stakeholders.1 
As in the climate change debate, in international politics the question of nuclear weapons 
presents a problem that has thus far avoided synthesis. Stakeholders have for decades attempted 
to resolve the problem, or to at least soften the edges. 
                                                
1 Obviously, on the other hand, it is impossible to satisfy or satisfice all ~7.7 billion humans and 
countless states, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and others. 
Attempts should be made to satisfy or satisfice the most stakeholders as possible. 
   
 
2 
The nuclear disarmament movement has been around since almost immediately after the 
1945 atomic bombings of Japan. The normative argument is one of morality. Nuclear weapons 
shrink a total war into a few short hours while maintaining total war’s pain,2 which, according to 
the abolitionist, is an unacceptable capability for any state to possess. Furthermore, they argue, 
nuclear weapons pose the risk of accidental detonation or the proliferation through theft or sale 
to non-state actors that cannot be deterred by conventional means. These moral arguments stem 
from knowledge of the direct consequences of nuclear attack, including immediate and delayed 
fatalities, in addition to unintended consequences dozens of miles away, such as the Daigo 
Fukuryū Maru (F/V Lucky Dragon 5) incident in which a Japanese fishing vessel was irradiated 
during the Castle Bravo thermonuclear test in 1954. To the disarmament movement, it is often a 
question of good versus evil. 
To nuclear weapons states, the question is one of survival. To survive the “Thucydides 
Trap,”3 nuclear weapons are necessary because they erase incentives for a military power to 
attack a rising power. The US cannot survive a nuclear war with China; therefore, if and when 
China overtakes the US as a global or regional hegemon, the simple fact that both states have 
nuclear weapons with second-strike capabilities that can survive a first strike means the 
transition in the balance of power will not delve into total war. Nuclear weapons states argue, 
therefore, that nuclear weapons are necessary to preserve the precarious international stability 
and prevent a major war. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, many thinkers and actors take this 
argument to a seemingly extreme conclusion—nuclear weapons should be horizontally spread to 
states that are likely to be good stewards of nuclear technologies. Indeed, Kenneth Waltz argues 
                                                
2 Adapted from Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1966), 21. 
3 This term was coined in Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape 
Thucydides’s Trap? Kindle edition (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 
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nuclear weapons would bolster peace in the Middle East if Iran had a nuclear deterrent to counter 
Israel’s nuclear deterrent.4 To nuclear weapons states, therefore, the question is not Biblical; it is 
not about good versus evil, but it is certainly about preventing Armageddon. At the very least, it 
is about preventing World War III. 
But the nuclear weapons problem is not merely a battle between disarmament activists 
and nuclear weapons states. There are roughly 200 recognized states, and fewer than ten of them 
have nuclear weapons, and the majority of those that do not possess nuclear weapons make up a 
considerable UN voting bloc, the Non-Aligned Movement. There are weapons systems 
production firms within nuclear weapons states. There are international verification and 
compliance agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Religious leaders and the 
media, while not necessarily particularly powerful to solve the problem, certainly have some 
noticeable level of influence over the faithful and the curious. Finally, Outlier States must be 
acknowledged. How does the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) or the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan fit into the problem? Can synthesis be reached in a way that can get 
these states onboard with the rest of the international community in the event that a global 
disarmament treaty is negotiated? 
And the nuclear weapons problem is not limited to a single problem. On the one hand, as 
already acknowledged, there is, quite simply, a disagreement over whether or not states should 
have nuclear weapons. This is a normative argument about how the world ought-to-be. On the 
other hand, solving this problem by simply banning nuclear weapons would require significant 
verification, and many, if not all, former nuclear weapons states would likely resist inspections 
that are too invasive, calling them violations of sovereignty that are unnecessary. Nuclear 
                                                
4 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean 
Stability,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 2-5. 
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weapons states would, therefore, likely abandon international arrangements that allow the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to perform inspections that are too comprehensive.5 
Therefore, in addition to the morality-versus-survival problem, there exists a problem of 
governance. Is it possible to negotiate a path towards nuclear disarmament while simultaneously 
guaranteeing former nuclear weapons states do not feel trapped and do not feel like their 
sovereign rights have taken a backseat to the new world order? This becomes even more 
complicated when we attempt to bring in the Outlier States mentioned above. These two 
problems, when taken together and acknowledging that solving one might make the other worse, 
constitute what I refer to in the rest of this text as the “mess.” 
Before modeling can even attempt to solve these problems and the constitutive “mess,” I 
must offer a major acknowledgment. The international environment, at the time of writing, is far 
too complex to solve the problem right away. I make no claims to have found an immediate and 
simple (or even difficult) solution to the “mess” or the problems. There are at present several 
“messes” that need to be solved prior to any attempts to reach an international consensus on the 
nuclear weapons problem. These are discussed in Chapter 8 and include the problems in Eastern 
Europe, particularly Ukraine and Georgia; the problems with the South China Sea and other 
disputed maritime shipping lanes; the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan; and three 
lesser but important disputes. These include the Middle East problem, the question of Taiwan, 
and the dispute on the Korean Peninsula. It is unlikely synthesis between stakeholders can be 
reached until these problems and “messes” are addressed, and solving all of those problems and 
                                                
5 For example, presently there is debate about how to safeguard Brazil’s planned nuclear 
submarine, which falls under a military exemption. Future safeguards arrangements that un-
exempt secret military systems are likely to fail to reach agreement. 
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“messes” at once is far outside the scope of this research, which is focused solely on the nuclear 
weapons problem. 
This acknowledgment is not novel in the disarmament literature. O’Hanlon has explicitly 
acknowledged this reality of international affairs. These contentious issues, he writes, make 
disarmament improbable, but solving them, he adds, makes resultant war in a disarmed world 
implausible.6 In other words, solving the nuclear “mess” in a world devoid of the aforementioned 
international disputes, and avoiding creating new disputes, avoids the risk of World War III or a 
“Thucydides Trap.” Therefore, modeling in this research takes place under the assumption that 
O’Hanlon’s imagined world is possible and then asks the question, “Is global nuclear 
disarmament possible?” 
Finally, given that these international problems are resolved and given that the model is a 
good representation of the problems, I hypothesize that three of the “mess’” variables can be 
altered so that nuclear weapons can be removed from the system without making either of the 
problems worse. First, sovereignty must remain a staple in international affairs. No former 
nuclear weapon state should be forced to endure reductions to its sovereignty outside of what 
presently is agreed upon through existing treaties. Second, a future disarmament treaty must 
affect only the disarmament process and be potentially temporary, depending on the security 
needs of independent states. In other words, the treaty cannot be “too big.” Third, it is important 
that Outlier States be given more international recognition. States like the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea should be not only brought into the disarmament negotiations but should be 
given more representation on other international platforms. This does not mean increasing their 
prestige so far that they are more important than the permanent members of the UN Security 
                                                
6 Michael E. O’Hanlon, A Skeptic’s Case for Nuclear Disarmament, Kindle edition (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), Kindle location 985. 
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Council, for example; rather they should be given slightly more prestige than non-nuclear states. 
A final consideration is that the only known mechanism for stabilizing security in a disarmed 
world is to accept the ability to re-proliferated in short order. 
 
1.2 Study Approach 
Nuclear weapons pose a prisoners’ dilemma. The possible strategies include cooperating 
(disarming) and defecting (not disarming). The payoffs for mutual cooperation might be better 
than mutual defection, which does not preclude the possibility of nuclear war,7 but the cost 
imposed on me if I disarm while the other side defects is a powerful reason to accept mutual 
defection. The possibility of nuclear war through mutual capability is better than being caught 
unprepared for a nuclear war. Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins calls the cost imposed on 
a unilateral cooperator the “sucker’s pay-off.”8 In a dyadic relationship between belligerent or 
potentially belligerent states, the “sucker’s pay-off” in the nuclear world might be to receive 
nuclear attacks while lacking the capability to retaliate, as Japan suffered during WWII. 
But this does not mean that mutual disarmament is impossible. Indeed, the above 
prisoners’ dilemma assumes two sides only get one shot at either cooperating or defecting. This 
compels “egoistic” behavior because defecting is always a dominant strategy to cooperating in 
single-round matches. But Robert Axelrod notes that international relations occurs on a 
continuous timeline. States have the expectations of running into one another again in the future. 
Mutual defection breaks down as the dominant strategy if the game is played on an indefinite 
                                                
7 See Chapter 2 for a discussion about the costs of nuclear war. 
8 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene: 40th Anniversary Edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). Kindle edition: 263. 
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timeline.9 I can apply Axelrod to the nuclear weapons problem and suggest that there is a time 
horizon where nuclear cooperation becomes possible, if only because “egoistic” impulses drive 
states towards mutual cooperation and a better payoff. Work has already been done in this field. 
Russett10 and Brams11 demonstrate that Axelrod’s iterated prisoners’ dilemma can be applied to 
arms control and nuclear weapons. McGinnis, on the other hand, notes that cooperative 
relationships in arms control are weak and tend to break down as players seek to include or 
resolve other issues.12 
This demonstrates the need for an alternate model with specific assumptions about state 
goals. These include several key issues that are expanded upon throughout the body of this study. 
These include 1) assumptions about security, 2) assumptions about confidence in the status quo 
and worlds we are capable of achieving, 3) assumptions about the role nuclear weapons and 
developments subsequent to their creation play in either transforming or maintaining 
international politics, and 4) assumptions about state goals, specifically assumptions about what 
it takes to convince states to buy in to global disarmament. 
First, this study relies heavily on an assumption that is explicitly built into the model. 
That is, the human knowledge of nuclear fission and fusion is a permanent fixture. Therefore, 
there is an inherent ability that, even in a world without nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation is 
always within the realm of possibility, be it horizontal or vertical proliferation. Therefore, a 
major assumption this study makes is that embracing, rather than trying to smother, this re-
                                                
9 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition (New York, New York: Basic 
Books, 2006). Kindle edition: 10 
10 Bruce M. Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms 
Control (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1983). 
11 Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 
12 Michael D. McGinnis, "Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 1 (1986): 141. 
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proliferation capability can maintain security. In a disarmed world states can threaten rapid 
proliferation to deter other actors from nuclear, or even non-nuclear, transgressions. This creates 
a binary set of options from which states can choose in reference to disarmament. Either we can 
enjoy security with nuclear deterrence or we can enjoy security with the threat of nuclear 
deterrence. One of these options carries an inherent threat of nuclear war, while the other 
requires an extra step before the inherent threat is achieved. Scott Sagan believes the ability to 
rapidly reconstitute nuclear forces creates intense instability and will likely result in nuclear war 
because the first side to build a warhead will believe it can win the war through first use.13 On 
the other hand, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, it will also consider how a first use or first strike 
will affect the global environment and politics. Furthermore, Schell argues the attacked will 
likely retaliate against the attacker, even if not immediately. This changes the potential attacker’s 
calculus and maintains mutual deterrence even when one side reconstitutes its nuclear capability 
first.14 In other words, short-order re-proliferation capability (defined later as rearmament within 
a matter of weeks) does not destabilize the system or increase the likelihood of nuclear or 
conventional war if a realist critique is adopted. This requires a realist understanding of what is 
at stake when designing a disarmament treaty. If we are willing to try to live in a world without 
immediate nuclear deterrence, getting the treaty right demands we weigh the costs and benefits. 
Therefore, second and similarly, as is explained by the arms control, disarmament, and 
other literature on international politics woven through this study, I make key assumptions about 
confidence. With the two options states possess, which offers more confidence regarding our 
                                                
13 Scott D. Sagan, "Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament,” Daedalus 138, no. 4 
(2009): 158. 
14 Jonathan Schell, “The Abolition,” reprinted in The Fate of the Earth, and The Abolition, 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 161. 
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security needs? Schell argues our confidence is increased with “weaponless deterrence,”15 
especially if one considers our imperfect confidence that nuclear deterrence can hold. This 
position is held to various degrees of confidence by Perkovich and Acton,16 Schelling,17 Wheeler 
and Booth,18 and O’Hanlon.19 I too follow this line of reasoning (in Chapter 8 I illustrate this 
fully through an extended form game). That is, adopting a realist critique that assumes states are 
cost-benefit calculators, confidence is increased without nuclear weapons and with re-
proliferation capability maintained by the former nuclear weapons states. This confidence boosts 
security considerations in the first assumption. 
Third, the question remains as to whether or not nuclear weapons have transformed 
international politics. Are nuclear weapons the best source of security by eliminating the 
uncertainty of your adversaries’ capabilities? Recall Kenneth N. Waltz’s confidence above and 
belief that Iran should have nuclear weapons. If yes—if nuclear weapons have transformed the 
system by eliminating the threat of major war—then there is no reason to continue this 
conversation. But history has not played out in the Waltzian way. Horizontal proliferation has 
not born fruit, and, defying normative claims about who should have nuclear weapons, major 
events have unfolded that bolster arms control, if not disarmament. For example, the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (the “Iran Nuclear Deal”) demonstrates that even Iran does not 
necessarily agree with Waltz. It is also unlikely that they have eliminated the threat of major war. 
The 2019 India-Pakistan crisis demonstrates that even nuclear-armed states are willing to risk 
                                                
15 Schell, 158. 
16 George Perkovich and James Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper 396 
(London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008). 
17 Thomas Schelling, "A World without Nuclear Weapons?" Daedalus 138, no. 4 (2009): 126. 
18 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Beyond nuclearism,” in Security Without Nuclear 
Weapons: Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). 
19 O’Hanlon, Kindle location 937. 
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escalation, even if realist logic suggests both nuclear-armed states will ultimately back down.20 
Ultimately, when two nuclear-armed states at the brink back down, determining which cause and 
effect is true (the threat of escalation or diplomatic success) is as difficult as proving a negative. 
Furthermore, the question of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) persists. 
To what extent has or should the IAEA transform international politics? If the IAEA is too 
empowered, nuclear weapons states might not sign onto a future disarmament treaty. Therefore, 
states must empower the IAEA, rather than eliminating nuclear sovereignty. Baroness Shirley 
Williams disagrees, writing that, “What we really need now is the additional protocol that 
enables the IAEA to simply walk into any place it fears might possibly be involved in the 
development of nuclear weapons—a laboratory, factory or anywhere else—without giving any 
advance notice before it conducts inspections.”21 The IAEA’s 1997 Additional Protocol does 
outline various scenarios that give inspectors sweeping authority to inspect anywhere they please 
if they have reasonable suspicion that clandestine activities can take place in certain locations, 
but adoption of the Additional Protocol is not compulsory, and there are time restrictions. 
Baroness Williams’ prescription for solving the nuclear weapons problem is near perfect in that 
it greatly diminishes the risk of clandestine operations, but it is far-from-perfect in that it requires 
states to adopt it. If a state seeks to clandestinely develop a nuclear weapons program, it will 
likely circumvent Williams’ IAEA. 
On the other hand it is obvious that some level of state-driven IAEA empowerment is 
warranted if disarmament talks are to be successful. Cheating is a major concern in a disarmed or 
disarming world. It would be reasonable for a disarming Russia to expect the US will hide away 
                                                
20 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” Adelphi Papers, 171 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), 7. 
21 Shirley Williams, "Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament," Political Quarterly 83, no. 2 (2012): 
340. 
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half a dozen bombs before the inspectors arrive, and therefore, Russia has incentives to hide 
away half a dozen (or maybe half a dozen plus one) before inspectors arrive. Dealing with 
potential cheaters requires more than a multilateral approach. There needs to be an IAEA with 
increased state-driven power in at least some circumstances,22 but this power is conditional to the 
specific and immediate needs of the international community of states. The aforementioned re-
proliferation capabilities ensure that the IAEA does not take on a life of its own. 
Therefore, nuclear weapons have only transformed the international political system 
insofar as states assume it has. On the other hand this transformation is weak; states can envision 
a collectivity of empowered inspectors to oversee and manage the knowledge of proliferation. 
Finally, fourth, what would it take for states to buy into disarmament? This question 
raises multiple questions that must be addressed in order to answer. First, how do you dismantle 
a nuclear warhead? In other words, is the nuclear problem merely technical in nature? The first 
thing we must do is to acknowledge that the solution requires a political answer because the 
nuclear weapons problem is not merely a technical problem. We have dismantled nuclear 
warheads in the past. Getting states to buy into disarmament requires several assumptions, raised 
by basic additional questions. 
Where do we want to be? The first and obvious truth—the realist truth—is that we desire 
security. More than mere security, we desire stable security. This harkens back to the first and 
second assumptions. If, for example, rapid re-proliferation capability destabilizes political 
disputes and increases the likelihood of major war, including nuclear war, then obviously that is 
                                                
22 This includes increased facility access, accelerated access to information under treaty, 
acknowledgement that IAEA inspectors are authorities, increased scientific training for 
inspectors to increase analytical competence, and strengthening incentives for cooperation and 
disincentives for defection. Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson, "Strengthening Nuclear 
Safeguards: Special Committee To the Rescue?" Arms Control Today 35, no. 10 (2005): 22. 
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not where we want to be. If, on the other hand, we can disarm without risking war, then we have 
added more stability (by essentially also eliminating the threat of nuclear war). And if we look at 
the problem through the security lens, we can separate ourselves from moral prescriptions that 
presuppose nuclear weapons are bad and disarmament is good. If the referent object is about 
stable security then we can dispense with arguments about good and evil, and we can focus 
solely on risk and basic survival. I deviate from Schell, who frames nuclear abolition as a 
question of the survival of the human species and, by extension, the survival of our loved ones.23 
Stable security, and thus diminished risk and increased survival, is obviously based in selfish 
bias for personal life over non-life, and if we accept this then we can also accept that human 
beings (and thus states) will generally bias decisions that promote personal life over non-life. If 
we accept this then we can answer the question—where do we want to be?—with a discussion 
about goals. 
On the one hand there are nine states possessing nuclear weapons. In this sense nuclear 
weapons are “possession goals” to enhance national standing in terms of security in an 
international system governed by anarchy. On the other hand there are other goals states seek 
that often contradict “possession goals.” Arnold Wolfers differentiates “possession goals”—
goals that enhance the state’s survivability through obtaining something of value—and “milieu” 
goals, which “aim instead at shaping conditions beyond [the state’s] national boundaries.”24 
Milieu goals are not necessarily altruistic in nature; states often make certain concessions in 
international politics because it values the benefit it receives from cooperation in concession 
                                                
23 Schell, 4-6. 
24 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, 
Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1962), 73-74. 
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more than the cost of the thing it sacrificed. In other words what we want depends on the benefit 
we expect to receive from either possessing nuclear weapons or disarming.25 
What about risk management? Under what conditions do we expect nuclear weapons to 
either manage or increase risk? Would disarmament be the reverse? Ultimately, answering this 
question is to help us better fully understand survivability. If nuclear weapons establish order 
through certainty, then disarming would require massive changes to management in the 
international system of states. But the world we build to replace nuclear weapons must be 
recognizable. As previously mentioned, and as will be more fully developed in the ensuing 
chapters, a New World Order—a single world government—is an unacceptable alternative to 
stability through nuclear deterrence. Managing risk means we can conceive of disarmament in 
the world that already exists. 
To figure out what we want, we need to understand security with nuclear weapons and 
security without nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons contribute to our security in several ways. 
They do so by changing state options. In a dyadic relationship they deter direct wars by 
establishing mutual assured destruction (MAD), which reduces our beneficial options to one—
back down; they prevent inadvertent war and increase de-escalation in the event of hostile 
developments; and they establish the threat of death as a major deterrent. Taken together, nuclear 
weapons increase our security.26 Additionally, nuclear weapons can help compensate for weak 
conventional forces. For example, as the US increases its military budget, Russia need not 
                                                
25 For more on possession and milieu goals and how this pertains to this study’s findings, see the 
discussion and conclusion chapter. 
26 Regina Cowen Karp, “Introduction,” in Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different 
Perspectives on National Security, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 17. 
   
 
14 
balance conventionally, as it already has achieved nuclear equilibrium.27 They allow states to 
resolve disputes through the threat of force, rather than escalating to actual force. They all-but 
eliminate the threat of attrition warfare, if one follows the conclusions of MAD. They allow non-
nuclear states to enjoy security guarantees from major powers under “nuclear umbrellas,” which 
frees up smaller states’ resources so they can be spent on building international prestige in non-
military ways. And finally, nuclear weapons create the hierarchical system and, therefore, they 
create a recognizable and stable order.28 
On the other hand, nuclear weapons pose enormous risk—and thus insecurity—in several 
ways. Addressing these is the other side of the coin we are trying to figure out. First, there exists 
the unavoidable threat of nuclear accident. While states can do their best to avoid an accident, 
accidents happen despite our best intentions.29 The possibility of nuclear terrorism, irrational 
actors inhereting nuclear arsenals, inadvertant militarized escalation, and regional competition 
over nuclear potential exasperate insecurity. Additionally, nuclear weapons programs are 
expensive, meaning there is a domestic cost to a nuclear weapons program.30 
Therefore, how do practitioners manage the nuclear age? Various mechanisms are at 
play. First, there is a narrative of the nuclear taboo, a longstanding tradition on the non-use of 
nuclear weapons since World War II.31 Press, Sagan, and Valentino note that, "If nuclear 
weapons are seen as taboo, their use might generate revulsion that could lead to deeper restraint 
                                                
27 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 
18, no. 2 (1993): 51. 
28 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World.” Daedalus 93, no. 3 (1964): 882-884. 
29 O’Hanlon discusses various accidents that could have resulted in nuclear detonation. 
O’Hanlon, 54-57. 
30 On the other hand, financial costs are rarely, if ever, part of states’ calculation to proliferate or 
not. Anne Harrington De Santana, Nuclear Weapons as a Currency of Power: Deconstructing 
the Fetishism of Force (2010, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses), 54. 
31 Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of 
Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999): 433. 
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in the future. If non-use is merely a tradition, however, breaking it could set a new precedent, 
potentially increasing the likelihood that others will use nuclear weapons in the future."32 This is 
a slight diversion from realism, and this assumption acknowledges that determining between 
these two possible outcomes requires understanding realism, on the one hand, and the process by 
which ideas are shaped through discourse, or constructivism, on the other hand.  
As aforementioned, global practitioners also manage the nuclear age through various 
arms control agreements. Many of these are identified in Chapters 5 and 6. It should be noted 
here that, although arms control generally works, with a few hiccups here and there (e.g., the 
bilateral suspension of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 between the 
US and Russia), arms control faces a realist backlash, some calling it an illusion that only exists 
when there are no insecurities. Colin Gray writes, “the theory and practice of arms control is to 
security what the flat-earth postulate was to cosmology: sincerely believed, responsive to some 
empirical evidence (the world can look fairly flat), attractive to common sense, but alas, 
invalid.”33 In other words, there is a strong possibility that arms control is doomed to failure. 
That said, arms control is a known mechanism and pathway towards (or at least in the direction 
of) global zero. 
It should also be noted that managers in the nuclear age have, up until this point at least, 
peacefully ended the Cold War, more or less constructed successful security guarantees to non-
nuclear weapons states, developed nuclear weapons free zones, established the IAEA, 
established the NPT, and conducted countless nuclear security summits, regardless of outcome. 
                                                
32 Daryl Press, Scott Sagan, and Benjamin Valentino, "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence 
on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons," The American Political Science 
Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 189. 
33 Colin S. Gray, House of Cards Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1992), 2. 
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On the other hand, as is mentioned in Chapter 2, a peaceful resolution to the Cold War does not 
necessarily translate into a peaceful resolution to all conflicts that include the possibility of 
nuclear strike. Security guarantees are not set in stone (as Colin Gray would probably agree). 
Nuclear weapons free zones do not mean free from fallout or other detrimental global effects of 
nuclear war, nor are nuclear weapons free zones endowed with the muscle necessary to enforce 
the law. The IAEA and the NPT cannot prevent nuclear war; they can just make it a little less 
likely. And nuclear security summits, like the one between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in 
February 2019, are often less-than successful. What this means is that, as is addressed in Chapter 
3, managing the nuclear age in the twenty-first century requires a holistic understanding and 
approach. 
Next, to figure out what we want, we must ask two questions: 1) is disarmament 
desirable? This question stems from many of the questions posed above. And 2) is disarmament 
feasible? To answer the first question, Schell has previously argued that disarmament is a moral 
imperative. Other abolitionists identified in Chapter 5 agree. But whether or not disarmament is 
desirable is not the important question. But because some actors say it is desirable, we can 
connect this question with feasibility. Wheeler and Booth see this as a necessary connection 
because disarmament begins with the policymakers who want disarmament. If disarmament is 
desired by decision makers, then disarmament is not feasible.34 They additionally posit that 
disarmament is only possible through a process-oriented gradual reduction. In other words, the 
idea is to wean states away from nuclear weapons. This weaning requires increasing cooperation. 
In 2010 Russian and US presidents Medvedev and Obama put this cooperative, process-oriented 
gradual reduction to use, signing the New START treaty. But, as shown by the bilateral 
                                                
34 Wheeler and Booth, 54. 
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suspension of the INF Treaty in February 2019, this process can be derailed. This study seeks to 
completely eschew the process. (Or at least, it seeks movement from some non-zero number to 
zero; whether or not that number is in the thousands or dozens is up to the imaginations of the 
reader. In the end, this model tests security stability without nuclear weapons.) Under my 
prescription, states will negotiate the terms of a disarmament treaty, choose a date on a calendar, 
and then open their doors to the outside world to verify the destruction of warheads, very similar 
to the INF Treaty warhead dismantlement inspections. This approach is akin to tearing an 
adhesive bandage off of an old wound in one pull. It is likely to be painful, but the pain will be 
shorter lived than if drawn out by a gradual process. This requires a small amount of big steps 
rather than an unknown number of small steps. With this approach there are fewer areas for 
derailment (although skepicism is magnified, which begs for a demonstration of benefit and 
reward through, for example, fuzzy cognitive mapping). 
 Finally, to come full circle, answering what we want requires us to acknowledge the 
most difficult aspects of a disarmed world, a disarming world, or even a world merely 
considering its nuclear options. Namely, how is verification of compliance strong enough that 
uncertainty is manageable? Furthermore, how can the IAEA be strong enough to verify 
compliance, but not so strong that the state loses its ability to govern itself? As previously 
mentioned, the IAEA must be empowered by the state. If the IAEA becomes more powerful than 
the sum of the power granted it by states without mechanisms for rearmament if necessary, it 
creates incentives for defection from the disarmament (or non-proliferation) regime. This has 
already been addressed above (see re-proliferation capability). For our purposes here, the IAEA 
has a first duty to know how many warheads are out there. This complicates the problems in 
Chapters 5 and 6 and the “mess” in Chapter 7. These numbers are usually closely guarded 
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secrets, and determining the actual number requires substantial reassurances through 
transparency. And it requires major baiting of milieu rewards to entice states to be open and 
truthful. 
A couple paragraphs above, I briefly make the case for ripping the bandage off in a single 
movement—going from some non-zero number to zero all at once. One of the reasons for this is 
because as nuclear redundancies diminish, numbers matter. Dismantling 1,000 warheads when 
you have 10,000 is simple. Dismantling 1,000 when you have 1,500 is more difficult. Going 
from 10 to 5 is even more difficult still. Going from 5 or 10 to zero is not unthinkable, but it is 
unbelievable. These stages create defection points each round. The great leap to zero 
circumvents the potential political crises that will emerge as new institutions are framed, new 
conventions are formed, and more potentially doomed-to-fail nuclear summits are held in order 
to manage the next small leap to a non-zero number. 
Therefore, to turn Colin Gray’s argument on its head and to adopt from John Mueller, the 
irrelevance of nuclear weapons narrative suggests that if we get to a point where nuclear 
disarmament is possible, not only will it be likely to occur out of mere circumstance, it will be 
likely to occur because re-proliferation capability is enough to deter belligerence. The weapons 
served their purpose in developing MAD. They are now irrelevant.35 They are unnecessary to 
maintain MAD explicitly because of the fact that we cannot put the nuclear genie back in the 
bottle. The question now is whether we should put the nuclear genie out to pasture. 
 
 
 
                                                
35 John E. Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar 
World,” International Security 13, no. 2 (1988): 56 
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The Model 
This study adopts a form of systemic decision-making called Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping, 
adapted from Axelrod36 and later Kosko.37 Fuzzy cognitive maps show relations between 
concepts as well as the strengths of those relationships. Imagine a hospital with a patient with a 
communicable disease as well as a doctor and a nurse. If we are examining this social network in 
terms of each actor’s health, the doctor and nurse can positively and strongly increase the 
patient’s health by providing various forms of accepted medicine, and the patient can weakly or 
moderately decrease the doctor’s and the nurse’s health by transmitting the disease. As this 
model stands, the doctor and nurse can neither increase nor decrease the other’s health unless the 
patient first transmits the disease to one or the other. Therefore the fuzzy cognitive map also 
accounts for changes in time. At timestamp 0, when the patient is admitted, the doctor and 
nurse’s health is unaffected; however, at timestamp 1, after the patient has been in the hospital 
for a pre-defined time, the doctor and nurse’s health could be affected. And at timestamp 2, 
considering one or the other healthcare worker has caught the disease; the newly infected actor 
can affect the health of the uninfected actor. 
This study incorporates this form of modeling and applies it to the nuclear weapons 
problems and “mess.” Its methodology adapts strongly from Patrick T. Hester and Kevin MacG. 
Adams38 to create a highly structured representation of the nuclear problems and the constitutive 
nuclear “mess.” The problems and the “mess” are created on an online modeling platform called 
Mental Modeler, the quantifiable contents of which are imported into an Excel spreadsheet 
                                                
36 Robert M. Axelrod, Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
37 Bart Kosko, “Fuzzy Cognitive Maps,” International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 24 
(1986): 65-75. 
38 Patrick T. Hester and Kevin MacG. Adams, Systemic Decision Making: Fundamentals for 
Addressing Problems and Messes, 2nd ed. (Springer International, 2017). 
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containing a macro capable of analyzing the model through a sigmoid transfer function to allow 
the model to evolve from one timestamp to the next. Finally, the model is examined by asking 
various “what-if” questions. That is, what happens if we make certain predefined changes to the 
structure of the “mess”? Do these changes help to solve the problem? Do they make the scenario 
worse off for relevant stakeholders? 
The modeling also takes place in an international environment that accepts the basic 
tenets of political realism. Hans Morgenthau posits that politics behave according to objective 
laws of human nature; politics is a response to changes in the measurement of power; the concept 
of power is fluid through time; morality is not insignificant, but it is often in contrast with 
successful policy; there is no objective good or bad in the laws of nature; and political realism is 
the domain of politics, despite its explicit acknowledgement that other schools of thought exist 
and matter to their respective subjects.39 Morgenthau acknowledges the existence of international 
law, human rights, and other institutions outside the scope of political realism, but he does not 
think they matter in the long term. States might temporarily decide to cooperate on a specific 
issue, but they are bound by the laws of human nature to defect from the cooperative relationship 
as soon as a reasonable opportunity presents itself. To be fair, as is discussed in Chapter 8, this 
tenet of political realism does not detract from my argument, but rather it bolsters it. 
Furthermore, this research deviates from political realism, despite acknowledging it, by 
acknowledging that other institutions indeed matter, if only in the present. It furthermore adds 
that states will first accept the laws of human nature, but they can also overcome them through 
rational choice in search of goals beyond their national boundaries that bolster their security but 
                                                
39 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th Ed. (New 
York: Knopf, 1967), 4-11. 
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not at the expense of others’ securities. In this sense, I adopt from Wolfers, E.H. Carr,40 and Ken 
Booth,41 who argue that states can accept the balance of power, but will also work towards a 
communal view of utopia when possible, if only because it serves a non-selfish benefit to the 
state moving towards utopia. Booth explicitly calls for going beyond realism to reach a fuller 
empiricism of the study of international relations.42 
 
1.3 Summary of the Study’s Findings 
The model I construct in Chapters 5 – 7 is highly complex, containing over 50 movable 
parts (and over 150 ways to move them). Although I go to great lengths to explain how each 
concept interacts with surrounding concepts, readers without engineering management 
backgrounds and a strong interest in social mechanics might find the model chapters dry. 
Therefore, a brief summary of the study’s findings is in order, so that the average reader will 
understand from the beginning what this highly complex machine is working towards. 
In short, ripping the nuclear bandage off quickly (the great leap to zero approach) is 
feasible, but this claim comes with several crucial caveats.  
First, as demonstrated in late February 2019,43 several ongoing international disputes can 
spiral towards crisis, and nuclear deterrence might be the only thing presently restraining nuclear 
powers.44 A terroristic suicide car bombing in Kashmir’s Pulwama district by a Pakistani militant 
against India’s Central Reserve Police Force spiralled out of control, culminating in Pakistan 
                                                
40 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: HarperCollins, 1946). 
41 Ken Booth, “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice,” International 
Affairs 67, no. 3 (1991): 527-545. 
42 Booth, 534. 
43 At the time of writing, this crisis is ongoing. The unfolding of events beyond February 2019 is 
unknown to the author. 
44 Although the power of diplomacy cannot be discounted. 
   
 
22 
shooting down two Indian military jets over Pakistan’s airspace. India and Pakistan have danced 
close to the brink of major militarized international dispute before, even after each state 
constituted nuclear deterrents. The quick recovery by March 1, 2019 and the increased 
diplomatic urgency surrounding the India-Pakistan 2019 crisis demonstrate two things: 1) 
Removing India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent before resolving the ongoing 71-year-old 
Kasmir dispute might lead both states to major war to resolve the Kashmir issue. And 2) there is 
a strong likelihood that diplomatic urgency is fostered by the nuclear deterrent, rather than 
diplomacy undermining nuclear deterrence. Beyond Kashmir there are a half dozen or so 
ongoing international geopolitical disputes that require the same treatment. Removing their 
respective states’ nuclear deterrents is untenable without resolving their disputes. 
Therefore, moving forward from some unknown date on a calendar when nothing 
prevents us from trying the great leap to zero, there are feasible things we can do that will make 
disarmament feasible and stable. First, nuclear weapons states need strong reassurance that their 
natural rights to govern their territory or to move in the international realm are not infringed 
beyond a pre-negotiated disarmament treaty. This has the effect of limiting international 
organizations’ powers. The IAEA is not empowered beyond the treaty. Second, the states 
outlying the NPT must be brought into the international fold, economically and diplomatically. 
Particularly, the recognized nuclear powers should acknowledge North Korea and Pakistan as 
nuclear powers. This might require an amendment to the NPT, temporarily forgiving past human 
rights violations, and bringing these states into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It certainly requires 
dropping sanctions. Third, the recognized nuclear weapons states and the states outlying the NPT 
must ceremoniously sign the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Additional 
Protocol as a measure of good faith. This will activate the IAEA to power commensurate to 
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agreed upon provisions in the disarmament treaty. A final crucial point highlights the importance 
of replacing security with MAD with a “weaponless deterrence.” Realizing or maintaining the 
capability to constitute or reconstitute militarized nuclear forces is, according to the model 
developed in the following chapters, the only way to maintain stable and recognizable security. 
By working Schell’s “weaponless deterrence” into the provisions of a working disarmament 
treaty, we can empower the IAEA through other provisions enough to deter proliferation through 
transparency, while limiting the IAEA’s power to stop proliferation. This acknowledges Colin 
Gray’s contribution that arms control only works when it can work. This leads to a resultant 
conclusion that disarmament will work only when it can work, and the IAEA will have to live 
with this. 
The above scenario is captured using fuzzy cognitive mapping, ascribing to realist claims 
that the possession of nuclear weapons increases security. My model, however, counters the 
realist’s position that nuclear weapons best maximizes the security needs of states. The ability to 
reconstitute nuclear weapons drives security without nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the fact that 
no stateholders—not even nuclear weapons states or even North Korea—are ignoring the nuclear 
weapons problem. Rather, historically they have demonstrated sincere eagerness to work towards 
resolving this problem. In other words, states recognize and accept that the problem is real and 
not merely in the imaginations of anti-war activists. 
What accounts for this recognition when nuclear weapons are a perfect demonstration of 
state capability? The model I present leaves us with epistemological uncertainty, due to its highly 
formalized structure that severs it from meaning. It shows cause and effect but not implication. 
Arnold Wolfers may offer some insight (expanded in the final chapter). He argues states have 
possession goals and milieu goals. Possession goals are things sought in competition with other 
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states. These are egotistical, competetive, and highly political, and they lead to a system of great 
competition and an inability to think in terms of the whole. They are merely to look inward 
rather than at the social environment. Milieu goals are actions states take to shape the social 
environment in which they operate. To a realist the milieu is anarchy, but the milieu is created 
through the actions and behaviors of states, rather than created by international structure. By 
shaping the milieu, states shape the choices of others. This is not for altruistic purposes, but 
rather out of egotistical sociability. That is, socially interacting with the environment serves our 
foreign policies. It is to serve our self-interests.45 
If we think about our nuclear choices not merely as a realist would—not merely about 
how they immediately serve our security needs—we note that alternatives become clearer. Arms 
control serves no possession goals for nuclear powers, but it serves to shape the social 
environment in which other actors consider their options. This requires some level of self-
restraint and cooperation; it is reasonable to offer self-restraint and cooperation if you expect it 
from others. But more important, as the prisoners’ dilemma can attest, mutual cooperation, while 
not a dominant strategy or serving to bolster possession goals, self-restraint and cooperation 
benefits the self-interest of the actor.46 This study suggests nuclear powers, whether recognized 
or not, seek both possession goals and milieu goals. Their concern about the role nuclear 
weapons play in the social context, demonstrated by their engagement in resolving the problems, 
and the understanding that shaping the social context through self-restraint and increased 
cooperation is driven by self-interests rather than altruism, explains why the model converges on 
increased security without nuclear weapons than with. 
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1.4 Organization of the Study 
This study is in eight chapters. 
In Chapter 2 I identify relevant literature regarding arms control, disarmament, mutual 
assured destruction, and the scientific literature pertaining to the effects of nuclear weapons from 
climatological, psychological, and sociological perspectives. This chapter makes the case for 
relevancy as well as the urgency of this study. 
In Chapter 3 I discuss the background of the modeling technique, the philosophy of fuzzy 
cognitive mapping, and the theoretical reasoning behind the study. Of particular note, this 
chapter addresses eight error types in logic that should be avoided during various stages in the 
modeling (problem structuring, action, and observation). While this study strives to avoid all 
error types, it is of particular importance that it avoids modeling the wrong problem (the Type III 
error) and solving one problem while making another problem worse (the Type IV error). The 
chapter goes on to discuss how problems interact and create a “mess,” which is a problem made 
up of other problems and is larger than the sum of its constituent problems. The chapter 
therefore, adopting from Hester and Adams, discusses why this study is more than merely trying 
to solve a single problem. 
Chapter 4 lays out the methodological framework, fuzzy cognitive mapping, as well as 
the problem structuring proposed by Hester and Adams. The chapter shows how this study seeks 
to model abstractions of the nuclear weapons problems and “mess” within an abstraction of the 
real-world system. It furthermore discusses the specifics of the model, including its rationale 
behind using the sigmoid transfer function (as opposed to a bivalent or trivalent function) as well 
as using a Likert-type scale (as opposed to a truly continuous scale). The chapter also provides 
easy-to-follow simulation examples. 
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Chapter 5 attempts to model Problem 1, which states that nuclear-armed states are 
resistant to disarmament, while significant portions of the world desire a nuclear-free 
international system. In doing so it first articulates the problem, providing a background 
discussion on disarmament, deterrence, and arms control, as well as political realism. It then 
methodologically goes through six problem parameters (who, what, why, where, how, and when) 
including qualitative reasoning for each quantitative link between model components. It finally 
tests the model’s stability by running a hypothetical test. In this case, it gives the International 
Atomic Energy Agency the preponderance of power to solve the problem. Doing so, however, 
would commit the Type IV error by taking the decision away from nuclear weapons states. In 
this scenario, nuclear weapon states would likely drop out of safeguards agreements and 
demonstrate that international governance is less feasible than initially thought. 
Chapter 6 attempts to model Problem 2, which states that there is a disagreement as to 
how much international governance is necessary to ensure verification of online, peaceful 
nuclear programs. It articulates the problem with a discussion on nuclear safeguards and the 
theoretical background that makes safeguards agreements possible. It repeats the previous 
chapter’s who, what, why, where, how, and when structure, providing link justification. It finally 
performs a stability test by ensuring nuclear weapons states’ sovereignty is not affected and that 
nuclear security is initially maximized. This solution, too, exposes a Type IV error because 
Outlier States are strongly opposed and therefore unlikely to disarm and are unlikely to agree to 
future disarmament treaties unless they have a seat at the table. 
Therefore, Chapter 7 stacks Problem 1 and Problem 2 on top of each other and 
restructures the “mess” to account for the role nuclear weapons play between the problems, 
providing link update justifications. It then runs six scenarios to test whether or not nuclear 
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weapons can be removed from the system. It finds that nations can disarm given that certain 
steps are taken. First, there can be no lasting reduction in nuclear weapons states’ sovereignty. 
Second, a disarmament treaty must be limited in its scope and contain a clause for withdrawal. 
Third, Outlier States must be engaged. When all three steps are taken, states can begin the 
process of disarmament. 
Chapter 8 begins by acknowledging the possible Type IV error. That is, we cannot be 
certain that we can avoid World War III in a disarmed world. At the very least we cannot be 
certain we can avoid war between the US and China if each state loses its deterrent capability. 
Therefore, it acknowledges that the present time is not the right time to negotiate to 
disarmament. There are certain international realities that must be dealt with before we can avoid 
the Type IV error. It then discusses how the ability for former nuclear weapons states to re-
proliferate might maintain stability in a disarmed world through two ways. First, re-proliferation 
will cause states in conflict to de-escalate to avoid suffering a nuclear war. Second, the threat of 
proliferation can be used to solve conflicts because the cost of proliferation is high if one wants 
to achieve a mutual assured destruction between states. The chapter finally addresses remaining 
uncertainties. First, Outlier States cannot be certain they will be rewarded for cooperation. 
History has shown that sometimes former rogue states are punished, despite giving up their 
nuclear programs. Getting them to trust the major powers will be difficult. Second, it cannot be 
certain that negotiations towards disarmament will be in good faith. The DPRK, for example, 
might try to misrepresent its preferences in order to get a better—or avoid the worst—outcome. 
Lastly, this study addresses and acknowledges variation in outcome by using different simulation 
types and attempts to overcome this limitation. Lastly, Chapter 9 summarizes the study and its 
findings, offering a discussion about the study’s implications and the future of nuclear weapons. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
2.1 The Costs of Nuclear Conflict 
Previously the threat of a limited nuclear war, where both sides limit the number of 
nuclear warheads used during conflict,47 was thought to most likely occur between India and 
Pakistan.48 In 2017 there was heightened reason to suspect the United States and North Korea as 
potential candidates due in large part to escalating tensions brought about by the 2017 Korean 
Crisis. This chapter sets the stage for the challenges modeled and analyzes in the rest of the study 
by examining in detail the literature on nuclear deterrence and its limitations.  
The probability of deterrence breaking down between the US and North Korea was 
arguably not zero in 2017, and the costs of a nuclear war are sufficiently high to warrant a 
serious discussion about the future utility of nuclear arsenals. This chapter demonstrates that 
nuclear deterrence can break down in at least four non-mutually exclusive ways. First, two 
players suffer from mutual uncertainty. If each side believes it will suffer a first strike, each has 
incentive to preempt nuclear war by attacking first. Second, either side might suffer from threat 
incredulity. If either side believes the deterrent threat made by the other is unbelievable it can 
therefore believe the costs of a second strike are tolerable. Third, conventional wars between 
nuclear powers can escalate to nuclear war if either side believes losing is synonymous with 
dying. Finally, either side can suffer a nuclear terrorist attack. While the probability of nuclear 
                                                
47 Jeff A. Larsen and James M. Smith, Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament 
(Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2005), 128. 
48 For example, see Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon, “Local Nuclear War, Global Suffering,” 
Scientific American 302, no. 1 (2010): 74-81 and Adam J. Liska, Tyler R. White, Eric R. Holley, 
and Robert J. Oglesby, “Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Climate: Probability, Increasing Risks, 
and Perception,” Environment 59 no. 4 (2017): 25. 
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terrorism is low, if an incident occurred there is no return address for retaliation, leaving the 
attacked state few options outside retaliating against the state suspected of giving rise to the 
nuclear terrorist. Furthermore, it is possible a nuclear terrorist attack can resemble an attack by a 
nuclear regime.  
The effects of a nuclear war between the US and North Korea (or any other two nuclear-
armed states) would be catastrophic, affecting the global climate, severely stressing societies, 
and pushing individuals to their psychological breaking points. This literature review suggests 
the effects of these consequences would likely compel a serious discussion about the future of 
deterrence and thus nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if the bulk of the scientific literature 
estimates intolerable global consequences following a limited or total nuclear war, then it is 
reasonable to suggest disarmament talks can be taken seriously now, rather than following 
catastrophe. The evidence presented through the literature provides states and societies the 
means by which to have a serious discussion about disarmament. While this project in no way 
predicts the outcome of that discussion, it does show that serious discussion can be achieved 
without suffering through costly nuclear wars. 
 
2.2 Korean and US Limited Nuclear War 
In 2007 George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn reinvigorated the 
disarmament conversation because deterrence does not apply to accidental or unauthorized 
nuclear weapons use or miscalculation.49 They explicitly allow for the possibility of nuclear war 
between the US and North Korea and between nuclear states in general. Particularly as new 
proliferation occurs, the system can become less stable. The Donald Trump Administration and 
                                                
49 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear 
Weapons," Wall Street Journal (New York, N.Y.), January 04, 2007. 
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Kim Jong Un during the Korean Crisis (2017 – present) appeared to be heightening nuclear 
tensions and diminishing deterrence stability, forming what could have become a limited nuclear 
war. For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed any nuclear war between these regimes will be 
limited due to North Korea’s finite stockpile and capabilities, relative to the US. 
As of 2014 the United States has roughly 4,650 nuclear weapons either stockpiled or 
deployed in addition to another 2,700 weapons awaiting dismantlement.50 This includes land-
based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs), and strategic warheads that can be loaded onto heavy bombers. US warhead yields 
range from the 10 ton “Davy Crocket” device to the 15-MT Castle Bravo. Estimates as of July 
2017 suggest North Korea has zero deployed nuclear warheads. It is uncertain how many non-
deployed, stockpiled weapons North Korea currently possesses;51 however, US estimates suggest 
North Korea has as many as 60 warheads.52 NORSTAR seismic testing estimates North Korea’s 
largest nuclear test on September 3, 2017 produced a yield of approximately 250-KT.53 
Due to the US’s reliance on proportionate response—a guarantee of a second strike 
retaliation proportionate to the opposing side’s first strike—and the current lack of evidence of 
North Korean weapons larger than 250-KT, this analysis does not believe a limited nuclear war 
                                                
50 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "US Nuclear Forces, 2014," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 70, no. 1 (2014): 86. 
51 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of 
American Scientists, July 8, 2007, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-
forces/. 
52 Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima, and Anna Fifield, “North Korea now making missile-ready 
nuclear weapons, U.S. analysts say,” The Washington Post, August 8, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-
ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-
b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.8d46b85aaab2. 
53 “The nuclear explosion in North Korea on 3 September 2017: A revised magnitude 
assessment,” NORSTAR, September 12, 2017, https://www.norsar.no/press/latest-press-
release/archive/the-nuclear-explosion-in-north-korea-on-3-september-2017-a-revised-magnitude-
assessment-article1548-984.html. 
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would necessarily escalate to megaton-sized weapons. However, any limited nuclear war 
between the US and North Korea would be devastating in terms of human casualties.  
Nuclear deterrence along those lines of direct human fatalities has held the peace for 
decades; however, at least four scenarios show how nuclear war could break out between the 
two, escalating each side to at least attempt to use weapons with yields upwards of 250-KT: 
mutual uncertainty, non-credible threats, escalation of conventional warfare, and response to 
nuclear terrorism. 
 
Mutual Uncertainty 
Deterrence can break down if either side believes it will be struck first—what Schelling 
calls “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”54 Schelling illustrates this dilemma with an armed 
burglar and an armed homeowner. If both the burglar and homeowner draw their weapons 
against each other, then the burglar fears the homeowner will shoot first. The homeowner fears 
the burglar will shoot first. Because both sides prefer to live, the fear of the burglar shooting first 
makes it necessary for the homeowner to shoot first, and vice versa. Under anarchy, where no 
police force can arrest either side for shooting first, constraint cannot be seen as a rational move. 
Morrow reemphasizes this, adopting from Schelling. His model suggests if either side believes it 
will be struck first, it has incentive to launch a first strike because the costs of receiving a first 
strike are greater than the costs of receiving a second strike.55 
 
                                                
54 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), 217. 
55 James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 180. 
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If relations between the United States and North Korea had devolved into a nuclear 
standoff, Donald Trump may have feared Kim Jong Un was planning to strike first. Kim Jong Un 
may have also feared Donald Trump was planning a first strike. Because the costs of receiving a 
first strike are potentially higher than receiving a second strike—given both sides have 
contingency delivery systems—both sides have incentive to launch a first strike, potentially 
curtailing the other side’s retaliatory capabilities. If North Korea believed the Trump 
Administration was planning to launch a first strike, North Korea could have launched more 
attacks against the US if it strikes first.  
 
Non-credible Threats 
During the Cold War deterrence provided stability through the concept of mutual assured 
destruction (MAD). Using nuclear weapons against the other was unthinkable because, due to 
each side’s second-strike capabilities, “the expectation of retaliation would surely constrain his 
hand.”56 On the other hand, asymmetric capabilities can break down deterrence through a 
process of major or minor, non-mortal miscalculations that can lead to general or total war, such 
as threatening the enemy.57 If one state makes non-credible threats towards the other, each side 
might find itself over the brink. Morrow notes that a rational first strike could occur if one side 
believes it can take out the other side’s retaliatory capabilities.58 A first strike can be rational if 
the opposing side threatens painful retaliation, and the retaliatory threat is be non-credible. 
 
                                                
56 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1959), 185. 
57 Schelling (1966), 97-99. 
58 Morrow, 181. 
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If North Korea’s retaliatory threats against the US were non-credible, and if Trump 
believed he could disarm North Korea by launching a first strike then a first strike becomes more 
likely. Given available unclassified information, such an attack would likely see warheads 
launched against about a dozen sites, including known launch pads and fissile material 
enrichment facilities.59 Nevertheless, there is circumstantial evidence that North Korea, aware 
that its launch pads are “JDAM bait,” is using its missile launches from aboveground pads to 
distract attention from a covert silo program.60 If undetected silos exist then even 15 or so 1-MT 
weapons might be insufficient to disarm North Korea, allowing for a North Korean second-strike 
volley. Furthermore, this possibility takes on a familiar and unsettling calculus. If North Korea 
believed the US was planning a preemptive strike to take out its first strike capabilities, it has 
incentive to use those capabilities before a US first strike. In other words, mutual uncertainty and 
non-credible threats accelerates the risk of nuclear war. 
 
Escalation of Conventional Warfare 
A minor armed confrontation can escalate to a larger war because it signals that both 
sides are risk accepting.61 On the other hand, Kenneth Waltz argues nuclear weapons provide 
robust stability, writing that when two nuclear powers engage in conventional warfare, each side 
is likely to draw back and offer concessions out of fear of nuclear escalation.62 While the formal 
                                                
59 North Korea has several bases, facilities, research centers, and testing sites. “North Korea 
Facilities: Missile Map,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.nti.org/gmap/missile_north_korea.html. 
60 On the other hand, there is no direct evidence of such a program. Ralph Savelsberg and James 
Kiessling, “Was North Korea’s July 4th Surprise A Mobile Launched ICBM?” Breaking 
Defense, July 21, 2017, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/was-north-koreas-july-4th-
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logic of this argument is sound, concession does not always offer the highest possible reward. 
Furthermore, risk accepting behavior can escalate a larger war to nuclear brinkmanship, 
particularly given that one side has everything to lose by conceding from the conflict. It is 
possible that a given conventional war is a zero sum war, where at least one side has intense 
resolve to achieve a specific goal, such as the overthrow of the existing regime. In such a case, if 
concessions do not increase the probability of survival, but rather bolster the other side’s goals, 
then the potentially willing side becomes unwilling to concede. If the losing side believes death 
is inevitable by conceding but has a small chance of survival by going nuclear, then using 
nuclear weapons is the more rational move. To illustrate this consider two states. State A and 
State B are fighting a conventional war. Both states have nuclear capabilities. State A’s 
unmovable goal is to eliminate State B. State B is losing the war. State B can concede, where 
death has a probability of 1, or it can launch a nuclear attack against State A, where death has a 
probability of less than 1. State B’s best option is to go nuclear, where the probability of survival 
is some number greater than zero. 
Donald Trump announced during his first prepared address to the United Nations in 
September 2017, the US has “no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.”63 This statement is 
likely tailored to leave little room for misinterpretation. While it could be mere rhetoric, it is 
certainly possible that a minor armed confrontation, such as a Naval and ground-based blockade 
of North Korea, can escalate to ship-to-ship and cross-border fighting. Given Trump’s public 
position, it is likely such an escalation will serve as a pretext for a larger military campaign. 
While a conventional war will likely be painful for both sides, the odds of a North Korean 
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victory are low. Even if Kim considers concession, he will have to weigh that option against the 
inevitability of a subsequent continued war until he is out of power. The other option is to inflict 
extraordinary pain on the United States by going nuclear, which provides a small sliver of hope 
that Kim will survive if Trump takes the realist position and decides Korea is “The wrong war, at 
the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”64 In this event, the breakdown 
of deterrence brings up the possibility of mutual uncertainty and non-credible threats 
incentivizing Trump to go nuclear first. 
 
Terrorism as a Pretext for Deterrence Breakdown 
Schultz, et al, identifies the “most alarming” risk of unauthorized use—terrorism. Nunn 
elaborated in October 2008, arguing, “I’m much more concerned about a terrorist without a 
return address that cannot be deterred than I am about deliberate war between nuclear powers. 
You can’t deter a group who is willing to commit suicide. We are in a different era. You have to 
understand the world has changed.”65 On the other hand, the risk of nuclear terrorism is low, 
while a nuclear conflict between the US and North Korea might be somewhat more likely. 
Matthew Bunn constructs a mathematical model of the risk of nuclear terrorism. He argues the 
probability is low. The terrorist group would first need to acquire the bomb by directly stealing a 
weapon, acquiring one from an insider, purchasing one on the black market, or receiving one 
from a state. It would then need to transform it into a working bomb (if it receives an unfinished 
weapon or materials). It would next need to transport the bomb without detection. Finally it 
                                                
64 This Korean War-era quote is from Omar Bradley, “Military Situation in the Far East” 
(hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 2, p. 732, May 15, 1951). 
65 Beth Maclin, “A nuclear weapon-free world is possible, Nunn says,” Belfer Center for Science 
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would need to decide to actually use the weapon. Each of these scenarios has some level of 
probability. When taken together the probability of a terroristic nuclear attack is very low.66  
On the other hand, low probability events happen often. People win multimillion-dollar 
lotteries and meteorites impact the earth on a regular basis, despite the odds against any given 
person winning or any given rock colliding with the earth. In the improbable event that a terrorist 
organization acquires a nuclear weapon, nuclear terrorism can break down deterrence in two 
ways. 
First, a terrorist organization can proliferate through the willing or unwilling help of a 
nuclear regime. Nuclear weapons are unlikely to be built by the terror group, leading them to 
seek to acquire by theft or from inside or outside agents. Given that the group proliferates and 
detonates the device against the US, it is likely US intelligence agencies will attempt to trace the 
origins of the weapon back to the country where it was built. If North Korea attempts to sell 
nuclear materials on the black market, if a rogue North Korean soldier steals a weapon and sells 
it, or if a criminal agent or group is able to steal materials from unsecure caches and sell them, 
then the US is likely to punish North Korea, potentially including the use of nuclear retaliation. 
Because terrorists do not have a return address, and because of the high emotional response to a 
nuclear terrorist attack, it is likely the US will punish North Korea in some way. Donald Trump 
might use such an event as pretext to a nuclear attack in hopes of decapitating the North. 
Second, nuclear terrorism can break down deterrence because a nuclear terrorist attack 
might resemble an attack carried out by a nuclear regime. If a terrorist group proliferates and 
charters a fishing vessel to a US military installation on a small island in the western Pacific 
Ocean, detonating the weapon would appear suspiciously similar to Kim Jong Un’s threat to 
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attack Guam during summer 2017. The initial response, prior to intelligence investigation, would 
likely be to retaliate against the most likely aggressor. If the Trump Administration believes it is 
under direct nuclear attack by North Korea, it will likely retaliate before the criminal 
investigation draws its conclusions. 
 
2.3 Effects of a Limited Nuclear War  
Alex Wellerstein’s “NUKEMAP,” hosted by the College of Arts and Letters, Stevens 
Institute of Technology, allows users to simulate nuclear detonations anywhere on the planet. 
Using two potential candidate cities for nuclear strikes, a single round volley using 150-KT 
airburst detonations directed at Pyongyang, North Korea and Honolulu, Hawaii results in an 
estimated three quarters of a million direct fatalities, with half a million in Pyongyang. Total 
injured exceeds a million. The ionizing radiation ring for such an explosion is 1.35 km2, where 
the fatality rate is estimated at 95%.67 These numbers do not account for indirect fatalities 
injuries due to panic-induced mass migration or separation from medical treatment. Further, 
direct and indirect fatalities during the initial day or so after an attack do not reflect the total 
impact of nuclear warfare. Climate changes, social pressures, and psychological pressures create 
a perfect storm of human tragedy likely to significantly outlast the nuclear war. 
 
Climate 
Throughout the Cold War, where the concept of nuclear war was total rather than limited, 
experiments and models gave rise to a secondary, and perhaps more devastating, effect of 
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nuclear war. The term “Nuclear Winter” entered the popular lexicon to describe the effects of 
nuclear explosions setting fire to large quantities of organic and inorganic compounds, resulting 
in millions of tons of black carbon rising to high altitudes and diffusing throughout the 
stratosphere where it would block significant portions of sunlight from reaching the ground, 
causing global temperatures to drop to sub-freezing levels, even during the summer months.68 
Following this, vegetation would die off and agriculture would largely come to an end. While the 
theory was not error-proof,69 the bulk of research suggests that more robust modeling overcame 
Nuclear Winter’s theoretical uncertainties.70 Following the Cold War the risks of Nuclear Winter 
subsided, but some contemporary models suggest even a small nuclear war could have a 
devastating impact on the climate.71 While the risk of total nuclear war has decreased following 
the end of the Cold War, the concept of limited nuclear war gave rise to the term “Nuclear 
Autumn.” 
In 2017 Liska, et al, explore the effects of a limited nuclear war on climate change. They 
find that a limited nuclear war, during which dozens of small to large nuclear warheads are 
exchanged between two or more states, has the potential to cause significant burning of 
structures, vegetation, or other organic or polymer-based matter, potentially releasing upwards of 
5 million tons of black carbon into the atmosphere. The impacts on the climate would be drastic, 
with a resultant impact on human survival. First, agricultural growing seasons could be reduced 
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by about a month or a month and a half each year for the next five years. Second, global 
temperatures could decrease for the next quarter century. Third, there could be an immediate dip 
in global temperatures to a low not observed in a millennium. Fourth, precipitation brought by 
Asian monsoons could decrease by 20-80%, which could result in much drier climates in the 
Americas, Africa, and Australia, causing, what they call, a “global nuclear drought.” Finally, the 
reduction in available food could cause a billion people to die from starvation and increase 
violence in acutely affected regions as resources become scarcer.72 
Liska, et al, expand upon a model proposed by Toon, et al, in 2007. Toon argues fires 
resulting from nuclear explosions in “megacities,” or densely populated urban areas, from a 
nuclear exchange consisting of 100 15-KT weapons could release 1 to 5 million tons of black 
carbon into the atmosphere. They argue this will cause surface temperatures, rainfall, and the 
length of agricultural growing seasons to be greatly affected. The result is severely decreased 
agricultural production and subsequent famines lasting over a decade.73 Toon’s model assumes a 
large exchange of relatively small (by today’s standards) nuclear weapons. Liska, et al, note 
today’s nuclear weapons are usually 6 to 330 times larger than those dropped on Japan and that 
“The use of only one 5-MT land-based missile deployed by China could burn an area similar in 
size to that of one hundred 15-KT explosions.”74 In other words, increasing yield and decreasing 
the number of weapons in a nuclear exchange overcomes Toon’s unlikely scenario. 
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The models predicting the effects of nuclear war, limited or otherwise, on the climate are 
not perfectly certain. Detractors might argue there have been no catastrophic climate variances 
following roughly 2,000 nuclear tests since 1945. On the other hand the bulk of previous nuclear 
weapons testing was conducted “in the U.S. Southwest desert, on small tropical islands, at high 
altitudes, or underground,”75 where there is little organic material, oxygen, or fuel to burn. 
Therefore, previous weapons testing offers little evidence to rebut the claimed effects of nuclear 
detonations on the climate, but it also offers little evidence to support the claims. Furthermore, 
scientific models simulating the effects of limited or total nuclear wars cannot be verified with 
independent evidence for the obvious ethical, logistical, and legal reasons, including that doing 
so would violate the provisions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits all nuclear tests 
except those performed under ground. 
The lack of independent evidence does not mean the theories of Nuclear Winter or 
Nuclear Autumn is merely hypothetical. Robock and Toon seek out analogous evidence through 
the study of historical events that released substantial amounts of particles into the atmosphere. 
Burned cities, massive volcanic eruptions, large forest fires, and asteroid-earth collisions, such as 
the Yucatán Peninsula impact event that caused the extinction of the dinosaurs, can all be 
examined. Additionally, they argue the seasonal cycle is a natural simulation of the effects of 
reduced solar input.76 A 2017 article in Forbes further states studying the effects of massive 
volcanic eruptions that burned sufficient vegetation or structures offers some insight. David 
Bressan highlights eruptions in Indonesia, Central America, and Iceland as candidates for 
causing the “Little Ice Age” during the 1200s, as well as an eruption in Indonesia in 1815 that 
caused the “Year without a Summer” in 1816, which spanned Eastern and Northern America to 
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Western Europe.77 The 1815 eruption reddened the American sky, causing May and June frosts 
at higher elevations that triggered crop failures, thus reducing food supplies.78 
The question is not whether or not nuclear explosions over metropolitan areas will affect 
the climate; the question is to what degree will it affect the climate. Robock, et al, modeled the 
effects of a regional nuclear war in 2007, finding the subsequent release of fine ash into the 
atmosphere cooled the global climate by 1.25 degrees Celsius,79 which is a full degree cooler 
than the first year effect of the 1815 eruption on the global climate, with comparable effects on 
global temperatures through 1818.80 
In summary, previous simulations both during and after the Cold War suggest a nuclear 
war, limited or total, will set fire to massive swaths of land. These fires will burn forests, 
structures, vegetation, and other organic and inorganic materials. The fires will likely produce 
fine black carbon ash that will rise into the atmosphere and block portions of solar rays for 
prolonged periods of time, resulting in cooler ground temperatures, shorter growing seasons, and 
drier climates, ultimately leading to greatly reduced crop yields lasting years. These affects are a 
function of total yield during the nuclear exchange—meaning total nuclear wars will likely lead 
to a Nuclear Winters and limited nuclear wars will lead to Nuclear Autumns. The effects on the 
climate are furthermore inescapable from social and psychological effects. 
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Social Disruptions  
A limited nuclear war, while not as deadly as a total nuclear war, will acutely result in 
massive human casualties. While the social effects are not as immediately recognizable as global 
climate effects, they have potential for global consequences. In 1975 Dr. Richard Garwin 
testified before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security 
Agreements, suggesting a limited nuclear exchange between the US and the Soviet Union would 
result in 16 million American dead.81 The committee found this number to be unacceptable.82 
Since 1975 technological innovations have possibly driven this number up, although Toon, et al, 
predict the US would suffer 4 million fatalities.83 The number of civilians killed in the blast, 
however, is not the whole picture of potential casualties and fatalities. To illustrate the potential 
impact, a novelist hypothesized a nuclear detonation over New Delhi in 2008, predicting the 
mass movement of millions of people, suffering from burn wounds and other injuries and 
seeking medical attention in an environment with essentially zero clean food or potable water.84 
Detractors might point to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the residents’ subsequent failure to 
migrate to rebut the claim that human beings will move en masse. On the other hand Japanese 
residents did not understand the radiological risks associated with returning to ground zero. 
Present-day knowledge of the negative health effects of radiation greatly increases the chances 
that mass human migrations will occur. 
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Other potential immediate and long-term effects include disrupting travel and shipping 
lanes, causing increased risk of cancer in areas near the explosions, and stymying entire fishing 
industries within a hundred miles or more of the affected coasts. Furthermore, the international 
community’s trust in the nuclear-armed states will be greatly diminished. 
More acutely important for survivors, even a limited nuclear war will result in decreased 
food supplies due to climate changes, as identified in the previous section. Food supplies can 
also be reduced because fallout will likely settle in farmlands, eradiating crops and livestock.85 
This will be especially painful to contemporary survivors of nuclear war that have eschewed 
Cold War-era unofficial policies of stockpiling non-perishable food products.86 Economic 
structures risk collapse with mass migration and the large-scale destruction of industry, as well 
as the inability of banks to collect mortgages and insurance companies unable to cover the costs 
necessary to rebuild.87 
It is likely some states will fail, particularly weak states or states acutely affected by 
nuclear war, plunging their societies into anarchy. With the aforementioned decrease in food 
supplies, society may turn to lawlessness because they will not be able to depend upon the state 
to provide basic food security. States unable to fulfill this basic role of food guarantor are often 
states making the failed state list.88 Economic damages listed previously are likely to incense 
political stresses. The state’s difficulty at collecting taxes may create a feedback loop where 
distrust of government will further divorce the citizen from the state, leading to more tax-
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collecting difficulties. This feedback loop could affect every aspect of government—its ability to 
repair broken water, electric, and communication lines; provide emergency services; treat the 
acutely radiated, people suffering related injuries after the explosions, and people suffering 
unrelated injuries and illnesses; and provide securities from neighboring states or groups wishing 
to exploit the chaos to secure resources for themselves. 
In acutely affected regions, a final consequence of nuclear explosions is temporary or 
long-term damage to electrical systems, electronics, communication lines, and entire power 
grids. Electrical systems that survive initial blasts might be disrupted or taken off line by a blast 
effect known as an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMPs can cause physical damage to electrical 
or electronic systems by shorting capacitors or burning out transistors. Additionally, systems can 
suffer temporary disruptions. These disruptions might then disrupt entire power grids and take 
them off line, requiring manual labor to restore electricity and communications. EMP strength is 
a product of weapon size, number of weapons, and where they are detonated (air bursts produce 
smaller EMPs than ground bursts).89 While there is little evidence of EMPs posing health risks to 
human beings, social disruptions might be further intensified by long- or short-term power 
failures and communications systems malfunctions. 
In the case of a nuclear exchange between the United States and North Korea, it can be 
hypothesized that the peninsula will be partly uninhabitable. The blasts might kill between 
100,000 and 1 million Koreans. Large-scale migration of survivors into China, Japan, and the 
South Pacific is likely, including Australia. With a combined population of roughly 75 million, it 
is reasonable to assume 10 to 20 percent of the peninsula’s population will migrate—in other 
words between 7,500,000 and 15,000,000 migrants. It is possible the international community 
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can handle this migrant crisis easier than it could the Middle Eastern migrant crisis of 2015 to 
present, due to South Koreans sharing some of the same cultural values of the West and the 
North Koreans being seen as innocent victims of an oppressive regime, liberated by the West. 
This is unlikely for several reasons. First, can the West share? Due to the aforementioned 
decrease in available food resources globally, host nations could feel squeezed as the threat of 
starvation increases, particularly in acutely affected states. Second, as the Middle Eastern 
migrant crisis demonstrated in Europe, mass migration is correlated with the rise of 
nationalism,90 which could be exacerbated by diminishing food supplies. In other words, sharing 
will likely be prioritized for in-group nationalities. Third, a shift towards nationalism amid a 
massive influx of Korean (and possibly Chinese and Japanese) migrants could potentially fulfill 
Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations hypothesis that future conflicts will be between 
societies of differing civilizational values.91 That is, a rise of nationalism sparked by diminishing 
food supplies and an influx of foreign nationals of differing ethnic and racial backgrounds could 
establish identities along ethnic lines, which could inflame racial tensions and increase crime. 
In summary, a limited nuclear war will likely cause massive social disruptions, including 
mass human migrations either away from irradiated sites or towards food resources; failed states; 
and the rise of nationalism and clashes between disparate ethnic or racial groups. Furthermore, 
EMP blasts produced by nuclear weapons detonations causing long- or short-term power failures 
might exasperate social stresses. In the case of a limited nuclear war between the United States 
and North Korea, it can be assumed millions of Koreans will flee the peninsula, exasperating 
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tensions and resource struggles. All of these social disruptions will likely be made worse due to 
the effects of nuclear explosions on the climate. 
 
Psychological Pressures  
Surviving a nuclear war could have severe psychological impacts on human beings. As 
demonstrated during the subsequent decades following the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
surviving civilians sensed “personal vulnerability, helplessness, guilt, isolation and fear.”92 
Helplessness and vulnerability are exasperated because nuclear attacks are extraordinarily 
difficult to defend against. If deterrence breaks down and a limited (or total) nuclear war is 
fought between two or more states, survivors have no expectation that deterrence can hold in the 
future. The fear of another volley of nuclear explosions will likely fill survivors with intense 
anxiety that the state cannot subside, no matter how robust it is in the aftermath. Survivor’s guilt 
is another psychological response to witnessing “massive death and suffering,” manifesting in 
“the cessation of normal human feelings.”93 Survivor’s guilt develops if survivors of large-scale 
tragedies “believe they should not have survived or that they did something wrong by making it 
through the traumatic event” because “people overestimate their preexisting, predictive 
knowledge of the event.”94 In the event of a nuclear war, survivors might believe they could have 
done more to pressure their governments to practice restraint or take disarmament talks seriously. 
These feelings might be intensified if the survivor is a citizen of a democratic state and voted for 
the leader that gave the order to launch a first strike. This feeling could become so intense that 
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the survivor is incapable of social and economic performance.95 On the other hand at least one 
anecdotal story from Hiroshima suggests survivor guilt is not universal, calling it an odd concept 
because it suggests “the idea that to be alive was a deviation from the norm of death and 
desolation.”96 
While any reconstruction would depend on uninjured survivors, these citizens might be 
suffering from severe psychological trauma that is only made worse by the climatological and 
social effects previously listed. The threat of future attacks, time spent in isolation, and dealing 
with the dead makes reconstruction more difficult, especially if the survivor re-enters a society 
that has fallen apart, is unable to rely on the government for assistance, and has limited access to 
life-sustaining resources.97 The psychological stresses from all of these new realities is likely to 
deeply impact adult survivors and affect adolescent and young childhood. 
Measuring the psychological effects of nuclear war is somewhat hypothetical; however, 
evidence exists from two main bodies of knowledge. First, psychological data was gathered from 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Second, there have been numerous large-scale natural and man-made 
disasters where psychological responses have been studied.98 Contemporarily, data can be 
collected from failed states or collapsed societies, such as Aleppo or Mosul. Other sources of 
evidence include the 1990s siege of Sarajevo, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and the Great 
Chinese Famine during the 1950s and early 1960s. While studying these effects are on the 
relatively small scale of trauma, patterns of human behavior might emerge that confirm what can 
be expected following a disaster at the nuclear magnitude. 
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Using the January 2010 magnitude 7.0 earthquake in Haiti as an example, numerous 
studies have examined its psychological consequences. For example, one study suggests roughly 
37% of respondents experienced post-traumatic stress disorder, roughly 26% suffered 
depression, and roughly 13% suffered both.99 Another study suggests these symptoms persisted 
at least 4 months following the earthquake.100 Another study suggests children in Haiti, 
regardless of distance from the earthquake’s epicenter, were sometimes twice as likely to suffer 
from trauma, anxiety, or depression.101 If human psychology works to scale or larger-than-scale 
it can reasonably be assumed that the psychological trauma of a limited nuclear war will greatly 
surpass trauma from an incredibly destructive earthquake. 
 
2.4 Recovery and International Conversation 
Any discussion between nuclear states about test bans, arms control, and disarmament is 
usually met with skepticism at best and ridicule at worst, but there is evidence that unlikely 
discussions can emerge from human tragedy. Following the US and Soviet Unions’ testing of 
thermonuclear weapons, testing accelerated, despite an international effort to reach a universal 
partial test ban. It was not until 1954, when the US accidentally irradiated Japanese fishermen 
aboard the ironically named Lucky Dragon that test ban talks were taken seriously. The 
fishermen were roughly 100 miles away from the 15-MT Castle Bravo nuclear test. Despite their 
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distance radiation from the explosion killed one sailor, and the crew suffered from acute 
radiation syndrome and severe dermal injuries. This incident was the third time in less than a 
decade that the US irradiated Japanese civilians (the first two occurring in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki). This event spurred the international community, led by the Japanese Diet and the 
non-aligned movement, to seriously debate the legality of aboveground nuclear testing. Public 
opinion across the international community eventually pressured the US and the Soviet Union to 
sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty.102 
Following a nuclear war there might also be domestic pressures influencing governments 
to take disarmament talks seriously. While North Korea and less-than-democratic regimes might 
be somewhat immune from the people’s will, surviving democracies might face tremendous 
pressure to prevent a recurrence of nuclear exchange. With deterrence no longer a security 
guarantor through MAD, the populace might demand assurance that nuclear tragedy never 
happens again.103 Among the surviving democratic states, analogous evidence takes several 
forms. 
First, recent research suggests residing near the scene of a mass shooting makes the threat 
of gun violence more profound in the consciousness of the resident. This is coupled then with a 
heightened demand that governments take gun control debates seriously.104 In the event of a 
nuclear war, limited or otherwise, distance from the epicenter collapses as a variable. In the age 
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of ICBMs, strategic bombers, and SLBMs, the “bad guy with a gun” does not need to be lurking 
at the dark end of the street; rather, an attack can be initiated from any silo, near or far; any point 
in the vast oceans; or any airstrip. The threat of future nuclear wars becomes salient in the minds 
of voters because the dark end of the street is quite literally anywhere. 
Second, Robert Pape’s work in suicide terrorism research highlights a peculiar strategic 
logic of the suicidal terrorist as applied to democracies, and his conclusion is not without merit. 
A suicide terrorist can detonate a suicide vest if detected, eliminating the possibility of 
deterrence. This coupled with the fact that suicidal terror is difficult to predict or prevent, makes 
the threat very real in the minds of voters. Suicide terrorists furthermore have more success 
targeting the civilians of democratic regimes because the voting bloc demands security that 
might be elusive without bowing to the terror organization.105 Israel, for example, is much more 
likely to give into the demands of terrorist groups than an authoritarian regime. Following 
nuclear war the voting bloc might demand the regime take disarmament talks seriously because 
security is elusive with nuclear weapons. 
Third, seemingly improbable events can take place following massive traumatic events. 
Following World War II Europe’s political landscape, once dominated by the balance of power, 
transformed into one of unity and integration. The traumatic effects of the rise of nationalism 
gave way to the emergence of the foundation that would become the European Union.106 The 
idea that anarchy could be mitigated was not taken seriously until Europe suffered the immense 
cost of non-integration. Furthermore, the risk of future wars compelled the European community 
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to integrate West Germany into the European economic fold. In other words, rather than 
punishing the vanquished, West Germany was offered a seat at the table for the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome. The integration of Europe and subsequent creation of the European Union, as 
well as other collective security and intergovernmental agencies, might not have been possible if 
not for the mass human tragedy brought by the balance of power. The balance of terror, if it were 
to break down, might oblige societies towards the very difficult disarmament conversation. 
Totalitarian and less-than-democratic regimes, while less susceptible to internal 
pressures, would still suffer many of the same consequences as democratic regimes. 
Furthermore, North Korea is likely to suffer more acutely than any other nuclear-armed state, 
given the current sociopolitical state of the world. If the state’s primary interest is self-survival, 
the newly emerged fact that deterrence can break down is a compelling reason to desire re-
stabilization by disarming. It is not unimaginable that even North Korea would willingly come to 
the discussion table if it survives a limited nuclear war. 
Should deterrence break down between the US and North Korea or between any two 
belligerents (India and Pakistan come to mind), a perfect storm of human tragedy could take 
place. First, nuclear weapons would kill potentially millions of civilians and destroy massive 
amounts of infrastructure. Second, burned carbon might rise into the atmosphere, decreasing 
global temperatures, and leading to shortened growing seasons and lowered agricultural yields. 
Third, social systems could be stressed beyond their limits. And finally, individual psychological 
pressures could be strained to their breaking points. Due to nuclear weapons affecting global 
structures, such as the environment and economies, any nuclear war, including limited, is likely 
to have global consequences. This superfecta of tragedy is likely to overcome disarmament 
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skepticism and derision. Once societies have recovered, meaningful disarmament talks could 
take place in which even totalitarian regimes might participate. 
 
2.5 Discussing Disarmament Now? 
Disarmament is a difficult conversation. The fact that there have been no meaningful total 
disarmament talks speaks to the robustness of deterrence. On the other hand, there are several 
reasons deterrence can break down, which this chapter identifies. Should deterrence fail the 
result would be catastrophic, not merely for acutely affected states and societies, but also at the 
global level. States, societies, and individuals are likely to demand preventative actions. If 
disarmament no longer guarantees security, then nuclear weapons no longer serve their basic 
function. This chapter proposes that nuclear disarmament talks are not strictly the domain of the 
catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. States and societies can have the conversation without 
suffering intense tragedy. 
Having this discussion before deterrence breaks down requires at a minimum three 
understandings. First, the logic of realist models brings us to the conclusion that nuclear weapons 
serve a function—deterrence. Deterrence serves a function—providing security. But realist 
models do not ask the questions: Can deterrence exist without nuclear weapons? Can security 
exist without deterrence? These questions are addressed in the Chapter 8, but for now, the 
questions should serve as a reminder that security is not limited by what simply works. Because 
systems can fail societies would be better to seek what works best.  
Second, serious conversations about disarmament require robust models and simulations 
in many branches of science, psychology, and sociology. Decision makers would need access to 
those models and their methodologies, including impartial teams that can explain the findings of 
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models outside the leadership’s expertise. In other words, in order to have a serious discussion, 
leaders would need to understand and accept the evidences from several fields of research. They 
should furthermore be encouraged to challenge the results with future replication models. 
Transparency at all scientific levels should serve as a trust building exercise.  
Finally, detractors might fear cheating. Any serious disarmament discussion should 
confront the potential for cheating. Acton and Perkovich suggest using the threat of cheating to 
deter cheating. That is, if the best payout either side can receive is for both sides to cooperate and 
the worst is for both sides to defect, then the threat of retaliatory cheating should compel the 
other side to cooperate.107 This does little to suggest how states can get to global zero, but it 
helps allay fears once zero has been reached.108 
With these three understandings at the table, and with the acceptance that nuclear war, 
limited or total, is unacceptable, disarmament negotiations can take place. If states generally 
prefer not fighting nuclear wars to the alternative, then it is in those states’ best interests to have 
the difficult disarmament discussion now rather than later. The evidences and models within a 
multidisciplinary scope serve as the foundation on which to begin the discussion.109 
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter asks the questions: How can deterrence break down? What would a nuclear 
war look like in the modern day? And can decision makers take nuclear disarmament talks 
seriously? This chapter examines four non-mutually exclusive models of deterrence failure: First, 
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mutual uncertainty pressures either side to strike first out of fear that they will receive a first 
strike. Second, non-credible threats can serve to encourage the stronger side to take out nuclear 
weapons sites to prevent itself from suffering an attack. Third, deterrence can break down by 
means of either side escalating conventional war, particularly if the war is zero sum. Finally, 
nuclear terrorism can lead to nuclear war due to either the attacked country retaliating against the 
host nation, or because nuclear terrorism can resemble a nuclear military attack. In other words, 
realist models of deterrence and stability are not necessarily as robust as they appear on the 
outside. These models are applied to the current crisis between North Korea and the United 
States. 
This chapter next looks to the existing literature in atmospheric sciences, sociology, and 
psychology, determining a convergence of catastrophe should nuclear war take place. Models in 
various fields, using analogous evidence in some cases, suggest the worst-case scenarios even 
with a limited nuclear confrontation. 
Finally, this chapter suggests that despite the difficulties surrounding disarmament talks, 
having a serious discussion is not unthinkable. Furthermore, simply understanding how painful a 
nuclear war would be at the global level can incentivize states and societies to have the 
discussion without first suffering through a nuclear war. It proposes that the international 
community could and should have the discussion now. If deterrence breaks down nuclear 
weapons lose all meaning above their military value. If deterrence can break down, then by what 
means do nuclear weapons have meaning now? The remainder of the dissertation uses fuzzy 
cognitive mapping models to explore the various scenarios of nuclear disarmament or not.  
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CHAPTER 3 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
This chapter discusses the background, philosophy of the methodology, and theoretical 
reasoning behind the study.  
 
3.1 Structuring the Nuclear Disarmament Problem 
This research draws heavily on systemic decision-making work by Patrick T. Hester and 
Kevin MacG. Adams. Their work in Systemic Decision Making: Fundamentals for Addressing 
Problems and Messes tackles complexity and how to think about problems and messes 
systemically. They call their approach “discipline-agnostic,” arguing their methodology can be 
applied across fields, from business to the politics of science. International relations, as a subset 
of political science, which is itself a subset of the social sciences, is rife with complex problems 
that, at face value, appear to be impossible for human beings to solve. From multinational 
conflict to refugee crises, there is no shortage of complex problems facing the globe. Perhaps one 
of the most complex problems humans face is: What do we do about nuclear weapons?  
As will be addressed in the second part of this literature review, nuclear weapons pose a 
dilemma; nuclear weapons provide security through deterrence, but nuclear weapons are so 
destructive that their use would shatter security. These are weapons of mass destruction, but a 
single total nuclear war would be so destructive that a better designation might be weapons of 
mass extinction. In other words a dialectic between security with deterrence and insecurity with 
deterrence emerges. The very thing that keeps states safe might be the thing that ultimately and 
utterly destroys states. Therefore, careful thought is necessary. 
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This chapter is divided into five subsections. First, the Think, Act, and Observe (TAO) 
approach is identified. This method is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Second, systems errors are 
discussed. Third, problems and messes are reviewed. Fourth, this research will discuss systemic 
thinking. Finally, fuzzy cognitive mapping, as a primary component of this research’s 
methodology, is discussed. Fuzzy cognitive mapping is a methodology for modeling complex 
systems and is particularly useful in social problems.  
 
Figure 3.1: Think, Act, Observe Approach (adapted from Hester and Adams) 
 
 
Systems Errors 
Hester and Adams provide a structured way to model problems big and small. It begins 
with a generalized way of understanding problems called the TAO approach, or Think, Act, and 
Observe.110 When a problem presents itself practitioners will approach the problem in three 
steps. First, think about the problem. Second, act to try to solve the problem. Third, observe the 
action’s outcome. After observation the Think phase reinitiates to understand whether the 
problem was solved. While in the real-world problems might be approached in less-than linear 
ways, this approach will serve as an approach to rational decision making, where decision 
makers have interest in the problem and its outcomes. The dialectic between security with 
deterrence and insecurity with deterrence is an enormous problem, and action should only be 
taken after careful consideration of the problem itself, devoid of systemic errors. Reasoning 
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about this problem provides many opportunities to make one or more systems errors,111 which 
could have catastrophic consequences. In Chapter 8 I will discuss feasible Type IV errors 
resultant from the model I build in Chapters 5 – 7. A list of these error types as identified by 
Hester and Adams is below. This list is not in sequential order because each error type is 
associated with a particular step in their TAO approach. The Type III error is typically associated 
with the Think step. Types IV, V, and VIII are associated with the Act step. Types I, II, and VI 
are associated with the Observe step. And Type VII is a collection of error types from any or all 
of the Think, Act, and Observe steps. 
Type III Error (γ): This error type is associated with the Think step in the TAO approach. 
Mosteller defined the Type III error in 1948, identifying it as “correctly rejecting the null 
hypothesis for the wrong reason.”112 Mitroff calls it the “error associated with solving the wrong 
problem precisely.”113 This occurs when improper thought has been dedicated to the problem. 
For the purpose of this research, an example might be solving the nuclear weapons problem by 
creating an agency of international atomic scientists to administer and house all nuclear weapons 
without governmental oversight, but finding out afterwards that it has not solved the proliferation 
problem, leading to several proliferations and re-proliferations to guarantee states’ security 
needs. 
Mitroff identifies five common causes for committing the Type III error. They include 
selecting the wrong stakeholders; limiting problem-solving options; incorrectly formulating the 
problem; narrowly defining the scope of the problem; and focusing on a specific part, the wrong 
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part, or missing connections between parts of the problem.114 Avoiding the Type III error is 
crucial, and once the correct problem has been thought about, decision makers can move onto the 
Act phase, which can lead to many other error types.115 
Type IV Error (δ): This error type is associated with the Act step in the TAO approach. 
The Type IV error occurs when a problem is solved correctly, but the effects of solving it are 
worse than the original problem. Marascuilo and Levin call this “the incorrect interpretation of a 
correctly rejected hypothesis.”116 Marascuilo and Levin use the example of “a physician's correct 
diagnosis of an ailment followed by the prescription of a wrong medicine.”117 Colloquially: “The 
cure is worse than the disease.” For the purpose of this research, one could imagine a solution to 
the nuclear weapons problem being a monolithic world government, or a Leviathan,118 that 
collapses sovereignty and imposes order over nations. While in such a system nuclear weapons 
have zero utility, the system would be so unrecognizable that it could only be accomplished 
through force and brutality against holdouts. 
Adams and Hester argue that correctly curing the disease is instrumental.119 As 
suggested, the international system following the Act step must be recognizable. Action must be 
taken within the system; the Leviathan would be to create a new, unrecognizable system that few 
would endorse.  
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Type V Error (ε): This error type is also associated with the Act step in the TAO 
approach. The Type V error occurs when a problem is correctly identified but no action is taken 
due to the erroneous belief that the problem will solve itself or go away on its own.120 Competing 
stakeholders’ inability to agree on the appropriate course of action or fear of committing the 
Type IV error could accentuate risk of the Type V error.121 The problem is that “many problems 
require intervention in order to be addressed and simply wishing for a problem to disappear on 
its own will not make it go away. There is substantial risk in not acting when action is called 
for.”122 Using a car as an analogy again, a driver notices a clicking sound when making turns. 
Rather than spending money at the mechanic’s shop for a diagnosis and potential solution, the 
driver opts to ignore the sound. A few months later the constant-velocity joint malfunctions, 
breaking the front axle, rendering the car inoperable. A small problem has become catastrophic 
because it was ignored. 
The purpose of this project is to think systematically through the nuclear weapons 
problem, ideally in a way that will identify viable solutions, and thereby help the world avoid 
Type V errors.  
Type VIII Errors (η): This error type is also associated with the Act step in the TAO 
approach. Type VIII errors occur when a correctly decided upon action is incorrectly acted upon. 
Hester and Adams note this is in contrast to willful violations of directed action, such as 
sabotage. Rather, they are the result of simple human mistakes.123 For example, in 2013 the Lac-
Mégantic derailment in Nantes, Quebec was caused when an engineer parked a train carrying 
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crude oil on an incline and then improperly tested the handbrake system. The engineer knew the 
correct brake system test procedure, and intended to apply it, but failed to carry out all necessary 
steps. 
Once types IV, V, and VIII errors have been reasonably avoided, decision makers can act 
and begin the Observation phase of the TAO approach. 
Type I (α) and Type II (β) Errors: These error types are associated with the Observe step 
in the TAO approach and were first formulated by Neyman and Pearson in 1928.124 Type I errors 
occur by rejecting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis’ condition is true (the false 
positive). A man walking alone in the woods at night can illustrate this. He hears the rustling of 
leaves and decides to turn around and go home in case there is an animal or person seeking to do 
him harm. In this case wind or a harmless rodent made the noise. The US committed a Type I 
error when it invaded Iraq partially on the incorrect belief that Saddam Hussein was 
manufacturing weapons of mass destruction 
Type II errors occur by failing to reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis’ 
actual condition is false (the false negative). Using the same analogy as above, the man hears the 
rustling of leaves and decides it must be the wind or a harmless rodent, when the actual condition 
is a brown bear seeking to eliminate a potential threat to its cubs. With nuclear weapons the US 
could make a Type II error if it assumes North Korea’s nuclear arsenal cannot survive a first 
strike attack but turns out to be wrong. 
Type I and II errors are committed due to adaptive bias. Reason is a product of human 
evolution, where humans are more likely to reason adaptively than rationally. Haselton and Buss 
posit that false positives and false negatives occur when reasoning the alternative is costly. 
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Furthermore, false negatives are more costly than false positives.125 This creates a propensity for 
the Type I error, the false positive, a phenomenon explained in social psychology as the error 
management theory. This theory suggests that if the costs of false negatives outweigh the costs of 
false positives, then there should be a bias towards false positives.126 With this in mind, it is 
reasonable to assume the man walking through the woods is more likely to commit the Type I 
error than a Type II error. 
Type VI Error (θ): This error type is also associated with the Observe step in the TAO 
approach. Holland summarizes Type VI errors: “Correlation does not imply causation…”127 In 
the TAO approach after action has been taken, practitioners might deduce that A caused B; 
however, the actual condition might be that B caused A, C might be a contributing factor to A or 
B, or the relationship between A and B could be a coincidence.128 That is, causation is not as 
simple as decision makers might assume. For example, if two students spend the night before an 
exam cramming, and if both students receive a high grade on their exam, then it is possible to 
note a correlation between cramming the night before a test and receiving high grades; however, 
this does not mean that cramming causes high grades. In international politics there is certainly a 
negative correlation between mutual assured destruction and the number of wars fought between 
superpowers. On the other hand this does not mean that nuclear weapons cause superpowers to 
keep the peace. There is only one Cold War available for observation, and establishing causation 
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would require many more Cold War observations or the impossible option to experiment by 
randomly assigning nuclear weapons to some superpower rivalries but not others. 
Type VII Error (ζ): The Type VII error is a system of errors, where types I-VI and VIII 
errors “compound to create a larger, more complex problem than originally encountered.”129 The 
consequences of Type VII errors include no longer being able to recognize the original problem, 
difficulty diagnosing the problem, decreased problem-solving resources or desire to solve the 
problem, difficulty identifying the solution, and decreased capability to solve the problem.130 The 
initial problem can become so complex with improper formulation, wrong action, and faulty 
observation that problem solving enters the realm of chaos. This is a worst-case scenario that 
should be practitioners’ largest concern.131 
Hester and Adams offer some guidance. Categorizing error types according to the TAO 
approach, practitioners can come better prepared. Type III errors are associated with thinking. In 
order to avoid making this error, the problem and its parameters must be carefully considered. 
Type IV, V, and VIII errors are associated with acting. Avoiding these errors means acting 
correctly and when warranted, correctly carrying out the action decided upon, and choosing the 
appropriate course of action. Type I, II, and VI errors are associated with observation. To avoid 
these errors practitioners should consciously consider each error type, using available statistical 
tools and careful consideration of the evidence.132 
Table 3.1 below is an illustration of the potential for making systems errors and a system 
of errors. Country A feels threatened by Country B’s expanded military capabilities. Country B 
might or might not have malicious intent behind its expanded capabilities. Regardless, Country  
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Table 3.1 Nuclear Proliferation Problem Example (adapted from Hester and Adams).133 
 
TAO	Stage	 Situation	Description	
Potential	
Errors	
Think	
Country	A	feels	its	security	is	threatened	because	
Country	B	has	expanded	its	military	capabilities.		 Type	III	
Act	
Country	A	creates	an	advisory	board	of	nuclear	
physicists	and	engineers.	
Types	IV,	V,	
VIII	
Observe	
The	board	listens	to	Country	A's	concerns	and	
collects	information	from	other	scientists	and	
engineers.	
Types	I,	II,	
VI	
Think	
Based	on	the	information	collected	from	the	leader	
and	other	sources,	the	board	reasons	about	possible	
steps	moving	forward.	The	board	recommends	
building	centrifuges	to	enrich	uranium	and	other	
materials.	 Type	III	
Act	 Country	A	invests	in	uranium	enrichment	facilities.	
Types	IV,	V,	
VIII	
Observe	
The	international	community	observes	Country	A's	
uranium	enrichment	activities	and	imposes	sanctions	
because	it	does	not	approve	of	nuclear	proliferation	
to	solve	international	disputes.	
Types	I,	II,	
VI	
Think	
Given	the	reduced	flow	of	capital	to	fund	
proliferation,	the	board	(not	wanting	to	lose	their	
jobs)	recommends	Country	A	find	alternative	
funding	through	black	market	deals	with	criminal	
enterprises.	 Type	III	
Act	
Country	A	engages	with	criminal	enterprises	to	enter	
black	markets.	
Types	IV,	V,	
VIII	
Observe	
With	new	capital	flows	Country	A	observes	it	can	
continue	its	uranium	enrichment	activities.	
Types	I,	II,	
VI	
Etc.	
Country	A	continues	to	think,	act,	and	observe.	
Meanwhile	the	original	problem	might	go	away	
(Country	B's	military	capabilities	might	no	longer	
pose	a	threat	to	Country	A),	but	the	danger	of	
recurrence	continues.	Thus,	Country	A	continues	to	
devote	resources	to	nuclear	proliferation	and	might	
eventually	successfully	test	a	nuclear	weapon.	The	
international	community	continues	to	respond	to	
Country	A’s	proliferation	attempts.	 Types	I-VIII	
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A spends resources creating a nuclear advisory board without properly thinking about Country 
B’s intent. If country A made a Type III system error, then the problem can spiral out of control 
to make a system of errors. 
The above example does not necessarily reflect reality. Some states proliferate for 
reasons other than the balance of power. Others might abandon their weapons program to avoid 
sanctions or because the nuclear taboo imposes other costs on proliferators. 
A major part of the focus of this research is to solve the nuclear weapons problem 
without committing a Type III error. That is, successfully solving this problem begins by 
analyzing the original problem formulation. Thinking about nuclear weapons systemically will 
help formulate the correct problem. In the above example, the formulated problem was that 
Country A’s security was threatened by Country B. Using realist logic it is easy to see how 
nuclear weapons have value, but if nuclear weapons solve the wrong problem precisely then 
what is an alternative problem? By formulating the correct problem the practitioner can then act, 
making sure that they act correctly and act when warranted. It is at this stage that we observe. 
Hester and Adams propose a probability function to determine the likelihood that the 
problem was correctly formulated.134 There is a probability that any given error type is 
committed in each respective step in the TOA approach. 
 
𝑃 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚
=  1− [ 1− 𝑃 𝛾 1− (𝑃 𝛿 + 𝑃 𝜀 + 𝑃(𝜂)) 1− 𝑃 𝛼 + 𝑃 𝛽 + 𝑃 𝜃 ] 
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In laymen terms, the probability that the correct problem was formulated shrinks drastically if 
any systems error types are committed. As each Think, Act, and Observe step is repeated, the 
probability of a correct problem can become quite small.  This reinforces the need to more 
carefully consider the underlying problem(s) behind why countries proliferate and presently 
refuse to disarm. 
At the extreme end of error consequences, deterrence breakdown could imply that the 
initial problem was incorrectly formulated, deterrence was incorrectly implemented, or 
deterrence was incorrectly assumed to cause security, rather than being merely correlated with 
security. A correct candidate problem might be: Country A and Country B have a dispute over 
Resource X. Despite whether or not a Type III error was made in the initial Think step, finding 
out requires observation. The major takeaway is that formulating the correct problem is of the 
utmost importance. Correctly inferring from observation is reliant on getting the problem right. 
 
Problems and Messes 
In 1967 Charles West Churchman referenced Horst Rittel as the author of the phrase 
“wicked problem.” A wicked problem, he writes, is a “class of social system problems which are 
ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision 
makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly 
confusing.”135 Rittel and Webber expanded on the idea of the wicked problem in 1973, adding 
they cannot be definitively formulated, lack a recognizable end point (unlike a game of chess, 
where both players recognize when the game is over), are ideologically driven, produce butterfly 
effect consequences over long periods of time, and cannot be solved by trial and error; but rather 
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a single attempt.136 In the systems age, discussed below, wicked problems might have 
stakeholders with divergent interests and perspectives, conditions that change rapidly, and 
difficulties that disrupt viable paths forward.137 
In order to formulate the problem correctly several steps should be taken. First, nuclear 
weapons are not part of a “machine age” problem. Instead, the problem exists in a “systems age.” 
Whereas machine age problems are simple, systems age problems are complex.138 In other 
words, disarmament is not as simple as physically dismantling nuclear weapons; rather, the 
ability for human agents to dismantle nuclear weapons requires a more holistic treatment of the 
complex system in which they exist. Agency drives complex systems; therefore, human beings 
must be included in full problem formulation.139 
Bringing humans in creates a paradox. While humans are essential parts of the system, 
and because humans have many different perspectives about reality, it is not necessarily true that 
a researcher can understand each perspective, yet understanding perspectives is necessary in the 
systems age. Bohr, therefore, proposes the principle of complementarity: “Two different 
perspectives or models about a system will reveal truths regarding the system that are neither 
entirely independent nor entirely compatible.”140 In other words, in agency-driven problems 
there are no universal realties; therefore, solving them requires some level of contextual 
understanding. 
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𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 =  𝑃!
!
!!!
 
 
where n ≠∞, and a perspective about the problem is a function of the number (i) of perspectives 
(Pi).141 
In other words, as the number of observed perspectives increases, our understanding 
increases. Perfect understanding, however, is essentially impossible, particularly because there 
are potentially 7.7 billion stakeholders affected by the existence or potential elimination of 
nuclear weapons at any given time, each with varying levels of capability, influence, and 
legitimacy. Increasing the value of contextual understanding of the major stakeholders is an 
essential and basic element to this research, but care should be taken to avoid raising the fidelity 
too much by bringing in extraneous variation (such as differences between state leaders, 
government types, etc.), which violates basic tenets of realist though (discussed later). 
Interestingly, the human perspective paradox increases a study’s validity, both in terms of 
scientific robustness and philosophical meaning. For example, the disparity between the 
perspectives of nuclear weapons proponents and abolitionists at the extremes offers this study the 
ability to collect more information that either confirms or disconfirms its hypotheses, meaning 
that hypotheses can better stand up to scientific scrutiny.142 Mitroff and Linstone expound a 
scientific appreciation for multiple perspectives. They write, “everything interacts with 
everything,” and that systemic thinking requires “the widest possible array of disciplines, 
professions, and branches of knowledge—capturing distinctly different paradigms of 
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thought…”143 Mitroff and Linstone thus capture the nuclear weapons dialectic, a la Plato and 
Aristotle at Raphael’s School of Athens. Divergent perspectives create theses and antitheses 
seeking synthesis. Jumping from the dialectic, divergent perspectives are central to Thomas 
Kuhn’s Scientific Revolutions, where anomalies in normal science give way to revolutionary 
science.144 That is, realist models of nuclear proliferation and balance of power, as discussed 
later, face anomalies in the form of disparate perspectives about nuclear weapons’ threat and 
utility. Balance of power is normal science, while contrasting perspectives inhabit revolutionary 
science in the minds of abolitionists. I can reasonably hypothesize that synthesis between the two 
paradigms is possible. 
Therefore, Hester and Adams propose a holistic approach to addressing wicked problems 
or “messes” in the systems age, where hard and soft approaches are combined. They write, “A 
hard system perspective includes notions such as objectivity, unitary viewpoints, and quantitative 
assessment; while a soft systems perspective evokes subjectivity, pluralistic perspectives, and 
qualitative assessments.”145 That is, the hard approach is technical and suited for machine age 
problems, such as systemic pressures under anarchy, while the soft approach captures socially 
constructed realities and human factors and is better suited for systems age “messes”. The 
holistic approach therefore requires the identification of the problem this research attempts to 
solve as well as its constituent problems. 
Gerald Smith identifies a problem’s three main criteria: First, a gap exists between the 
present and desired states of the world. Second, closing that gap is difficult. Third, solving the 
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problem, or closing the gap, is desirable for at least one actor.146 Sage adds a fourth criterion: At 
least one stakeholder views the problem as solvable.147 Pidd adds that problems in the social 
context have no single correct answer; rather, answers are conditional on how the problem solver 
perceives it.148 With multiple, equally valid perceptions of the problem and its solution, Pidd 
adds that the optimal, or even an acceptable, solution requires some level of expertise and 
ingenuity.149  
Additionally, problems have owners. Problem ownership is reflected in Smith’s third 
criterion for problem identification. Beyond merely wanting to see the problem solved, problem 
owners are willing to dedicate resources to solving the problem. Hester and Adams note that 
ownership does not necessarily mean the owner has the authority to allocate resources.150 For 
example, a wealthy A-list celebrity might have the resources necessary and the willingness to 
host a nuclear weapons summit at his estate; however, he does not have the authority to compel 
state leaders (decision makers) to attend. 
Problems do not necessarily exist in a vacuum. Systems of problems can exist. A system 
of problems is referred to throughout this text as a “mess.” A “mess” is a system of problems 
“with multiple stakeholders who may hold quite different views on what is feasible and 
desirable.”151 Moreover, stakeholders might disagree on the mess’ contours, meaning “both the 
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problem formulation and methods to address it are potentially in conflict.”152 Mess articulation, 
therefore, can be difficult, as opposed to the problem’s articulation. James Greeno captures this 
difficulty: “When a problem has an indefinite goal, the problem solver cannot know what the 
solution state will be like until it is achieved—or at least until some progress has been made” and 
“Indefinite goals seem to be an important factor in producing the weakness of structure in many 
ill-structured problems.”153 This differentiates messes from problems because problems’ goals 
can be succinctly stated. Without a succinct desired end state, there can be no practical, empirical 
solution, and generalized solutions cannot be empirical.154 Newell, et al, demonstrate this: 
 
I want to take my son to nursery school. What’s the difference between what I 
have and what I want? One of distance. What changes distance? My automobile. 
My automobile won’t work. What’s needed to make it work? A new battery. 
What has new batteries? An auto repair shop. I want the auto repair shop to put in 
a new battery; but the shop doesn’t know I need one. What is the difficulty? One 
of communication. What allows communication? A telephone…And so on.155 
 
 
That is, in Newell’s anecdote, he cannot articulate the solution to his situation succinctly. While 
driving to the nursery school is a succinct solution to one problem of his mess,156 it does not 
solve the communication problem. Likewise, using the telephone to call the automobile repair 
shop does not get his son to nursery school. In this case using the phone to call the repair shop is 
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merely a single step Newell can take to get him closer to his desired state, dropping his son off at 
the nursery school. 
The decision to pick up the phone to ring the repair shop was one of many possible 
solutions to the immediate communication problem. Newell could have walked to the repair 
shop. These two solutions make up his problem space, which “may include several intermediate 
steps which each move your current state some amount closer to your desired end state.”157 
With the definitions of problems and messes made clear, I now turn to the final part of 
this subsection: structuring problems. 
Because this research wishes to avoid making a Type III Error at the beginning, or 
“solving the wrong problem precisely,” I must discuss structuring problems. This is important 
because it helps develop a holistic understanding of the proposed mess. Problem structuring 
methods “help a series of divergent stakeholders to understand the complex problem they face 
before attempting to resolve it…”158 That is, it helps stakeholders understand the actual problem.  
The goal is to break a mess down into its constituent problems. But Pidd points out that 
this does not imply the problems are separate.159 That is, a mess is made up of individual 
problems. For example, a war is a mess. It is made up of several problems (e.g., there is a 
disparity between states over rights to some resource, there is no consensus as to how the conflict 
should be resolved, there might be domestic anti-war movements pressuring governments 
participating in the war, etc.). All the mess’ component problems are linked and are not isolated. 
Using problem-structuring methods, therefore, can help address issues, such as “multiple actors, 
differing perspectives, partially conflicting interests, significant intangibles, [and] perplexing 
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uncertainties.”160 This does not imply that problem-structuring methods make the process simple. 
It remains no easy feat. 
Hester and Adams propose that problem structuring requires an appreciation of the 
problem’s “underlying purpose of its associated system.”161 What are the stakeholders’ true 
concerns? Who are the decision makers and the problem’s owners? What are the structural forces 
behind the problem? What triggers those forces? Blanchard suggests “Defining the problem is 
sometimes the most difficult part of the process, particularly if one is in a rush to ‘get going.’”162 
The problems might be extraordinarily large; Mitroff suggests it might be better to define the 
contours of the problem outside the researcher’s comfort zone in order to make sure the 
researcher has fully captured the problem.163 The bottom line: If the problem is large, the 
structured problem should be large enough to capture the entire problem.  
 
Thinking Systemically 
Holistic thinking in the systems age traces its roots to the early 20th century; however, it 
came to prominence during the late 1930s and early 1940s, when complex technical and political 
problems during WWII required more than simple mechanical solutions. The joint American and 
British field was called Operations Research (OR). OR has no precise definition, and many 
definitions overlap. Charles Kittel was first to define it. He writes, “Operational Research is a 
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scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions.”164 
Despite its lack of coherent definition, and despite Kittel’s vague definition, what it does is more 
or less definable. It employs methods from various fields of research, such as mathematics, 
chemistry, engineering, physics, psychology, management, economics, and social sciences. It 
seeks to apply scientific methods, using quantitative analysis to support managerial decisions. 
Saul Gass has a good summary of the history of OR and discusses the evolution of OR during 
WWII from first being used to develop antiaircraft guns and submarine hunting systems to its 
subsequent expansion into business and industry.165 
While Gass’ article is somewhat optimistic about the future of OR,166 Hester and Adams 
argue that as complexity increases, particularly by bringing in many different viewpoints, the 
need for new approaches increases.167 As the Type III error warns, this reinforces the need to do 
the “right problem” before doing the “problem right.”168 In other words, research must avoid the 
Type III error before it can hope to solve the problem. Hester and Adams refer to this as hard OR 
(doing the problem right) and soft OR (doing the right problem), and with increased complexity 
comes increased need to be doing both the right problem and the problem right.169  
Doing the right problem, as Mitroff previously points out, means capturing all the parts of 
the problem, even if it means bringing in things beyond the visible edges of the problem. Hester 
and Adams expand, demonstrating that a mess is made of constituent problems, but the 
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constituent problems might not make up the entire mess. Assume a mess (M1) is made of five 
problems (P1, P2, … P5). However, solving the mess is not the summation of solving the 
constituent problems:170 
 
𝑀! = f(𝑃!,𝑃!,…𝑃!) ≠ 𝑃! 
 
It is here where viewing the mess as a system with interacting component parts becomes 
necessary because the interaction between the problems adds to the mess’ condition. The 
behavior of the mess is greater than the sum of its parts. Ackoff summarizes this reality: 
 
Problems are elements abstracted from messes; therefore, problems are to messes 
what atoms are to planets. There is an important systems principle, familiar to all 
of you, that applies to messes and problems: that the sum of the optimal solutions 
to each component problem considered separately is not an optimal solution to the 
mess. This follows from the fact that the behavior of the mess depends more on 
how the solutions to its component problems interact than on how they act 
independently of each other.171 
 
 
It is therefore true that handling the mess does not mean optimizing each problem. Hester 
and Adams propose satisficing, or “acceptable compromises.” This means it is an unfortunate 
reality that finding the best solution is often not possible. Rather, they point out, the goal of 
systemic thinking is “to resolve or increase our understanding of a mess…”172 For instance, 
while this might upset the Global Zero Movement if the reality is that the system is stable, and 
                                                
170 Hester and Adams, 42. 
171 Russell L. Ackoff, “Optimization + Objectivity = Opt Out,” European Journal of Operational 
Research 1, no. 1 (1977): 4-5. 
172 Hester and Adams, 43. 
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nothing can be done to abolish nuclear weapons, finding equilibrium in the present state helps us 
avoid making the Type IV error, or destabilizing the system with an inappropriate intervention. 
It is also true that inherent in a mess, given the divergence of perspectives, is the 
necessity to treat the system as pluralistic (divergent viewpoints where compromise is possible) 
or coercive (divergent viewpoints were compromise is not possible).173 This is due to the 
subjectivity of the system. While objective systems have unitary actors (convergent viewpoints), 
messes are subjective social interactions where an optimized solution that satisfies everyone is 
not possible. 
Finally, Hester and Adams propose a multimethodology for systemic decision-making.174 
That is, they borrow four processes that structure complex problems from Millet and Gogan: 
groping, structuring, adjusting, and unstructuring.175 Groping is taking incremental steps to 
impose structure on highly ambiguous problems. Structuring occurs when the state changes from 
unstructured to structured. Adjusting is adding or removing constraints incrementally, while 
maintaining a high level of structure. Unstructuring involves changing the state from structured 
to unstructured. Millet and Gogan caution that these steps do not necessarily, and indeed rarely, 
occur linearly. They may “cycle through a complex sequence of groping, structuring, adjusting 
and unstructuring before resolution is achieved.”176  
From the structuring phase, it is also rarely a linear procession from structuring to the 
Thinking, Acting, and Observing, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Instead, as shown in Figure 3.2, 
                                                
173 Hester and Adams, 48. 
174 Hester and Adams, 48. 
175 I. Millet and J. L. Gogan. “A Dialectical Framework for Problem Structuring and Information 
Technology,” The Journal of the Operational Research Society 57, no. 4 (2006): 435. 
176 Millet and Gogan, 435. 
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practitioners follow a nonlinear process where steps occur out of sequence, where feedback 
occurs.177  
 
Figure 3.2: Systemic decision making flow chart (adapted from Hester and Adams [p. 50]) 
 
 
3.2 Summary 
Solving the nuclear weapons problem requires more than what traditional international 
relations theory can offer. This chapter outlines the philosophical approach to the methodology 
that is explained in the next chapter. As a practitioner carefully thinks about the problem, he or 
she should attempt to avoid the Type III error. One cannot solve a problem easily if they are 
trying to solve the wrong problem. Other error types are identified, and avoiding them, 
particularly the Type IV error, which could result in nuclear catastrophe, further complicates the 
methodology. 
Further, this chapter highlights that the nuclear weapons problem is not merely a single 
problem; rather, it is a system of interacting problems, or a “mess.” Solving each of the “mess’” 
constituent problems individually does not necessarily resolve the “mess,” but might instead 
commit a Type IV error. Therefore, care should be taken to structure and think about the mess in 
a way that captures problem interaction in order to avoid the Type IV error.
                                                
177 Hester and Adams, 49-50. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
Drawing from Hester and Adam’s Structure-TAO approach, this project is a 
combination of modeling real-world problems (a system) as well as various simulations 
within the proposed real-world system (see Figure 4.1).178 That is, this project seeks to 
model and experiment with an abstraction of the real-world system in which the nuclear 
weapons problems exist. To accomplish this, this project uses fuzzy cognitive mapping. 
 
4.1 Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping 
 
Figure 4.1 Modeling in Systemic Decision Making 
 
 
 
Fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM) is adapted from Robert Axelrod’s cognitive mapping, 
which is a graphical representation of a system’s elements as points or nodes, which have causal 
links between them (represented as arrows or links).179 In Axelrod’s modeling, nodes can 
increase, decrease, or have no effect on other nodes. This trivalent logic, where positive 
relationships take on a value of 1, negative relationships take on a value of -1, and no 
                                                
178 Hester and Adams, 103. 
179 Axelrod, 5. 
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relationship is represented by 0, can be illustrated with the following model and matrix (Figure 
4.2 and Table 4.1): 
 
Figure 4.2: Cognitive Map Example 
 
 
Table 4.1: Cognitive Map Example Matrix 
		 C1	 C2	 C3	 C4	 C5	
C1	 0	 0	 -1	 0	 1	
C2	 -1	 0	 1	 0	 0	
C3	 0	 0	 0	 0	 -1	
C4	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	
C5	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	
 
 
This is a set of strict causal relationships between components. C1 decreases C3 and 
increases C5; C5 increases C2, and so on. This form of modeling captures the direction of the 
relationship but not the strength. Therefore, Bart Kosko overcomes some of the limits in 
assigning causality by allowing “hazy degrees of causality between hazy causal objects 
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(concepts).”180 That is, he addresses relationships that can influence a receiver component “a 
little bit” or “a lot” by some number defined on [-1, 1].181 Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2 illustrates 
this. 
 
Figure 4.3: Fuzzy Cognitive Map Example 
 
 
Table 4.2: Fuzzy Cognitive Map Example Matrix 
		 C1	 C2	 C3	 C4	 C5	
C1	 0	 0	 -0.25	 0	 0.75	
C2	 -0.5	 0	 0.75	 0	 0	
C3	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0.25	
C4	 0.5	 0	 0	 0	 0	
C5	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	
 
 
                                                
180 Kosko, 65. 
181 Kosko, 67. 
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The benefits of using the FCM are that they visually represent the real world, allow 
simulation, and can be qualitatively assessed. Furthermore, unlike Multiple Criteria Decision 
Making,182 FCM allows for feedback loops and “can suggest alternatives through exploratory 
analysis,” and unlike systems dynamics, FCMs can rely on situations where data is lacking.183 
Hester and Adams work through the mathematical underpinnings of FCM modeling, 
where, “FCMs evolve over time … and can be analyzed relative to this evolution.”184 In their 
example, they show three nodes, A, B, and C.185 The weight of the influence, or the matrix, of B 
or C on A is represented by W.  
 
Figure 4.4: FCM Weights Example 
 
 
In Figure 4.4, the state of A at step t + 1 is a function of At and W: 
                                                
182 This is a formal decision-making framework that examines problems with elements in 
conflict that require trade-offs. For example, a person needs a car, and they want both the 
sportiest car at the cheapest price. These variables contradict the other. See Stanley Zionts, 
“MCDM—If Not a Roman Numeral, Then What?,” Interfaces 9, no. 4 (1979): 94. 
183 Hester and Adams, 104-105. 
184 Hester and Adams, 108. 
185 Athanasios K. Tsadiras, “Comparing the Inference Capabilities of Binary, Trivalent and 
Sigmoid Fuzzy Cognitive Maps,” Information Sciences 178, no. 20 (2008): 3884. 
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𝐴!!! = 𝑓(𝐴!𝑊) 
 
Where “f is known as a transfer function used to evolve the FCM from one timestamp to 
the next.”186 In short, by altering one or more independent variables, the dependent variables take 
on values from timestamp to timestamp as a result of their initial value and the weights affecting 
the component. To illustrate this effect, consider a car driving in a straight line at a constant 
speed. If you want to know where the car is, figure out where the car started and how fast it was 
traveling. Its starting point and its speed determine its present location. To round out this 
analogy, the combustion engine is a suitable transfer function f, even though non-combustion 
propulsion is also available. 
Tsadiras says the most common forms of f are binary, trivalent, and sigmoid.187 Using the 
binary function allows movement along the edges of 0 and 1. He adds, “Binary FCMs are 
suitable for highly qualitative problems where only representation of increase or stability of a 
concept is required.”188 The trivalent function allows variables to take on -1, 0, or 1 values, 
where qualitative problems require a representation of decrease, stability, or increase. The 
sigmoid function allows continuous movement between -1 and 1, inclusively. This captures 
qualitative or quantitative problems, “where representation of a degree of increase, a degree of 
decrease, or stability of a concept is required and strategic planning scenarios are going to be 
introduced.”189 This is demonstrated in the following equation. 
 
                                                
186 Hester and Adams, 108. 
187 Tsadiras, 3885. 
188 Tsadiras, 3894. 
189 Tsadiras, 3894. 
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𝑓!"# 𝑥 = tahn 𝜆𝑥 =
𝑒!" − 𝑒!!"
𝑒!" + 𝑒!!"
 
 
where 𝜆 represents a user-defined constant value for the sigmoid function’s slope. For the 
purpose of this research, the sigmoid function is the most suitable. Bueno and Salmeron suggest 
a 𝜆 value of 5 as this value “provides a good degree of normalization…” while a value of 10 
closer resembles a trivalent function, and a value of 1 or 2 is close to linear.190 
In this project, the above formula for the sigmoid transfer function is applied using an 
Excel macro developed by Patrick Hester (UNC Ashville)191. To aid comprehension of the 
results and the logic they reflect, the next few paragraphs contain a step-by-step description of 
how it works.  
First, recall that all λ takes on a value of 5. Each value of x is the result of λ on the 
movement from timestamp 0 to 1, and so on. Therefore each value of e depends on the 
relationship between nodes according to the effect of λ at each timestamp. The following simple 
simulation illustrates the methodology. Three components, A, B, and C, are in a relationship, 
where A decreases B and increases C, B increases A and C, and C decreases A and increases C.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
190 Salvador Bueno and Jose L. Salmeron, “Benchmarking Main Activation Functions in Fuzzy 
Cognitive Maps,” Expert Systems with Applications 36, no. 3 (2009): 5223. 
191 The macro was first introduced in a series of conference papers, particularly Patrick Hester, 
“Analyzing Stakeholders Using Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping,” Procedia Computer Science 61 
(2015): 92-97. 
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Figure 4.5: FCM Example  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: FCM Example Matrix 
 
 A B C 
A 0 -1 1 
B 1 0 1 
C -0.25 0.5 0 
 
 
In this scenario, I set C to an initial value of 1, apply the sigmoid transfer function, set λ 
to 5, and run the simulation for 20 timestamps. Therefore, C represents a non-permanent change 
within this hypothetical simple scenario. 
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Figure 4.6: FCM Example Scenario 1 Results 
 
 
In this scenario two things are apparent. First, this simulation never reaches equilibrium. 
There is periodic behavior, placing it within the complex domain.192 Second, initially setting C to 
1 causes an immediate and dramatic decrease in A and an even more dramatic increase in B. 
Starting at about timestamp 5, a recurring pattern emerges, where B increases, followed by an 
increase in A and a simultaneous decrease in B, followed by an increase in C and a simultaneous 
decrease in A, and finally a decrease in C. in this scenario, setting C to 1 initially indicates that 
there would be cyclical behavior.  
                                                
192 For more on problem domains, refer back to the first section in this chapter. 
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The cyclical behavior follows from the logic of the causal relationships identified in the 
map.  A high initial value of C exerts a causal effect on both A and B, pulling both up.  However, 
for A this is dampened by the negative effect of B on A. As the relationship between these causal 
factors settles into a periodic cycle, we see a repeated pattern in which equilibrium is elusive. 
A second example scenario is run where B is clamped to 1. Equilibrium in this second 
scenario is reached immediately, showing a maximum increase in all three nodes. 
 
Figure 4.7: FCM Example Scenario 2 Results 
 
 
Finally, FCMs are dynamic and deterministic. They are dynamic in that behavior changes 
over time. They are deterministic in that initial values determine output. With the continuous 
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FCM (sigmoid function), there are potentially infinite end states, meaning continuous FCMs can 
show chaotic results.193 
 
4.2 Problem Structuring 
Jetter and Kok propose a six-step framework for FCM mapping. This includes: 1) Project 
objectives and information needs clarification, 2) knowledge elicitation plans, 3) knowledge 
capture, 4) FCM calibration, 5) FCM testing, and 6) interpretation and use of model.194 
The first step is the problem articulation.195 Sterman argues this is the most important 
step in modeling the problem.196 Useful models, while representing the real world, are models of 
the problem, not the system.197 The reason I model the problem and not the system is because the 
model’s purpose is to address a problem in a simplified way that exists in a real-world system.198 
This harkens back to avoiding the Type III error. Wooley and Pidd argue the importance of 
problem structuring, writing, “the process of arriving at a sufficient understanding of the 
components of a particular problem to proceed to some sort of useful operational research 
work.”199 In other words, problem structuring helps uncover the actual problem rather than 
relying on initial assumptions about the problem. This step also necessitates some accounting for 
time (i.e., on what time scale does the model operate?).200 
                                                
193 Hester and Adams, 110-111. 
194 Antonie Jetter and Kasper Kok, “Fuzzy Cognitive Maps for Futures Studies—A 
Methodological Assessment of Concepts and Methods,” Futures 61 (2014): 48. 
195 Hester and Adams, 112. 
196 John Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2000), 89. 
197 Sterman, 90. 
198 Hester and Adams, 112. 
199 R. N. Woolley, and M. Pidd, “Problem Structuring -- A Literature Review,” The Journal of 
the Operational Research Society 32, no. 3 (1981): 198. 
200 Hester and Adams, 112. 
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Step two addresses sources of knowledge. Jetter and Kok identify three: the modeler, 
experts via survey, and from documents (e.g., scientific journals, reports, and newspaper 
sources). They furthermore note these methods can be combined.201 This allows for expert 
participation in both knowledge elicitation and ensuring the problem is properly structured to 
help avoid making the Type III error.202 These open sources are identified in subsequent 
chapters. 
Step three is the actual collection of knowledge. Hester and Adams note that experts and 
stakeholders should note this is a causal and not a correlation map.203 Additionally, once 
causation (e.g. “a change in A causes a change in B”) is identified between concepts, the proper 
weights can be assigned to the causal link. This is accomplished using a Likert-type scale where 
weights are qualified rather than absolute.  
 
Table 4.4: Sample Weight Scale (Adapted from Likert)204 
Qualitative rating Associated weight 
Very strong 
positive 1 
Strong positive 0.75 
Medium positive 0.5 
Weak positive 0.25 
No effect 0 
Weak negative -0.25 
Medium negative -0.5 
Strong negative -0.75 
Very strong 
negative -1 
 
                                                
201 Jetter and Kok, 49. 
202 Hester and Adams, 113. 
203 Hester and Adams, 114. 
204 Rensis Likert, “A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes,” Archives of Psychology 22, 
no. 140 (1932): 55. 
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This helps for two reasons. First, it generalizes the model so that experts, stakeholders, and 
observers can better understand cause and effect. Second, it simplifies the potentially infinite 
values the weights can take, as identified in the discussion about the sigmoid function. 
Participants will not need to argue over the exact weight, but rather a limited number of qualified 
weights. 
The fourth step is calibrating the FCM once it has been constructed in step three. This 
allows the modeler to see if the simulation behaves as expected. The fifth step is testing. Sterman 
notes this is not validation in the strictest sense because “All models are wrong, so no models are 
valid or verifiable in the sense of understanding the truth.” He adds, “The question facing clients 
and modelers is never whether a model is true but whether it is useful.”205 Therefore, the goal is 
simply to test whether or not it acts as expected. Hester and Adams note this is ultimately 
subjective.206 In the subsequent problems this stability test is performed without claiming to 
solve the problem. 
The sixth step is the exploration of the model’s parameters. Hester and Adams refer to 
this as “speculative, what-if scenarios.”207 For example, the modeler can ask what would happen 
if a concept were clamped to a specific value. That is, the modeler can “play God” with feasible 
system changes. Clamping “is not a one-time impulse …, but a change that lasts over extended 
periods of time.”208 This can be illustrated with the following example: In a fictitious model of 
the disarmament problem, the researcher can clamp the value of the authority of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to +1. When running the scenario, linked concepts will affect 
                                                
205 Sterman, 890. 
206 Hester and Adams, 117. 
207 Hester and Adams, 117. 
208 Antonie Jetter and Willi Schweinfort, “Building Scenarios with Fuzzy Cognitive Maps: An 
Exploratory Study of Solar Energy,” Futures 43, no. 1 (2011): 55. 
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each other depending on direction and weight of the links; however, at each step in the 
simulation, the IAEA’s authority will not be undermined by changes to the system. In this 
hypothetical scenario, if all states surrendered sovereignty over nuclear weapons to the IAEA, 
then, depending on how the rest of the model’s parameters were set up, the value of nuclear 
weapons might collapse to zero. 
Finally, FCMs can be constructed by hand, in spreadsheets, in Photoshop, or in 
computational modeling and simulation software, such as Gephi,209 or Mental Modeler. Mental 
Modeler is a FCM analysis tool that allows researchers the ability to explore environmental, 
social, or other issues. It utilizes user-defined components within a system, user-defined 
relationships between components, and user-run “what if” scenarios. Users can then determine 
how the system as a whole is affected by feasible tweaks to specific variables within the 
system.210  
Applying FCM to this research, after examining two related problems that upset efforts 
towards global nuclear disarmament, I recreate the parameters of these real-world problems. This 
process requires several steps. First, I identify each problem’s stakeholders and stakeholder 
goals. Stakeholders are groups with vested interest in the outcome of the problem. This includes 
states, civilian firms, nonprofit organizations, religious groups, and others. Power to control the 
outcome of the problems’ solutions is not spread equally, nor does one stakeholder hold an 
absolute monopoly of power. This step is represented by “Who?” The second step is to clearly 
identify and articulate the problems and to break them down into their basic elements. This 
includes identifying the problems’ objective narratives, objective hierarchy networks, and the 
                                                
209 Gephi is a network analysis tool, usually to explore social networks, using graph theory. Its 
applicability to FCMs requires tweaking the purpose of the software to some degree.  
210 Steven Gray, “Mental Modeler,” http://www.mentalmodeler.org/. 
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means-ends networks. This step is represented by “What?” The third step identifies substantive 
information, or the motivational forces behind the problems and actions. This step is represented 
by “Why?” The fourth step is to refine the problem by identifying the context and problem 
boundaries. This step is represented by “Where?” The fifth step is to identify the mechanisms by 
which stakeholders can move from the current state (the problem) to an idealized state (a 
solution). This step is represented by “How?” The final step is to assess the appropriate 
timeframe for problem interaction. This step is represented by “When?” Before progressing to 
the final stage of modeling, in order to test problem stability, hypothetical scenarios are run that 
do not necessarily indicate a viable path towards synthesis; rather, this stage is merely to ensure 
there is no chaotic behavior. Once the problems have been constructed using these six steps, the 
model progresses by merging the two problems together and restructuring to ensure nuclear 
weapons interact with the problems as they would in the real world. This final structuring creates 
the “mess,” or the complex interaction between problems. Components and links are color coded 
according to the following scheme illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
 
Figure 4.8: FCM Color Code 
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This simulation is deterministic. It utilizes cause and effect to determine the outcome 
along [-1, 1]. Incorporating the Likert-type Scale for outcome, final variable states of -1 indicate 
a maximum decrease. For example, in a hypothetical if maximizing cooperation causes 
sovereignty to take on a final value of -1, then maximizing cooperation decreases sovereignty to 
the maximum degree. Negative values other than -1 are scored according the Likert-type Scale. 
Final variable states of 1 indicate a maximum increase. Final variable states of 0 indicate no 
change. In other words, 0 indicates the status quo. 
Using the FCM framework, I identify the problems’ elements as noted above and apply 
the Likert-type Scale to show interaction and weights between nodes. I accomplish this using 
Mental Modeler, an online FCM tool, described above. I run several “what if” scenarios using 
Hester’s PC-based Excel scenario tool that allows users to design scenarios using the following 
criteria: transfer type from one timestamp to the next (identified above as binary, trivalent, and 
sigmoid), the specification of λ (which is set to 5, according to the explanation above by Bueno 
and Salmeron), the number of timestamps to run (ranging from 1 to ∞), and the independent 
variables. Because I am using the Likert-type Scale to indicate the weight of node links, I am 
using the sigmoid transfer function.  
Independent variation is further controlled by two mechanisms. First, the user can choose 
an initial value for a variable to take along [-1, 1]. This simulates a one-time change in value. For 
example, the signing of an international agreement maximizes cooperation for a single 
timestamp only; in other words, cooperation once does not compel further cooperation within the 
model. Signing one treaty does not mean all future treaties are signed. Take note that setting the 
initial value of an independent variable means it will revert to a dependent variable following the 
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first timestamp. The second way the user can control independent variation is to “clamp” the 
value of a variable to a number along [-1, 1], as noted earlier. For example, a successful 
disarmament treaty will not replace sovereignty with something else. Therefore, it could be 
useful to clamp sovereignty to zero. Unless otherwise indicated by setting initial values or 
clamping independent variables, all dependent variables will begin at timestamp 0 with an initial 
value of 0. In other words, 0 is the status quo that varies according to weights within the model 
and user-defined, feasible changes. 
 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter outlines fuzzy cognitive mapping methodology as well as its mathematical 
underpinnings. It then creates an example model and runs various scenarios in order to illustrate 
how problem resolution can be attempted using fuzzy cognitive mapping. Finally, it addresses 
problem structuring and how to apply fuzzy cognitive mapping to the problems identified in the 
following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PROBLEM 1 
Nuclear-armed states are resistant to disarmament, while significant portions of the world desire 
a nuclear-free international system. 
 
5.1 Problem 1 Articulation 
Ultimately, the disarmament problem is one with no formal solution. To illustrate this 
problem, Lewis F. Richardson’s arms race model211 reveals that, by diminishing positive 
numbered nuclear redundancies, arms races cannot be worked backwards to reach zero. Rather, 
models can only approach zero. On the other hand, the model is likely to stop at 1 per side; if the 
referent object is a warhead, then there is no such thing as a partial warhead, for the purpose of 
disarmament. Therefore, at best, arms control proponents can only mathematically work back to 
a non-zero whole number.212 This is also illustrated by Fry’s model, where—in uncomplicated 
terms—State A’s military spending SA is a function of State B’s military spending SB: 
 
𝑆! = 𝑓(𝑆!) 
 
In Fry’s arms race, each side’s military spending is determined by the other side’s 
military spending in an effort to reach capability equilibrium. Neither side desires being less 
battlefield-ready than their respective adversary. Financial transactions for weapons, however, 
are not crucial, but Fry’s model shows the realist logic that should prevent disarmament. To put 
                                                
211 Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins 
of War, ed. Nicolas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco (Literary Licensing, LLC, 2012). 
212 Of course, it is within the realm of possibilities that introducing an unforeseen delta or 
random variation can collapse Fry’s model to 0. 
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this in more relevant terms, “great powers always counter the weapons of other great powers, 
usually by imitating those who have introduced new weapons,”213 and the fact that one bomb 
exists means that two bombs must exist at a minimum. 
Therefore, this modeling does not attempt to show how nuclear redundancies can 
diminish to zero; rather, it tries to synthesize international realities and desired end states, where 
nuclear weapons no longer serve deterrence functions, and where, to borrow from John Mueller, 
nuclear weapons are essentially irrelevant. Mueller argues that Cold War relative peace has 
created a pattern where it is now assumed major war is not within the set of potential future 
outcomes; therefore, mutual assured destruction (MAD) and nuclear weapon utility has atrophied 
out of boredom.214 At this point, disarmament becomes possible. Mueller’s optimism during the 
waning Cold War years has not born fruit, but that does not imply that his conclusion is 
incorrect. Rather, it might simply mean his conclusion needs some tweaking to account for 
changes in the international system since 1988. Therefore, this project will attempt to account for 
present-day structural theories, particularly those that gave rise to Mueller’s unfulfilled 
prophesy—namely realism. 
Given presently understood physics, chemistry, and technological capabilities, there is a 
limit to balancing where equilibrium is certain—MAD. Nuclear weapons’ destructiveness 
signals to adversaries the state’s capabilities in no uncertain terms. There is no more perfect 
weapon for reaching equilibrium than the atomic weapon. 
There is a caveat that must be addressed, however. The ultimate weapon in this regard 
can only order the international environment given that two adversaries have weapon systems 
that can survive a first strike. For the purpose of Problem 1, MAD through symmetry stabilizes 
                                                
213 Waltz, (1981): 7. 
214 Mueller, 56. 
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the system because no side can survive a nuclear war, and the threat of nuclear war diminishes 
incentives to engage in even conventional wars, out of the fear of escalation. Furthermore, 
Brodie sums up the relationship between second-strike capabilities and security: “Stability is 
achieved when each nation believes that the strategic advantage of striking first is overshadowed 
by the tremendous cost of doing so.”215 The ability to return fire is crucial in this calculus. 
Schelling agrees that stability and equilibrium are reached given two variables: First, both sides 
must be able to obliterate the other, and second, both sides’ retaliatory capabilities must be 
strong enough to survive a first strike.216 In the age of nuclear triads, where second-strike 
capabilities are guaranteed through land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), realist theory suggests 
equilibrium has been reached between much of the nuclear-armed world.217 MAD’s stability is 
so compelling that some scholars prescribe more proliferation to prevent any future wars.218 
Both Brodie and Schelling explain stability in a bipolar world (i.e., the Cold War) in 
terms of absolute symmetry. The balance of power (BOP) must account for proliferation 
decisions in addition to the maintenance of nuclear weapons programs. That is, if State A 
proliferates, and if State B does not balance, the states are in an asymmetrical relationship and 
are thus not in equilibrium. If State B does not have security guarantees by another nuclear 
                                                
215 Brodie, 303. 
216 Thomas C. Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
15, no. 10 (December 1959): 414. 
217 China, India, Russia, and the US have nuclear triads. Roughly 99% of the world’s nuclear 
weapons in 2018 fall under triad systems. There is some additional evidence Israel also enjoys a 
nuclear triad. See Ewan W. Anderson, Liam D. Anderson, and Ian Cool, An Atlas of Middle 
Eastern Affairs [e-book], Second ed., (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2014): 233. 
218 Waltz (1981), and John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the 
Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56. 
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power, then State A may pose an existential threat to State B. Erickson adds that without such 
guarantees, State B is willing to suffer proliferation costs to bring it back into equilibrium.219 
Waltz argues that gradual proliferation occurs because the ability to annihilate the other 
offers deterrence and peace assurance.220 Schelling agrees, arguing that even limited wars are 
unlikely because small wars can escalate to major wars, and major wars can escalate to nuclear 
wars.221 In this sense if two sides come to the brink of even a limited war, both sides have more 
to gain by conceding than they do by moving forward with war, especially if potential gains from 
winning the war are minor. Waltz further argues that even if great powers do come to militarized 
conflict the war will be limited because neither side can gain advantage over the other without 
risking nuclear war.222 
Steven Pinker—not writing explicitly about nuclear deterrence and proliferation—
highlights deterrence succinctly. He writes,  
 
"A credible deterrence policy can remove a competitor's incentive to invade for 
gain, since the cost imposed on him by retaliation would cancel out the 
anticipated spoils. And it removes his incentive to invade from fear, because of 
your commitment not to strike first and, more importantly, because of your 
reduced incentive to strike first, since deterrence reduces the need for 
preemption."223 
 
 
                                                
219 Stanley A. Erickson, “Economic and technological trends affecting nuclear nonproliferation,” 
The Nonproliferation Review 8, no. 2 (2001): 42. 
220 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science 
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In addition to Waltz’s argument that “More may be better,” de Mesquita and Riker 
support this conclusion, writing, “Once half the nations in the system have nuclear weapons, the 
number of possible nuclear attacks diminishes, going to zero when all countries have sufficient 
capabilities to deter their relevant adversaries.”224 Mearsheimer furthermore makes blanket, 
normative arguments for horizontal proliferation,225 as well as individual arguments that Ukraine 
and Japan should enjoy nuclear deterrents.226 Sagan calls this approach “proliferation positive.” 
Although critical of “proliferation positive” approaches, Sagan notes that it “flows easily from 
the logic of rational deterrence theory.”227  
Taking this to its resultant conclusion, even non-proliferated states with robust security 
guarantees by nuclear-armed states should be expected to proliferate on a long enough timeline. 
Because under realism alliances can change, states under nuclear umbrellas cannot be certain 
their guarantees will last; therefore, these states have incentive to proliferate to maximize their 
future expected payoff.228 
Hymans sums up the realist position: 
 
[A]dopting the realist vision of international relations inexorably leads to the 
conclusion that all states that can go nuclear, should go nuclear—and the sooner, 
the better. If they have not done so yet, it is simply a matter of time before they 
do. The core realist prediction about proliferation is that some event will 
                                                
224 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective 
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inevitably come along—sooner rather than later—that finally causes the dam to 
break and the world to go nuclear.229 
 
Not all who accept realist logic agree with its prescriptive argument, which opens up one 
contentious point in Problem 1. Reiss agrees that proliferation will happen, but he disagrees that 
it should. He writes, “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear 
‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, 
thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic,”230 adding, that the US should take a leading role in 
preventing proliferation.231 
Additionally, Sagan’s debate with Waltz offers some critiques of realists’ “proliferation 
positive” arguments, adding an “alternative theory of the consequences of nuclear 
proliferation.”232 Sagan, a proponent of realism as formal logic but a defector from its normative 
conclusions, makes two broad critiques of horizontal proliferation. First, militaries, as essential 
and powerful components of the state, have shared preconceptions, rigid customs, and insular 
interests that could lead military leaders towards and beyond the nuclear brink. Second, many 
future proliferators might lack adequate civilian control over the military. Juntas are less likely to 
fear domestic unrest or coup, and are therefore more likely to eschew civilian concerns.233 He 
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furthermore argues that military culture and reputational pressures “to protect oneself” have 
prompted some military nuclear accidents.234 
This research adopts realist logic in the same way that Sagan adopts it. Nuclear weapons 
pose enormous risk to the international system, despite their utility in promoting or maintaining 
non-belligerent relations. This form of realism accepts realism’s underlying logic but also 
acknowledges that it cannot ignore other states’ and non-state actors’ existential concerns vis-à-
vis the hazards of nuclear weapons by accidental or designed detonation. Nuclear abolitionists,235 
although holding a fraction of the vote held by nuclear states, still get a vote in Problem 1’s 
resolution. Abolitionists’ fears are implicitly articulated throughout this text; however, the 
driving problem in this “mess” is the tension between nuclear weapons states’ desire for 
deterrence and abolitionists’ desire for disarmament. 
Abolitionists make several arguments for disarmament. First, the fate of the world should 
not be left up to the whims of a handful of states in conflict.236 That is, a war between two great 
powers might not abide by sovereign borders, and nuclear war will affect non-belligerent states 
at the global level, as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, it is the responsibility, they argue, of 
nuclear weapons states to take disarmament negotiations seriously. Because of the risk to non-
nuclear states, and despite a lack of power over nuclear weapons states, members of the non-
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aligned movement feel or have felt it is their duty and their right to take ownership of the 
problem.237, 238  
Second, some actors see the possession of nuclear weapons through a lens of injustice. 
That is, nuclear weapons are an expression of primal strength that perpetuates inequality among 
nations.239 In this sense these actors see nuclear weapons as an obstacle to issues of global 
justice. Dependence on the status quo means that perceptions of injustice are ignored. For 
example, boots on the ground during an annexation of a deterrent-less state’s territory by a 
superpower means no other superpower can enact justice on behalf of the victim state. 
Diplomacy might not persuade the aggressor to back down if its deterrent capabilities give it no 
reason to back down, and deterrence means military action is unwise. It is therefore reasonable 
for small states to call for abolition along these lines. 
Third, Wheeler argues the deterrent assumption of realism is not a permanent fixture in 
international order. Rather order is a function of trust building.240 This complements the second 
argument. Expressly, reliance on deterrence diminishes the utility for nuclear-armed states to 
engage in trust-building exercises. Here, Wheeler appears to be taking the “utopian realism” 
approach, which accepts the balance of power but argues that norms change through an iterative 
process whereby states seek to mitigate anarchy by slowly evolving towards some nondescript 
goal of global peace. In other words, conflict might not be a rational choice in a future global 
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community of communities.241 Neither Wheeler nor Booth takes the position that international 
politics has reached an endpoint where conflict is unacceptable; rather, they take issue with 
realist arguments that disarmament is a “fictional utopia,” and they argue that human agency and 
free will give decision makers the ability to change the system for a better. Therefore, a world 
without nuclear weapons is not unthinkable, and it is a world for which nuclear weapon states 
should work through an iterative process of gradual disarmament.242 
Fourth, Müller envisions a stable world without nuclear weapons. That is, a future state 
of global zero will most likely reflect cultural norms that make nuclear possession untenable. He 
sees this future very clearly as evidenced by today. Our abhorrence of nuclear weapons and fear 
of their effects today reside in a space also occupied by stability through deterrence. But through 
a social process already in motion, the weight of our abhorrence and fear, as well as the nuclear 
neglect and disinterest, will continuously reduce nuclear weapons’ roles to an ever-diminishing 
speck until they no longer serve any useful purpose. Because this is a likely outcome on a long 
enough timeline, Müller writes, it is important to continue working towards this end goal.243 
The last arguments from abolitionists include the assertion that possessing nuclear 
weapons is inherently immoral, that they are unable to place trust in irrational leaders following 
the realist assumptions of deterrence, that there is a high risk of nuclear accidents, and, quite 
simply, that the costs of building and maintaining nuclear weapons is exorbitant.244 One way to 
phrase this is if moral arguments and extraordinary risks will not persuade states to give up their 
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nuclear arsenals, then perhaps the best argument is that nuclear weapons programs hit states 
where it hurts the most—their wallets.245 
These divergent arguments—with realists and nuclear weapons states on the one hand 
and abolitionists on the other—exposes a dialectic, which is the fundamental basis of the 
problem. Although some actors have significantly more power than other actors, both powerful 
and less-powerful actors are presently engaged in a conversation about the utility of possessing 
nuclear weapons. Neither camp desires to back down, which means the problem cannot be 
solved simply, but nevertheless they are willing to participate in the discussion. In other words, it 
appears satisficing is possible. Therefore, in the following sections the problem’s stakeholders, 
components, boundaries, operating means, and timing are identified, discussed, and modeled 
using Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping. 
 
5.2 Problem 1: Who? 
Central to the nuclear weapons “mess” and its constituent problems are stakeholders. 
These are actors that have some level of influence over behavior, whether strong, weak or in 
between, and have interest in the outcome of decisions. Pokras adds that “Effective problem 
solving ensures that all necessary stakeholder viewpoints are considered or represented during 
discussions. The best insurance to finding the right solution and guaranteeing buy-in to its 
implementation is to widen the view of a problem at the beginning.”246 With the proliferation 
problem, there are certainly going to be divergent viewpoints, but, as will be demonstrated 
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below, these different viewpoints’ inclusion in the model is necessary. If the needs of some 
stakeholders are overlooked, these stakeholders can simply walk away from the discussion. If a 
nuclear-armed state walks away, then there is no hope for the pro-disarmament camp. 
This section has six steps. First, identify stakeholders. Second, classify stakeholders. 
Third, evaluate stakeholder attitudes. Fourth, map out stakeholders. Fifth, identify stakeholder 
engagement priorities. Sixth, develop a stakeholder management plan.247  
Identify Stakeholders 
Because nuclear weapons pose global threats, there are—at the time of this writing—
potentially 7.5 billion stakeholders. Even scientists on long-term assignment aboard the 
International Space Station or at the Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station have some level of 
interest in nuclear weapons, but they have little power to change the system. In other words, the 
list of stakeholders can be quite long. For the purpose of this research, however, stakeholders 
will include actors with some noticeable power to make changes to the system. Table 5.1 
identifies seven groups of stakeholders as relevant to the mess and its constituent problems. 
Each stakeholder has various wants. These are identified in Table 5.2. For the purpose of 
this research, wants will be pared down to the ultimate goal; secondary and tertiary goals will 
become self-evident and will be included in the model during later modeling. Ultimately, nuclear 
weapons serve states’ security goals, if only under different names (e.g., deterrence for the US, 
grandeur for France). Other stakeholder wants vary accordingly. 
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Table 5.1: Problem 1 Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Description 
1. NWs states Nuclear-armed states as unitary actors 
2. Production 
Firms 
In the case of the US these are three private US for-profit corporations 
that build, house, and manage US nuclear warheads. These include 
AECOM and Betchtel, BWX Technologies, and Honeywell. Beyond 
the US, these include component manufacturers, raw materials 
extractors, etc. These production firms are furthermore influenced by 
stockholders. 
3. International 
verification and 
compliance 
agencies 
These are international organizations that encourage peaceful use of 
nuclear materials, administer safeguards to ensure compliance, and 
work to prevent nuclear proliferation (for example, the IAEA). 
4. NGOs and 
activists 
These are groups of civilians that actively promote nonproliferation 
and disarmament (examples include ICAN, Greenpeace, etc.). 
5. Media These are groups or individuals that spread information through 
various communication methods (e.g., television, radio, print, social 
media). 
6. NPT states These are signatory states in good standing in accordance with the 
NPT, which includes most recognized states not previously identified 
as nuclear weapons states248 and major UN voting blocs, such as the 
non-aligned movement249. 
7. Religious 
leaders 
These are influential individuals of various faiths that can sway public 
opinion from the pulpit. 
 
 
The nuclear-armed states above all require some form of security, and they believe 
nuclear weapons serve that goal. While the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK view security 
through a deterrent lens against Russia, during the Cold War the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons 
program was not necessarily developed for traditional deterrence, but rather to balance against 
coercive US foreign policy.250 France, while even less concerned about deterring Russia, views 
its nuclear weapons program as a means by which to ensure its territorial integrity and, more 
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Table 5.2: Problem 1 Stakeholder Wants 
 
Stakeholder Want 
NWs states Security 
Production Firms Maximize profits 
International 
verification and 
compliance 
agencies 
Abolition 
NGOs and activists Abolition 
Media Stories that sell 
NPT states Abolition 
Religious leaders Abolition251 
 
 
importantly for the French, a means by which to maximize its position as a world power.252 
Israel, on the other hand, completely views its nuclear weapons program as a mechanism for 
deterring conventional war and Arab proliferation, in addition to being the ultimate guarantor of 
its survival.253 In very much the same vein, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program serves to 
ensure its very existence. The lesson from the Korean War is that the North’s international 
legitimacy is not certain. Because of this, The DPRK’s official position is that of deterrence 
against the US and Asian forces, and it views thermonuclear devices and ICBMs as guarantors of 
Kim’s survival.254 Pakistan and India, while adversarial, do not share the same existential threat 
                                                
251 Most religious leaders call for abolition; however, some, as identified in the following text, do 
not call for abolition and might even call for nuclear attack. 
252 Klaus Schubert, “France,” in Security with Nuclear Weapons?: Different Perspectives on 
National Security, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 162-
163. 
253 Nuclear weapons’ ultimate role are to provide Israel with a “Samson option,” where, rather 
than allowing military conquest of Israel by Arab armies, Israel can destroy itself in order to 
destroy its enemies. Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and 
American Foreign Policy, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1991), 137-138. 
254 While writing this in spring and summer 2018, significant positive events occurred between 
the DPRK, the ROK, and the US that might change this model’s calculus. Continued monitoring 
is necessary. 
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that The DPRK and Israel face. Pakistan and India seek to balance against each other (India’s 
calculus is more complex, including a “threat of a USA-Pakistan-China axis”255). The creation of 
Pakistan and India exposed contested territorial divisions and has resulted in armed combat to 
settle these divisions. Nuclear weapons, therefore, seek to prevent territorial loss on either side of 
the borders. 
Although holding varying degrees of power and capability, nuclear weapons states are 
viewed in this literature through a realist lens. Keohane does not necessarily subscribe to realism, 
but he succinctly defines states as structural realists see them: 
 
[S]tates [are] unitary rational actors, carefully calculating costs of alternative 
courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected utility, although doing 
so under the conditions of uncertainty and without necessarily having sufficient 
information about alternatives or resources to conduct a full review of all possible 
courses of action.256 
 
The word “unitary” here is a key defining term. Anarchy implies the sameness of states;257 
therefore, there is no need to differentiate all nine nuclear weapons states as individual units of 
analysis. For the purpose of abiding by the foundational tenets of realism, the only necessary 
distinction between states is whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. How or why they 
proliferated or not is only of secondary or tertiary concern. Once nuclear weapons come into 
possession, the weapons between states share a common goal: Security. This point is crucial and 
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must be driven home. Because unilateral disarmament in no way maximizes expected utility and 
instead undermines security needs, there is no difference between the goals of the US and those 
of the DPRK or any other state. On the other hand, this research does not discount very real and 
perceptible differences between states in terms of power and capability. These distinctions, 
however, are more suited for Problem 2. 
As identified earlier, the US is possibly the only state that privatizes the construction, 
housing, maintenance, and management of its nuclear arsenal. In this text these organizations are 
referred to as production firms. AECOM and Bechtel (NYSE:ACM), an engineering firm, holds 
contracts to two of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) nuclear stockpile 
laboratories. Honeywell Federal Manufacturing and Technologies (NYSE:HON) manages the 
third NNSA laboratory. BWX Technologies (NYSE:BWXT) holds a contract for nuclear 
weapons component manufacturing. These corporations seek to maximize their profits, may or 
may not be publicly traded, and answer to a set of shareholders (or profit-seekers in cases where 
there is no public sale of stocks) that, in turn, seek to maximize profits. Other states’, although 
not as explicit as the US also employ some kind of civilian labor upstream and downstream of 
finished nuclear warheads. 
International verification and compliance agencies are intergovernmental organizations 
that seek to ensure that member states of the UN are good stewards of nuclear energy programs 
in accordance with the NPT. Ultimately, these organizations seek abolition,258 but other 
                                                
258 As will be discussed later, NPT Article VI calls for the eventual global elimination of nuclear 
weapons and for nuclear weapon states to take steps towards abolition in “good faith.” United 
Nations, Office of Public Information, Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
United Nations, Office of Public Information, United Nations Publication OPI/372 (New York, 
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secondary or tertiary goals are more at the forefront of their work, due to secondary and tertiary 
goals being easier to reach. For example, the IAEA’s mission is to  
 
Accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and 
prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance 
provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in 
such a way as to further any military purpose.259 
 
The IAEA, situated in Vienna, Austria, operates through member states. The US, for example, 
supports the IAEA through the Department of Energy, and support is provided through various 
national laboratories, one of which states on its website, “The IAEA faces many challenges such 
as essentially flat budgets, increasing work load as more nuclear facilities come on-line, greater 
reliance on safeguards information and advanced technologies, and increased effort to detect 
undeclared nuclear activities and procurement networks.”260 In other words, international 
verification and compliance agencies depend on the state for mission resources, and their ability 
to ensure compliance is diminished as more nuclear energy reactors, uranium enrichment 
facilities, and fissile materials sites are constructed, and clandestine programs are created. 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and activists are groups or individuals that 
collectively advocate for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. While these groups are 
represented as a single unit with a unified stance against nuclear weapons, the text must reflect 
other divergent goals. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) takes no 
position against peaceful nuclear energy programs; however, Greenpeace, an abolitionist, 
environmental group that protested nuclear testing due to its degradation of the environment, 
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believes “Nuclear power is part of the poblem,” due to the risk of nuclear reactor meltdown.261 
Still, because this research focuses on the primary goal, these divergences will be identified only 
when necessary. 
The Media is a collective group of reporters that seeks to find stories that sell. These 
include legitimate journalists reporting through television, radio, newspapers, or social media. 
This group also includes hobby journalists that report through social media, blog posts, or 
Internet videos. Many in this latter group do not get paid for their efforts; however, they “sell” 
their stories for clicks or to build their Internet profile. 
For the purpose of this research NPT states are defined as non-nuclear weapons states 
that are in good standing with the NPT and seek to uphold the NPT’s three pillar mission: non-
proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. This includes most of 
Europe, all of South America, all of Africa (except South Sudan), much of Asia, and all of 
Oceania. NPT states make up a major voting bloc in the UN; however, the normative values of 
the NPT do not necessarily translate to NPT states voting behaviors. While 190 states are 
member to the NPT, including a handful of nuclear-armed states, only 122 states voted in favor 
of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Most of the rest of NPT states failed to cast 
a vote. The Netherlands, while a party to the NPT, cast a no vote. For the purpose of this project, 
NPT states are abolitionists. Variance from this position will be identified when and if 
necessary.262 
Religious leaders include figures, such as the Pope, the Dalai Lama, and charismatic 
Jewish, Islamic, and spiritual leaders. This list also includes leaders such as Billy Graham (d. 
                                                
261 “Nuclear power is part of the problem,” Greenpeace, last modified July 1, 2016. 
https://www.greenpeace.org/archive-international/en/campaigns/climate-
change/Solutions/Reject-false-solutions/No-to-nuclear/. 
262 “When and if” because this model will change as social and political realities change. 
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2018), Deepak Chopra, Thich Nhat Hanh, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, and L. Ron Hubbard (d. 1986), 
whose writings presently influence social beliefs and behaviors (despite whether or not those 
figures are presently living). Here, religious leaders stand against weapons that can usher in 
Armageddon. They are abolitionists because that is the dominant position. However, some 
religious leaders endorse using nuclear weapons. For example, during summer 2017 after US 
President Donald Trump called for “fire and fury” against the DPRK, Trump’s friend and 
Evangelical Southern Baptist pastor Robert Jeffress said Donald Trump had been given divine 
sanction to kill DPRK leader Kim Jong Un using any means necessary. Speaking to the 
Washington Post, he suggested this God-ordained green light included using nuclear weapons 
against North Korea.263 Because religious leaders can influence voters, and because voters can 
influence policy in more democratic states, religious leaders have some level of power within the 
model, even if it is modest.  
 
Stakeholder Classification 
For the purpose of this model, stakeholders are imbued with certain attributes: Power 
(Pi), legitimacy (Li), urgency (Ui), and prominence. Power is an actor’s ability to get another 
actor to do something that they would not otherwise do.264 In this sense power is relative. States 
certainly have more power than non-states in this model. Ultimately, without extreme coercion, 
states cannot be compelled to give up their weapons programs. Legitimacy is the view that a 
                                                
263 Sarah Pulliam Bailey, “‘God has given Trump authority to take out Kim Jong Un,’ 
evangelical adviser says,” The Washington Post, August 9, 2017. 
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given stakeholder’s actions “are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, definitions.”265 Once again, states hold dominant 
legitimacy. An exception to this rule might be the DPRK, which the international community 
feels has violated norms against proliferation; this is not reflected in Problem 1, but Outlier 
States, such as the DPRK, are modeled into Problem 2 and the “Mess.” Urgency is the “degree to 
which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention.”266 In this model these attributes fall on a 
binary range. Either stakeholders possess these attributes, or they do not. Finally, prominence is 
the average of the respective stakeholder’s attributes 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒! = 𝑃! + 𝐿! + 𝑈! /3 
 
and “represents a relative level of importance of each stakeholder to a given problem.”267 
Stakeholders can be placed into one of eight different classes depending on prominence. 
They can be further placed into one of four stakeholder classifications. These are identified in 
Table 5.3. 
Latent stakeholders have the least prominence and are the least important in the system. 
Expectant stakeholders are secondary actors in the system because they exhibit two attributes. 
Finally, definitive are primary actors because they exhibit all three traits. For this research, Table 
5.4 shows this model’s stakeholders and their attributes, class, and classification.268 
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268 For a discussion on the rationales for stakeholder classification and identification, see Table 
2: Mitchell, et al, 860-862. 
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Table 5.3: Stakeholder Classes and Classifications269 
Class Description Classification 
Dormant Powerful, not legitimate, not urgent Latent 
Discretionary Legitimate, not powerful, not urgent Latent 
Demanding Urgent, not powerful, not legitimate Latent 
Dominant Powerful, legitimate, not urgent Expectant 
Dangerous Powerful, urgent, not legitimate Expectant 
Dependent Legitimate, urgent, not powerful Expectant 
Definitive Powerful, legitimate, urgent Definitive 
Nonstakeholder Not powerful, not legitimate, not urgent Undefined 
 
 
Table 5.4: Problem 1 Stakeholder Classification 
Stakeholders Power Legitimacy Urgency Prominence Class Classification 
NWs states 1 1 0 0.67 Expectant Dominant 
Production 
Firms 
0 1 1 0.67 Expectant Demanding 
Stockholders 0 1 0 0.33 Latent Discretionary 
International 
verification 
and 
compliance 
agencies 
1 1 1 1.00 Definitive Definitive 
NGOs and 
activists 
0 1 1 0.67 Expectant Demanding 
Media 0 1 0 0.33 Latent Discretionary 
NPT states 0 1 1 0.67 Expectant Demanding 
Religious 
leaders 
0 1 0 0.33 Latent Discretionary 
 
 
Stakeholder Attitude Evaluation 
Before determining strategies for each stakeholder, stakeholder attitudes must be 
evaluated. Stakeholder potential for threat and cooperation determines strategies. Adapting from 
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Savage, et al, stakeholders with mixed attitudes have both high potential for threat and 
cooperation. High potential for cooperation and low potential for threat indicates supportive 
attitudes. Low potential for cooperation and high potential for threat suggests non-supportive 
attitudes. Both low potential for threat and cooperation indicates marginal attitudes. Savage, et 
al, then add the strategies are defined as thus: collaborate with mixed stakeholders, involve 
supportive stakeholders, defend against non-supportive stakeholders, and monitor marginal 
stakeholders.270 Table 5.5 shows this model’s stakeholder attitudes and strategies. Support is 
determined through a simple Cooperate minus Threat calculation. 
 
Table 5.5: Problem 1 Stakeholder Attitudes and Strategies 
Stakeholders Threat Cooperate Support Attitude Strategy 
NWs states 1 1 0 Mixed Collaborate 
Production Firms 1 0 -1 
Non-
supportive Defend 
International verification 
and compliance agencies 0 1 1 Supportive Involve 
NGOs and activists 0 1 1 Supportive Involve 
Media 0 0 0 Marginal Monitor 
NPT states 0 1 1 Supportive Involve 
Religious leaders 1 1 0 Mixed Collaborate 
 
 
FCM for Stakeholder Objectives 
Figure 5.1 shows this model’s initial FCM with stakeholders and objectives. 
 
 
 
                                                
270 Grant T. Savage, Timothy W. Nix, Carlton J. Whitehead, “Strategies for Assessing and 
Managing Organizational Stakeholders,” The Executive 5, no. 2 (1991): 65. 
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Figure 5.1: Problem 1 FCM Who 
 
 
Stakeholder Management Plan 
At this point in the modeling, the objective is to develop a stakeholder management plan. 
This plan allows practitioners and stakeholders an opportunity to determine how resources and 
effort should be distributed in order to maintain stakeholder support. Table 5.6 shows the 
stakeholder management plan from previous steps in the modeling, in addition to stakeholder 
engagement priorities. Table 5.6 combines stakeholder wants, strategies, and metrics from Table 
5.5. Stakeholder engagement priority is set by arranging metrics. The metrics are summarized 
with qualifying justification in Table 5.7. Nodes and weighted links from the FCM model 
determine Activity and Popularity for each stakeholder. Activity is set by OutDegree in 
descending order. Popularity is set by InDegree in descending order. Priority is set by Activity in 
ascending order and then Popularity in descending order (to break ties). 
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Table 5.6: Problem 1 Stakeholder Management Plan 
Stakeholder	 Strategy	 InDeg	 OutDeg	 Activity	 Popularity	 Engagement	
Priority	
Maintain	
Nuclear	
Weapons	
Collaborate	 2	 3.5	 4.582576	 3.464102	 1	
NPT	 States:	
Abolition	
Involve	 2	 3.25	 4.031129	 3.162278	 2	
Int'l	
Verification:	
Abolition	
Involve	 2.25	 3	 3.872983	 3	 3	
NGOs:	
Abolition	
Involve	 2.75	 2	 3.162278	 3.708099	 4	
Stories	 that	
Sell	
Monitor	 2.5	 1.75	 2.95804	 3.535534	 5	
Religious	
Leaders:	
Abolition	
Collaborate	 2.75	 1.5	 2.44949	 3.708099	 6	
Maximize	
Profits	
Defend	 1	 0.25	 0.5	 1	 7	
 
 
Table 5.7: Problem 1 Who Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
NW States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Production 
Firms: Maximize 
Profits 
1 NWS provide production contracts to various 
firms. 
NW States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Int'l Verification: 
Abolition 
-0.5 By desiring nuclear weapons NWS moderately 
decrease the IAEA's mission in 2 ways: 1) it 
blocks the IAEA's ability to enforce NPT Article 
VI, 2) they use voluntary offer agreements, which 
restrict what the IAEA can do. 
NW States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
NGOs: Abolition -0.5 NWS moderately decrease NGOs' ability to 
operate, but NGOs will continue their missions, 
despite hurdles. 
NW States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Stories that Sell 0.5 States moderately increase the media's ability to 
sell stories. It does not graduate to strong because 
the media might find more profitable stories, 
depending on circumstances. 
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NW States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
-0.5 NWS moderately decrease NPT states' mission, 
but the NPT also focuses on non-NWS. 
NW States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
-0.5 NWS moderately decrease Religious Leaders, but 
these leaders continue their work. 
Production 
Firms: 
Maximize 
Profits 
NW States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0.25 Firms can lobby the government to continue 
production orders; however, this link is weak 
because the state can do as it pleases, and it does 
not need Production Firms' blessings. 
Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
NW States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.5 This link is moderate because, while NWS can 
simply ignore the IAEA if they choose, they do 
not choose to ignore them. This relationship 
changes as NWS goal changes. 
Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
NGOs: Abolition 0.75 IAEA communications and data strongly help the 
NGO mission. 
Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
Stories that Sell 0.5 IAEA communications help the media sell stories 
moderately. The media can also choose to run 
other stories. 
Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
0.75 The IAEA directly assists the NPT states. 
Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
0.5 This relationship is moderate. While the IAEA 
has the power to do what Religious Leaders hope, 
Religious Leaders ultimately cannot do those 
things. 
NGOs: 
Abolition 
NW States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.25 NGOs can lobby governments, but this 
relationship is weak; governments can simply 
ignore them. 
NGOs: 
Abolition 
Int'l Verification: 
Abolition 
0.25 NGOs can supply the IAEA with information, but 
this information is a small part of the information 
the IAEA collects. 
NGOs: 
Abolition 
Stories that Sell 0.5 NGOs moderately increase the Media's ability to 
sell stories, but the media can ignore them. 
NGOs: 
Abolition 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
0.25 NGOs can lobby governments, but this 
relationship is weak; governments can simply 
ignore them. 
NGOs: 
Abolition 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
0.75 NGOs and Religious Leaders often work together 
for a common cause. 
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Stories that Sell NWs States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.25 The Media can sell more stories by reporting on 
negative things about governments, but this 
relationship is weak because there are many 
stories in the day. 
Stories that Sell Int'l Verification: 
Abolition 
0.5 The Media can report on IAEA inspection results 
or comments from the Board of Governors. 
Stories that Sell NGOs: Abolition 0.25 The media can help NGOs, but NGOs also 
receive help from much larger organizations. 
Stories that Sell NPT States: 
Abolition 
0.25 See above. 
Stories that Sell Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
0.5 Religious leaders often use the media. 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
NWs States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0.5 The non-nuclear norm moderately affects NWS 
behaviors. 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
Int'l Verification: 
Abolition 
1 NPT States make up a super majority of the 
IAEA. 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
NGOs: Abolition 0.75 NPT States often work with NGOs. 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
0.5 NPT States often work with Religious Leaders, 
but religious leaders do not have huge amounts of 
resources. 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
NWs States: 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.25 Religious Leaders can sway the minds of some 
voters, but not in less-than-democratic states, and 
not to a massive degree, especially when national 
security is on the line. 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
NGOs: Abolition 0.5 Religious Leaders can give a moral authority to 
NGOs. 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
Stories that Sell 0.5 Religious leaders can make authoritative 
statements to the press. 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
0.25 This relationship is weak because states can 
operate independently from the church. 
 
 
Summary 
This model is largely consistent with realist assumptions of states as primary drivers of 
international politics hold. On the other hand, international verification and compliance agencies, 
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NPT states, and NGOs must not be discounted. Involvement from abolitionist stakeholders and 
collaboration with nuclear weapons states are crucial actions that can synthesize the disarmament 
antitheses. Decision makers should monitor the media to look for signs that they have taken a 
supportive or non-supportive position. Finally, religious leaders should be consulted for 
collaboration because they can influence state leaders and, importantly for democracies, 
constituents. Religious leaders can communicate with their flock that disarmament is the moral 
option. However, they do have the potential to defect from their abolitionist position. This 
stakeholder analysis should be continuously monitored for changes. 
Before moving on another stakeholder must be identified. The view that all nuclear 
weapons states are functionally similar is certainly contentious, and this research acknowledges 
that—although even the DPRK has the capacity for cooperation with the US—states are not 
wedded to cooperation. Even cooperative states have the potential for defection. Therefore, in 
Problem 2, Outlier States (the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan) are identified as a distinct 
actor. This stakeholder mimics nuclear weapons states but behaves differently in key areas that 
are identified in Problem 2. For the purpose of avoiding redundancies that alter model behavior, 
this stakeholder does not interact with Problem 1’s other components until Problems 1 and 2 are 
combined to form the final “mess.” 
 
5.3 Problem 1: What? 
Understanding the “What” of the mess’ constituent problems is to break the problem 
down into its basic elements.271 In the previous section this research identified stakeholders and 
their goals and how the pursuit of those goals affects the goals of other stakeholders in the 
                                                
271 Hester and Adams, 157. 
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system. It did not reveal, however, the anatomy of the problems. Therefore, this section seeks to 
capture the problems’ objective narratives, apply a fundamental objective hierarchy and a means-
ends network, and update the FCM to address the problems’ constituent parts.  
 
Problem 1 Objective Narrative 
Problem articulation relies on the foundation that nuclear-armed states’ are the primary 
stakeholders, and their primary collective goal is to simply possess nuclear weapons. Their 
problem is that there is a continuing debate in the international community between nuclear-
haves and actors that want to approach global zero. At the Conference on Disarmament, an 
international forum tasked with negotiating to global zero, in 2018 U.N. Secretary-General 
Antonio Guterres argues, “Countries persist in clinging to the fallacious idea that nuclear arms 
make the world safer … At the global level, we must work towards forging a new momentum on 
eliminating nuclear weapons.”272 The US, France, and China expressed critical warnings that the 
international system’s future is too uncertain to pursue disarmament negotiations at the present 
time. On the other hand, nuclear-armed states are actively participating at the forum. The 
Conference on Disarmament includes ambassadors from every nuclear-armed state, including the 
DPRK. In other words, nuclear-armed states have not chosen to simply ignore the problem; they 
are actively contributing to the debate. Furthermore, there is some evidence as of March 2018 
that even North Korea is willing to negotiate for abolition. Kim Jong Un met with South Korean 
envoys to discuss dismantling the North’s nuclear weapons program and that the North is willing 
                                                
272 Antono Guterres quoted in Tom Miles, “U.N. chief calls for new push to rid the world of 
nuclear weapons,” Reuters, February 26, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-arms/u-n-
chief-calls-for-new-push-to-rid-the-world-of-nuclear-weapons-idUSKCN1GA1TK. 
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to disarm if its security needs are met.273 In June he met with US President Trump to discuss this 
further. In other words, at face value the DPRK does not see this as a problem of possession, but 
rather security. If the decisions were out of states’ controls, these states, particularly the DPRK 
and Israel, would be left with uncertain security in an environment they perceive as hostile. In 
other words, nuclear weapons serve a purpose: Defense. And defense serves a purpose: Security. 
It is from this position that the objective narrative begins. 
Nuclear weapons states collectively aim to balance their security needs with the demands 
of a highly interconnected international community. If it focuses solely on its security needs it 
violates norms against proliferation, which affects its access to international goods, trade, or 
decision-making forums. For example, there is a weak but apparent link between being in good 
standing with the NPT and IAEA membership. Article VI of the NPT requires nuclear weapons 
states to take good faith steps towards disarmament. The DPRK left the IAEA in 1994 after its 
withdrawal from the NPT raised concerns with the IAEA’s board of governors. But if the nuclear 
weapons states focus primarily on the demands of the international community, it undermines its 
primary goal of possessing nuclear weapons. It can be established, therefore, that nuclear 
weapons states’ fundamental objective is to balance security in the international system with its 
reputation.274 Various mechanisms can achieve this goal, which are addressed in the fundamental 
objectives hierarchy and means-ends network.  
Examining the other stakeholders’ preferences reveals another justification for focusing 
on nuclear weapons states as the prioritized stakeholder. From the perspective of international 
                                                
273 Choe Sang-Hun and Mark Landler, “North Korea Signals Willingness to ‘Denuclearize,’ 
South Says,” The Washington Post, March 6, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/world/asia/north-korea-south-nuclear-weapons.html. 
274 For the purpose of this project, “reputation” refers to normative constraints imposed on states 
at a psychological level.  
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verification and compliance agencies, NPT states, and NGOs, these fundamental goals are 
reasonable. NPT states, for example, desire regional security. If nuclear weapons states lost 
deterrence, many states with security guarantees from nuclear weapons states might fear either 
defection from those guarantees or spillover from regional conflicts. That is, they seek to avoid 
making a Type IV error, or making their situations worse. Additionally, due to the high 
interconnectedness of the planet, non-nuclear weapons states benefit from trade with nuclear 
weapons states. They support nuclear weapons states’ secondary aim of having access to 
international markets and other goods.  
 
Problem 1 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy 
This research identifies two fundamental objectives in the dialectic between nuclear 
weapons and disarmament: Maximize defense and maximize reputation (which increases access 
to various benefits). Maximizing defensive abilities can be broken down to include a balanced 
strategy (military capability and avoiding making unnecessary threatening behaviors275), 
diplomacy, and economic power. Maximizing reputation is broken down into ethical behaviors, 
following norms, and soft power.276 Collectively, these goals are referred to as maximize 
security. These are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The goal of nuclear weapons states can be updated 
                                                
275 The “security dilemma” is an inherent reality in the realist structure, where “Striving to attain 
security from [an] attack, [insecure states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to 
escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and 
compels them to prepare for the worst.” John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security 
Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950): 157. 
276 Soft power is the ability for actors to get others to act the way it wants through attraction. 
Joseph S. Nye, “Soft power,” Foreign Policy no. 80 (1990): 166. See also Barbara G. Haskel, 
“Access to Society: A Neglected Dimension of Power,” International Organization 34, no. 1 
(1980), 89-120. 
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from simply possessing nuclear weapons to maximizing security, which, as mentioned, is a 
combination of high levels of defense and high levels of reputation. 
 
Figure 5.2: Problem 1 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy 
 
 
Problem 1 Means-Ends Network 
The means-ends network, while similar to the fundamental objectives hierarchy, captures 
more cause and effect. That is, the point is to ask how do or can we achieve our fundamental 
objectives,277 or, in case, how is security maximized? Maximizing security includes both 
defensive capabilities and reputation. Furthermore, maximizing defensive capability is a means 
by which to maximize reputation (e.g., avoiding war with neighbors means following certain 
norms), and maximizing reputation is a means by which to maximize defense. 
                                                
277 Robert T. Clemen and Terence Reilly, Making Hard Decisions with Decision Tools, 3rd 
Edition (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2013), 52. 
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Maximizing defense means having adequate military capabilities (this presently includes both 
nuclear and conventional weapons, for the nuclear weapon state), avoiding unnecessarily 
threatening postures, having diplomatic relations with others, and increasing economic power 
through international investments and return on investment gains (i.e., economic partnerships 
decrease the effects of military threat). Maximizing reputation means properly responding to 
violations of international norms, treating citizens properly, practicing self-restraint, being 
transparent, conforming to internationally acceptable forms of behavior, and obtaining desired 
outcomes through simply attracting others to the state’s brand. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3: Problem 1 Means-Ends Network  
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Problem 1 What FCM 
Applying the means-ends network and nuclear weapons states’ updated problem 
statement to Problem 1’s FCM shows emergence of new links between who and what. Of 
particular note, the causal link between nuclear weapons states’ goal and international 
verification agencies’ goal is updated from negative to positive. This is because nuclear weapons 
states ultimate goal is security. The IAEA works in ways that increase states’ security. 
Additionally, other links are broken. Religious leaders goal of disarmament and the media’s goal 
of selling stories no longer affects nuclear weapons states’ goal of maximizing security. The rest 
of the updates are noted in Table 5.8, and the updated FCM is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4: Problem 1 FCM What 
 
 
Table 5.8: Problem 1 What Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
Reputation Security 0.75 Reputation strongly increases security because the 
risk of war declines as states become more 
reputable to their neighbors. 
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Reputation Defense 0.5 Forming half of this positive feedback loop, 
reputation moderately increases defense by 
decreasing the risk of conflict. 
Defense Security 0.75 Strong defenses strongly increase security by 
increasing the opponent's attack cost. 
Defense Reputation 0.5 Forming half of this positive feedback loop, 
defense moderately increases reputation because 
strong defense decreases risk of conflict, and 
lower conflict increases the state's reputation as a 
member in good standing of the international 
community. 
Military 
Capability 
Defense 1 Military capability is a very strong component of 
defense. 
Diplomacy Defense 0.75 Diplomatic relations strongly increase defense by 
making conflict less likely. 
ROI Gains Defense 0.5 Returns on investment increase defense 
moderately by adding to available military funds. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Military 
Capability 
1 This relationship is self-explanatory. 
Conventional 
Weapons 
Military 
Capability 
1 This relationship is self-explanatory. 
International 
Investments 
Defense 0.5 International investments increase defense by 
making conflict less likely278 
Avoid Threats Defense 0.5 Avoiding actions that can be perceived as 
threatening increases defense by making conflict 
less likely. 
Proper Response Reputation 0.75 Properly responding to norm violations strongly 
increases reputation by signaling to the 
international community that the responder abides 
by international social norms. 
Self-Restraint Reputation 0.5 By restraining oneself from behavior deemed 
deviant, reputation as a member in good standing 
with the international community increases. 
Proper 
Treatment of 
Citizens 
Reputation 0.25 This relationship is weak because international 
reputation is more concerned with international 
behavior; however, human rights violations can 
have a negative impact. 
Conformity Reputation 0.5 Conforming to international norms moderately 
increases reputation. 
                                                
278 Phillip G. Cerny, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, Kindle 
Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), Kindle Locations 3343-3346. 
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Transparency Reputation 1 Transparency very strongly increases reputation 
by diminishing uncertainty about intentions. 
Attraction Reputation 0.75 Being attractive strongly increases reputation. 
 
 
5.4 Problem 1: Why? 
The first section identified and analyzed nine stakeholders and developed a stakeholder 
management plan. The second section decomposed the mess’ constituent problems into 
component parts. This section tackles substantive information: motivation analysis, motivation 
models, and motivation feedback. That is, this research is now looking at the motivating forces—
the premises and purposes—behind events and actions. In the Structure, Think, Act, and Observe 
model from Chapter 3, this would fall under Structure, Restructure. The revised model follows 
from this restructuring. 
As identified in the first section, the primary actors in Problem 1 are nuclear weapons 
states, and nuclear weapons states’ fundamental goal in Problem 1 is security (remembering that 
nuclear weapons serve a function, defense, and defense serves a function, security). Another way 
of stating this is nuclear weapons’ primary goal in a hostile world is Maslow’s proposed second 
hierarchical need: Safety.279 Primarily attention is paid to relationships between other stakeholder 
objectives, looking for feedback loops. Then necessary modifications to the FCM are made. 
These updates are explained in Table 5.9 and shown in Figure 5.5.  
 
 
 
                                                
279 A. H. Maslow, and Herbert S. Langfeld, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological 
Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 376. 
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Table 5.9: Problem 1 Why Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
Military 
Capability 
Maximize 
Profits 
0.75 Production firms' profits increase strongly as 
military capability increases because the 
production firms are awarded military contracts. 
Military 
Capability 
Stories that Sell 0.75 The media enjoys reporting on increased military 
capability. 
Military 
Capability 
Defense 1 Military capability is a very strong component of 
defense. 
Diplomacy Int'l Verification: 
Abolition 
0.5 As an international body, the IAEA functions 
diplomatically. In acting diplomatically, NWS 
uphold the IAEA's mission. 
Diplomacy Stories that Sell 0.5 Diplomatic behavior is often reported in the news. 
Diplomacy NPT States: 
Abolition 
0.5 NPT States utilize diplomacy to further their 
goals. 
Avoid Threats Stories that Sell -1 With no threatening behavior to report on, the 
media is less likely to sell stories. 
Attraction Stories that Sell 0.5 Attractive stories increase the media's ability to 
sell stories (for example, cinema and new music 
coming from the state) 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Problem 1 FCM Why 
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5.5 Problem 1: Where? 
When speaking in terms of “where,” this research is tackling two things: the context of 
the problem and the boundaries. Context is “the circumstances, factors, conditions, values, and 
patterns that surround messes and problems” and the boundaries are “the representations we use 
that provide lines of demarcation between messes and problems and the surrounding 
environment.”280 “Where” does not refer to geographical or physical locations. This section 
allows the research to be refined in a way that decreases complexity, providing an improved 
understanding of the problem. 
Focusing on the prioritized stakeholders, nuclear weapons states, this research adapts 
from Ulrich281 to generate a boundary critique. This force-field diagram is an assessment of what 
is and what ought to be in the model.282 First, identify the sources of motivation. Whose interests 
are served versus whose should be served? What are and should be the consequences? How can 
what is and should be be considered an improvement based on consequences? Second, identify 
the sources of power. Who is and should be the decision maker? What resources do and should 
that decision maker control? What decisions are and should be outside the decision maker’s 
control? Third, identify the sources of knowledge. Who are and should be considered the 
experts? What is and should be considered a source of knowledge? Who does and should 
guarantee improvement? Finally, identify the sources of legitimacy. Who are and should be the 
legitimate stakeholders? Where does and should legitimacy lie? How is and should improvement 
be viewed? 
 
                                                
280 Hester and Adams, 207. 
281 Werner Ulrich, “Reflective Practice in the Civil Society: The Contribution of Critically 
Systemic Thinking,” Reflective Practice 1, no. 2 (2000): 256. 
282 Ulrich, 259. 
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Problem 1 Boundary Articulation 
The sources of motivation are examined. First, the clients are all stakeholders with formal 
recognition. This model should serve the interests of at a minimum both nuclear weapons states 
and NPT states. Second, the purpose is security. The measure of improvement is whether or not 
various stakeholder goals reduce uncertainty. For example, joining the IAEA reduces 
uncertainty, which is shown in the following game: 
 
Table 5.10: IAEA and reduction of uncertainty 
 2 JOIN 2 DEFECT 
1 JOIN 1, 1 0, 0 
1 DEFECT 0, 0 0, 0 
 
 
In the game profit comes from joining because both players must join and make their systems 
verifiable. Reducing uncertainty by examining another state’s materials means making one’s 
materials verifiable. 1 represents profit, while 0 represents the status quo. 
Next, the sources of power are assessed. First, nuclear weapons states are the primary 
decision makers within this problem. No other stakeholder—not even non-nuclear weapons 
states—can compel disarmament. However, because nuclear weapons can destabilize the system 
or, if used, intensely burden all states, the decision-making should be a collective effort. Second, 
decision makers should control resources identified in the means-ends network to maximize 
reputation. Third, as previously specified, the system cannot be made worse. The outcome 
cannot be a cause of major instability. Therefore, while states can control overt instability-
inducing conditions (e.g., compellence through war), decision makers should not be able to 
control these conditions. 
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The next step is to identify sources of power. First, because the IAEA answers directly to 
the General Assembly and, if need be, the Security Council of the United Nations, and because 
the United Nations is explicitly a sub-stakeholder part of the international verification and 
compliance stakeholder, these agencies, along with states (nuclear and non-nuclear), should be 
considered the primary experts. Second, there are several documents that should provide 
guidance for knowledge experts. Several of these are identified in Table 5.11. These include 
treaties, declarations, and statements on morality. Third, the guarantor of success should be an 
international body, such as the United Nations, where improvement is determined through 
consensus. 
 
Table 5.11: Problem 1 Sources of Knowledge 
Document Type Description 
Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT), Article VI283 
Treaty Article VI states “Each of the Parties to the Treaty 
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, 
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control.” 
Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons284 
International 
legal 
opinion 
International Court of Justice opinion that concludes 
there is not legal reason to prohibit states from possessing 
nuclear weapons; however, it required states abide by 
NPT Article VI. All members, including the permanent 
members of the Security Council, voted to pursue the 
requirements set forth in NPT Article VI. 
United Nations 
Charter, Chapter 7, 
Article 51285 
Treaty Article 51 upholds UN member states’ right to self- and 
collective defense and requires states invoking this right 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council. 
Treaties under IAEA Various These are agreements, conventions, and protocols on 
                                                
283 Israel is a non-signatory, and North Korea has withdrawn.  
284 “International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons,” International Legal Materials 35, no. 4 (1996): 809-938. 
285 United Nations, “United Nations Charter, CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO 
THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION,” 
1945, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/. 
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Auspices286 various organizational, nuclear safety and security, 
liability, technical cooperation, and scientific and 
technical areas under IAEA jurisdiction. 
The Challenge of 
Peace: God's Promise 
and Our Response287 
Catholic 
declaration 
This document tackles the moral implications of nuclear 
deterrence and makes the case for disarmament through a 
Christian lens. 
Resolution On 
Multilateral Arms 
Control288 
Southern 
Baptist 
Resolution 
This document supports arms reductions and the 
reallocation of resources from nuclear research to human 
needs. 
The Talmud Jewish holy 
text 
Shavuot 35b forbids nations from conducting war that 
kills more than one-out-of-six people.289 
Scientific books and 
journals 
Various These provide decision makers with the physical, 
existential, meteorological, psychological, social, and 
economic effects of nuclear war. 
 
The final step is to examine the sources of legitimacy. First, states are the primary 
legitimate stakeholders. However, intergovernmental agencies, being made up of sovereign 
states, should share some of the legitimacy. Second, states should be the emancipatory 
stakeholders. Intergovernmental agencies shall not replace sovereignty. Lastly, improvement 
shall be determined as reconciliation between states’ security and international security. 
 
Problem 1 Context Articulation 
Context is the noticeable and important elements of the problem: the circumstances, 
factors, conditions, values, and patterns that create new nodes of influence in the model.290 The 
circumstances of the international system structure behaviors. For this problem, these include 
international agreements, such as Article VI of the NPT. Article VI requires nuclear weapons 
                                                
286 “Treaties under IAEA Auspices,” International Atomic Energy Agency, 
https://www.iaea.org/resources/treaties/treaties-under-IAEA-auspices. 
287 Daniel F. Hoye, “The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,” National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops (May 3, 1983). 
288 “Resolution On Multilateral Arms Control,” Southern Baptist Convention (1978). 
289 B.T. Shavuot 35b would be in the Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berachot, Folio 35 back (b) 
side. 
290 Hester and Adams, 211-212. 
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states to make progress towards disarmament in good faith. Other requirements are included in 
Table 5.11 above. 
Factors are invariable realities. Because this research avoids the Hobbesian solution to 
this problem, the circumstances operate in a factor of anarchy. Within an anarchical system 
uncertainty prevails as a second unavoidable factor. While states and intergovernmental agencies 
can work to mitigate the effects of anarchy and uncertainty, it is not possible to reduce these 
factors to negligible levels in the foreseeable future. Nuclear weapons states therefore accept the 
nuclear risk in hopes of managing uncertainty. 
The conditions refer to the current state of the world that influences the outcome of the 
model. These include the risk of nuclear terrorism and the risk of human error. Conditions can 
change without notice; therefore, these must be continuously monitored. For example, a major, 
non-nuclear war between superpowers is a potential factor that could disrupt the present-day’s 
model output. While real, the threat of war, accident, or terrorism is not—at this moment—
modeled as actual wars, accidents, or attacks. 
Values are strongly held beliefs that shape behavior. This includes nonproliferation, 
disarmament, and no first use or first strike policies. For example, behavioral norms pressure 
states to not violate the provisions of the NPT. While states not in good standing with the NPT 
can ignore Article VI (the DPRK and Israel, for example), these states cannot avoid the social 
stigma that comes with being in bad standing.  
Finally, patterns are generally acceptable, structurally perceived, and recurring behaviors 
in the international system. The effects of conflict and cooperation are relatively predictable and 
either mitigate or exasperate the effects of anarchy and uncertainty. Conflict is likely to reduce 
certainty and increase the perception of the anarchical structure of the system. Cooperation is 
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likely to reduce uncertainty, particularly if managed by intergovernmental agencies, and mitigate 
the structural forces of anarchy. 
 
Table 5.12: Problem 1 Context Articulation 
Category Elements 
Circumstances International agreements 
Factors Anarchy, uncertainty 
Conditions Risk of nuclear terrorism, human error 
Values Behavioral norms 
Patterns Conflict, cooperation 
 
 
There are several competing elements within this problem. International agreements, the 
risk of nuclear terrorism, behavioral norms, and the potential for cooperation drive this problem 
towards resolution; however, anarchy, uncertainty, and the potential for conflict serve as 
roadblocks. 
 
Force Field Diagram 
The force field diagram combines new elements from the context and boundary 
articulations. This seeks to analyze what is and what ought to be. Ultimately, this is a problem of 
uncertainty, which prevents abolitionist groups and nuclear weapons states from finding a 
mutually beneficial resolution to this problem. This is reflected in Table 5.13. 
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Table 5.13: Problem 1 Force Field Diagram 
Driving 
Force 
Strength 
as-is 
Strength 
ought-
to-be 
Problem Restraining 
force 
Strength 
as-is 
Strength 
ought-to-be 
International 
Agreements 
0.5 1 Present State: 
States operate 
under anarchy 
and uncertainty, 
which decreases 
security.  
 
Idealized State: 
They should 
abide by UN 
Charter Article 
51 and work 
closer with 
international 
verification and 
compliance 
agencies that 
have significant 
power to reduce 
uncertainty. 
Uncertainty -1 -0.25 
Risk of 
Nuclear 
Terrorism 
0.25 1291 Anarchy -1 -0.25 
Behavioral 
Norms 
0.5 1 Conflict -1 -0.25 
Cooperation 0.5 1    
 
 
Proposed Ought-to-Be Changes 
Nuclear-armed states should embrace cooperation as a means by which to reduce 
uncertainty and increase security. This inevitably means states should work closer with 
international verification and compliance agencies, abiding by international norms, and abiding 
by existing international agreements. The risk of nuclear terrorism is another reality that can 
greatly reduce states’ security; however, the probability for non-state actor proliferation is low.  
 
                                                
291 That is, the risk of terrorism should be a driving force; this change in no way implies terrorists 
should have more power. 
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Table 5.14: Problem 1 Where Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
International 
Agreements 
Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
0.75 Existing international agreements strongly 
increase the IAEA's ability to perform its mission. 
International 
Agreements 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
0.75 Existing international agreements strongly 
increase the NPT States' ability to perform their 
mission. 
International 
Agreements 
Reputation 0.75 Existing international agreements signal to the 
world that signatory states are in good 
international standing. 
Risk of Nuclear 
Terrorism and 
Human Error 
Defense -0.25 These are inherent risks, but their probability is 
low. 
Behavioral 
Norms 
Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
0.5 Presently, nonproliferation is the norm, but it is 
not universal. 
Behavioral 
Norms 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
0.5 Presently, nonproliferation is the norm, but it is 
not universal. 
Behavioral 
Norms 
Reputation 0.5 Abiding by Behavioral Norms moderately 
increases Reputation. This relationship does not 
graduate to strong because other things (like 
attraction) also increase reputation. 
Cooperation Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
0.75 Cooperation strongly increases the IAEA's 
mission because cooperative behavior is the 
cornerstone of the IAEA Charter. 
Cooperation NPT States: 
Abolition 
0.75 Cooperation between NPT states forms the 
nonproliferation regime. 
Cooperation Reputation 0.5 Cooperation moderately increases reputation. 
Cooperation Defense 0.5 Cooperation decreases the likelihood of conflict. 
Anarchy Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
-0.5 Anarchy is a structural force that mitigates the 
IAEA's ability to function. 
Anarchy NPT States: 
Abolition 
-0.5 Anarchy decreases the likelihood that the 
nonproliferation regime will survive on a long 
enough timeline. 
Anarchy Defense -0.25 Anarchy weakly decreases Defense by creating a 
system where conflict is possible. 
Conflict Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
-0.25 Militarized international disputes are rare, but 
when they occur they have a small potential for 
incentivizing proliferation. 
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Conflict NPT States: 
Abolition 
-0.25 Militarized international disputes are rare, but 
when they occur they have a small potential for 
incentivizing proliferation. 
Conflict Reputation -0.5 Conflicts between states moderately reduce those 
states' reputations because those states have 
violated a norm against militarized international 
disputes. 
Conflict Defense -0.75 Using defensive capabilities and having those 
capabilities attacked strongly reduces defensive 
capability. 
Uncertainty Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
-0.5 This psychological pressure incentivizes defection 
but only moderately. 
Uncertainty NPT States: 
Abolition 
-0.75 This psychological pressure strongly undermines 
the NPTs mission by disincentivizing 
nonproliferation. 
Uncertainty Defense 0.25 Uncertainty weakly increases defensive capability 
by incentivizing weapon production. 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
Behavioral 
Norms 
0.5 Religious leaders have a moderate ability to 
define morality within a society. 
Stories that Sell Self-Restraint 0.5 The media can report on deviant behavior, which 
pressures states to practice restraint. 
Stories that Sell Proper 
Treatment of 
Citizens 
0.5 The media can report on deviant behavior, which 
pressures states to treat citizens properly. 
Stories that Sell Conformity 0.5 The media can report on deviant behavior, which 
pressures states to conform. 
Stories that Sell Attraction 0.75 The media is a driving force behind attraction. 
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Figure 5.6: Problem 1 FCM Where 
 
 
5.6 Problem 1: How? 
Now that the problem is beginning to take on significant structure, this research can turn 
to the specific means by which the international system can reach its goals. That is, what are the 
mechanisms by which the international system can move from its present state—disagreement 
over the role nuclear weapons play—and the desired state—a world without nuclear weapons 
that maintains states’ security needs? Amarel calls these mechanisms “a set of relevant moves 
that can be applied from a state to obtain a new state.”292 Hester and Adams note there are three 
mechanism categories: Human mechanisms, abstract mechanisms, and physical mechanisms, 
which are further broken down into nine unique mechanisms that do not work alone, but rather in 
concert with one another.293 Human mechanisms include human capital and knowledge, skills, 
and abilities. Abstract mechanisms include methods and information. Physical mechanisms 
include material, money, time, equipment, and facilities. 
                                                
292 Saul Amarel, “On the mechanization of creative processes,” IEEE Spectrum 3, no. 4 (1966): 
112. 
293 Hester and Adams, 232. 
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Based on the previous section’s force field diagram, the preferred state is one where 
nuclear weapons states make better use of verification agencies and UN Charter Article 51 to 
mitigate the restraining forces. Transitioning from the present state of the world, where anarchy 
is more of an ordering mechanism than verification, is to transition from less ordered to more 
ordered in accordance with Booth’s “utopian realism.” Hester and Adams propose a Cynefin 
framework to move from un-order to order.294 This includes five domains of order and un-order. 
Disorder exists at the center. Surrounding this domain begins on the ordered side—simple 
(known-knowns) and complicated (known-unknowns)—and traverses into un-order—complex 
(unknown-knowns) and chaotic (unknown-unknowns). 
 
Problem 1 Cynefin Analysis 
Problem 1 appears relatively ordered, placing it in the complicated domain. That is, there 
does not appear to be unknown elements of complexity and chaos. However, there are still the 
known-unknowns, such as uncertainty under anarchy. This stems from a lack of verifiable 
information, even under the purview of safeguards and verification. Hedging is still a possibility, 
and outright cheating is certainly not beyond the realm of possibilities. Therefore, stakeholders’ 
objectives should apply the appropriate mechanisms, which includes various human, abstract, 
and physical nodes. These mechanisms describe the means by which one can transform the 
problematic situation as presented above into a state that is more desirable.295 
 
 
 
                                                
294 Hester and Adams, 242. 
295 Hester and Adams, 231. 
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Problem 1 Mechanism Analysis 
Most noticeably, gaining information from nuclear weapons and nuclear energy states 
requires significant human capital and money. However, on the abstract side, as the world 
approaches global zero, significant verification improvements must be developed to ensure 
proper safeguards of nuclear components as well as automatic short lead-in times for re-
proliferation. Safeguard improvements include beginning accountancy at the refining process, 
safeguards for potentially weaponizable isotopes, increased inspection frequency, safeguards to 
detect small material diversions, increased violation detection systems, better violation reporting, 
and establishing a good track record of violation identification.296 Short lead-in times for re-
proliferation discourages re-proliferation by giving states the ability to retaliate against new 
proliferations or re-proliferations. In short, it gives previous nuclear weapons states the option to 
build nuclear weapons in short order.297 This helps stabilize the system in two ways: 1) it 
encourages nuclear weapons states to sign international agreements to disarm by giving them the 
option to hedge or defect later, and 2) it makes hedging or defecting costly. Therefore the 
mechanisms include safeguard improvements and re-proliferation capabilities. 
 
Table 5.15: Problem 1 How Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
Re-Proliferation 
Capabilities 
Transparency 0.5 Re-Proliferation Capabilities must be open in 
order to achieve proliferation deterrence, but this 
relationship is not perfect. 
Re-Proliferation 
Capabilities 
International 
Agreements 
0.5 Re-Proliferation Capabilities moderately increase 
the chances of successful International 
Agreements by providing signatory states with 
assurances. 
                                                
296 Perkovich and Acton, 73-74. 
297 Perkovich and Acton, 102. 
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Re-Proliferation 
Capabilities 
Uncertainty -0.5 Re-Proliferation Capabilities moderately 
decrease uncertainty by offering assurances that 
proliferation will beget proliferation. 
Safeguards 
Improvements 
Transparency 0.75 This relationship is strong. A unit increase in 
improvement greatly increases the international 
community's ability to monitor nuclear programs 
worldwide. This is exemplified by the functional 
differences between the CSA and the AP, which 
allows complementary accesses with little to no 
notice. 
Safeguards 
Improvements 
International 
Agreements 
0.5 This relationship is moderate because improving 
safeguards reinforces the normative structure of 
the international agreements to which they are 
assigned. This relationship is not perfect, 
however, because future developments might 
privilege sovereign constraints. 
Safeguards 
Improvements 
Risk of Nuclear 
Terrorism and 
Human Error 
-0.75 Regular monitoring strongly reduces the risk of 
inadvertent use or misuse of nuclear materials. 
Safeguards 
Improvements 
Cooperation 0.5 Safeguards Improvements moderately increase 
Cooperation by reinforcing norms. 
Safeguards 
Improvements 
Uncertainty -0.75 Improving safeguards strongly reduces 
uncertainty by increasing the ability to detect 
diversion or other illicit activities. 
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Figure 5.7: Problem 1 FCM How 
 
5.7 Problem 1: When? 
The final step in Hester and Adam’s FCM technique is to assess when intervention is 
appropriate. To determine the appropriate time Hester and Adams attempt to determine “if any 
option exists for intervention in our system that provides a larger benefit than its associated 
cost,”298 using an inequality where max !"#"$%&
!"#$
≥ 1. That is, what is the actual cost of an 
intervention compared to the benefit of intervening? In the system constructed for Problem 1, 
can the cost of finding a synthesis between nuclear weapons states and the abolition movement 
be justified given the potential payout? If the system in which this problem exists is too mature 
(e.g., if the present system of states is expected to be replaced in the foreseeable future) then the 
inequality is not met; however, if it is assumed the system is not too mature and requires near-
term intervention then, by definition, the inequality is met. 
It is unlikely the present-day system of states under anarchy is going to be replaced by 
some other ordering mechanism in the near term. Further, other stakeholders, such as verification 
                                                
298 Hester and Adams, 257. 
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agencies, are unlikely to disappear in short order. Finally, a world where security is maximized 
and where the threat of nuclear war, attack, or accident is erased is a world that benefits all 
stakeholders. Therefore, max !"#"$%&
!"#$
≥ 1 can reasonably be assumed. In other words, the 
problem warrants some form of intervention. 
The problem appears fairly stable. There are few, if any, unknown-unknowns that might 
add chaotic elements to the problem. If the inequality is met, and if the system is stable, then the 
correct course of action, as identified in Figure 5.8, is to act to achieve objectives. 
 
Figure 5.8: Courses of Action (Adapted from Hester and Adams)299 
 
 
Hester and Adams’ technique then provides a framework for determining timescale. They 
require that all concepts operate on the same timescale, and proscribe increasing or decreasing 
weights depending on changes in time.300 In this problem there is no definitive time horizon. 
                                                
299 Hester and Adams, 268. 
300 Hester and Adams, 270. 
   
 
143 
System evolution will continue, and no differences in timescale exist between nodes. Because 
the timescale is immediate and ongoing, no changes to the FCM are necessary. 
 
Problem 1: Intervention Timing 
Finally, referring back to Figure 5.8, this project concludes that max !"#"$%&
!"#$
≥ 1. The 
system is stable and operating on a standardized timeline. The next step is to determine how the 
status quo should appear. Therefore, a few scenarios are run. 
The first step in intervention is to calculate popularity and activity. This will provide a list of 
ranked concepts to investigate. Table 5.16 shows popularity, activity, and whether or not 
changing these variables is feasible. Popularity is a measure of the weights going into a concept 
set in descending order from highest popularity to lowest. Activity is a measure of the weights 
coming out of a concept set in descending order from highest activity to lowest. Measuring the 
activity rank in ascending order and popularity rank in descending order sets the engagement 
priority.  
 
Table 5.16: Problem 1 Popularity, Activity, and Feasibility 
Concept Activity Popularity Engagement 
Priority 
Change 
Feasible? 
Stories that Sell 6 6.873864 1 N 
Security 4.582576 4.769696 2 Y 
Safeguards 
Improvements 
4.031129 0 3 Y 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
4.031129 8.485281 4 Y 
Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
3.872983 8.124038 5 Y 
Cooperation 3.162278 0.707107 6 N 
NGOs: 3.162278 3.708099 7 Y 
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Abolition 
Diplomacy 3 0 8 Y 
Military 
Capability 
2.738613 2 9 Y 
Conflict 2.645751 0 10 N 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
2.645751 3.708099 11 Y 
International 
Agreements 
2.598076 1.414214 12 Y 
Re-Proliferation 
Capabilities 
2.12132 0 13 Y 
Behavioral 
Norms 
2.12132 0.707107 14 N 
Uncertainty 2.12132 1.581139 15 N 
Anarchy 1.936492 0 16 N 
Avoid Threats 1.732051 0 17 Y 
Attraction 1.581139 0.866025 18 N 
Defense 1.581139 7.952987 19 Y 
Reputation 1.581139 8.455767 20 N 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
1 0 21 Y 
Conventional 
Weapons 
1 0 22 Y 
Transparency 1 1.581139 23 Y 
Proper 
Response 
0.866025 0 24 Y 
ROI Gains 0.707107 0 25 N 
International 
Investments 
0.707107 0 26 Y 
Self-Restraint 0.707107 0.707107 27 Y 
Conformity 0.707107 0.707107 28 N 
Proper 
Treatment of 
Citizens 
0.5 0.707107 29 Y 
Risk of Nuclear 
Terrorism and 
Human Error 
0.5 0.866025 30 N 
Maximize 
Profits 
0.5 1.870829 31 N 
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For the first scenario, international compliance and verification agencies are clamped at 
0.25. This simulates a small increase in adherence to IAEA safeguards. All remaining nodes will 
begin at zero. Zero in this simulation represents no change from the status quo. A change in +1 
represents a maximum increase, and a change in -1 represents a maximum decrease.  
The following simulation utilizes a sigmoid transfer function, applies a lambda of 5,301 
and runs for 50 iterations (to allow sufficient time for hidden chaotic behavior to emerge; 
however, the results will be truncated at the twelfth timestamp to reflect where equilibrium is 
achieved). The results are shown in Figure 5.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
301 Lambda used here is a constant for function slope. Smaller lambda values (𝜆 ≤ 1) 
approximate linear functions, large lambda values (𝜆 ≥ 10) approximate discrete functions, and 
lambda values around 5 represent a good “degree of fuzzification.” Elpiniki I. Papageorgiou, 
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps for Applied Sciences and Engineering: From Fundamentals to Extensions 
and Learning Algorithms (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 180-181. 
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Figure 5.9: Problem 1 Stability Analysis: International Verification 
 
 
At timestamp 0 the IAEA’s goal of International Verification is clamped at a minor 
increase. By timestamp 1 this results in a moderate increase in Nuclear Weapons States’ 
Security, as well as moderate to significant increases in NGOs, the Media, NPT States, and 
Religious Leaders’ goals. Self-Restrain, Proper Treatment of Citizens, Conformity, Attraction, 
and Behavioral Norms all experience a permanent maximum increase. 
These changes, particularly Abolition goals, result in a maximum decrease of Security by 
timestamp 2. On the other hand, NGOs, the Media, NPT States, and Religious Leaders 
experience a maximum increase in their goals, which remain maximized through the end of the 
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simulation. Self-Restrain, Proper Treatment of Citizens, Conformity, Attraction, and Behavioral 
Norms all experience a permanent maximum increase. 
Timestamp 3 shows continued maximum reductions in Security. Additionally, Production 
Firms’ profits experience a dramatic decline, due to Security reductions. Reputation is 
permanently maximized. The only significant change in timestamp 4 is the increased demand for 
Defense. 
By timestamp 5 increased Defense has led to increased Security, and by timestamp 6 
these have led to a permanent maximization of Profits. Finally, by timestamp 7 equilibrium is 
reached, were all stakeholders benefit from the new arrangement with the IAEA. 
This scenario reached a stable end state, and the situation is complicated. All stakeholders 
benefit from increased cooperation with the IAEA. Of particular note, nuclear weapons states’ 
security is maximized. On the other hand, anarchy and uncertainty have not been mitigated. 
Therefore, if the nuclear weapons states believe in the future that compliance is compulsory, 
these states can and may simply withdraw from IAEA membership and, if disarmed, rebuild 
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this risks a Type IV error because these states might distrust the 
efficacy of existing or future international agreements if other states begin withdrawing from the 
NPT or the IAEA Charter. This risk of Type IV error is heightened during the early stages of the 
simulation when Security is greatly reduced. During this period, the risk of conflict or war is 
amplified. 
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Table 5.17: Problem 1 Stability Analysis End States 
Component End 
State 
Security 0.99965 
Maximize Profits 0.999909 
Int'l Verification: Abolition 0.25 
NGOs: Abolition 0.999986 
Stories that Sell 1 
NPT States: Abolition 0.999819 
Religious Leaders: Abolition 0.999998 
Reputation 1 
Defense 0.986614 
Military Capability 0 
Diplomacy 0 
ROI Gains 0 
Nuclear Weapons 0 
Conventional Weapons 0 
International Investments 0 
Avoid Threats 0 
Proper Response 0 
Self-Restraint 0.986614 
Proper Treatment of Citizens 0.986614 
Conformity 0.986614 
Transparency 0 
Attraction 0.998894 
International Agreements 0 
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism and 
Human Error 
0 
Behavioral Norms 0.986614 
Cooperation 0 
Anarchy 0 
Conflict 0 
Uncertainty 0 
Re-Proliferation Capabilities 0 
Safeguards Improvements 0 
 
 
The preceding simulation is not necessarily a solution to the mess; rather, it exists to 
determine whether or not the system is stable enough to warrant action. This solution might 
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cause a Type IV error. For example, nuclear weapons states’ goal of security is strongly 
improved by forcing transparency on nations; however, it might undermine Problem 2 by taking 
the question of sovereignty away from states; therefore, the following chapters will build more 
complexity to the mess, allowing further analysis. Although movement is towards acting to 
achieve goals, more understanding of the mess is necessary before a discussion on actual action 
is possible. 
 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter tackles the divergence between nuclear weapons states and other actors that 
seek to abolish nuclear weapons. It first seeks to understand stakeholder goals and how those 
goals interact with other stakeholder goals. It then finds that, by abstracting nuclear weapons 
states’ goal of possessing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons states’ goal can be updated to 
maximize security. From this, numerous additional nodes are identified that form the edges of the 
problem, thus creating the problem in systemic terms. Finally, it is established that the system is 
not too mature for intervention and that it is stable enough to warrant intervention, and that it is 
stable enough to make intervention possible. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROBLEM 2 
There is a disagreement as to how much international governance is necessary to ensure 
verification of online, peaceful nuclear programs. 
 
6.1 Problem 2 Articulation 
Recognizing the potential threat nuclear technology poses on a global scale, particularly 
the prospect of rapid proliferation, the IAEA was established in 1957. The IAEA’s mission is to 
ensure the safety and promotion of peaceful nuclear technologies while further ensuring nuclear 
materials302 are not diverted to weapons programs. While membership in the IAEA is high, and 
while even nuclear-armed states have signed agreements with the intergovernmental 
organization, even to the extent of agreeing to make good faith progress towards upholding the 
disarmament provisions of NPT Article VI, compliance is not universal. As will be discussed 
below, many states fall under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the Additional 
Protocol (AP), while the Permanent Five members of the Security Council—China, France, the 
UK, the US, and Russia (from here on referred to as P5)—have voluntary offer agreements—
meaning, these states decide what the IAEA does and does not have jurisdiction over. 
Furthermore, some states fall completely outside IAEA and NPT jurisdiction. In other words, 
cooperation with the IAEA ranges from zero to a number below 100 percent. 
Here, a dialectic takes shape. Recognizing that universal IAEA jurisdiction cannot be 
compelled on the P5 or any state wishing to merely withdraw from IAEA jurisdiction, the IAEA 
has to balance global security needs with the security needs of individual states. If the IAEA and 
                                                
302 “Nuclear materials” refer explicitly to Uranium, Plutonium, and Thorium. Non-fissile 
radiological materials fall outside the scope of IAEA safeguards. 
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the NPT wish to prevent proliferation or promote international equality, they must give states the 
legal authority to proliferate because binding agreements that permanently prevent proliferation 
are unlikely to be signed and, therefore, undermine the non-proliferation regime. That is, 
carrying a big stick is not an attractive way to promote the nonproliferation brand. Therefore, the 
IAEA cannot demand every member state have strict obligations. The legal authority to 
withdraw from the NPT is expressly provided in Article X. 
Adding further complication to this problem is the inherent dialectic within the nuclear 
weapons states, a reality that complicates the problem’s realist foundation. In summary, these 
states have the potential to both threaten and cooperate with the nonproliferation regime and the 
IAEA’s mission. For example, while the UK has the highest levels of transparency among the P5 
states, France and China have almost no transparency of their weapons program.303 Additionally, 
even within international agreements sit complicated realities that undermine the 
nonproliferation regime and the IAEA. For example, the bilateral Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty (SORT) between the US and the Russian Federation, which sought to reduce both sides’ 
nuclear arsenals by 50% by 2012, did not mention exactly how many weapons were to be 
eliminated, and it did “not require the destruction of these weapons, [did] not include tactical 
nuclear weapons and [did] not have any verification provisions. Additionally, the process is 
neither irreversible, not transparent.”304 The 2011 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START)—at face value—attempts to overcome many of the verification limits set forth by 
SORT; however, it implicitly feeds into this problem because its verification depends on each 
state’s own intelligence services rather than intergovernmental oversight. The New START’s 
                                                
303 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “Nuclear Proliferation,” in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. 
Paul D. Williams (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008): 367. 
304 “Nonproliferation and Disarmament Go Hand in Hand” International Herald Tribune, 
September 22, 2004, quoted in Sidhu, 367. 
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national technical means of verification (NTM) are—as the name implies—technical rather than 
legal. Furthermore, while being a key provision in New START for the US and the Russian 
Federation, NTM uses universal intelligence techniques that can gather information on non-
parties to the treaty, reducing non-party states’ cooperative option. 
The nonproliferation regime is a large voting bloc of states that adhere primarily to the 
NPT, in addition to several historical and current treaties and other tools that either implicitly or 
explicitly seek the total abolition of nuclear weapons. These are identified in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Nonproliferation Regime Tools 
Year Active? Treaty/Regime Purpose 
1963 Yes Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests 
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, abbreviated as Partial Test 
Ban Treaty (PTBT) 
Limitation of nuclear weapons 
testing 
1970 Yes Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
Nonproliferation and disarmament 
1972 No Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
Agreement (SALT I) 
Arms control 
1972 No Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) Limitation of anti-ballistic missile 
(ABM) systems 
1974 Yes Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) Explosive yields limitation on 
testing 
1979 No Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
Agreement (SALT II) 
Arms control 
1988 Yes305 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty (INF Treaty) 
Arms control and disarmament 
1994 No Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START I) 
Arms control 
1996 No Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) 
Limitation of nuclear weapons 
testing 
2000 No Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START II) 
Arms control 
2003 No Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
(SORT) 
Strategic nuclear disarmament 
                                                
305 At the time of writing the treaty is active; however, in October 2018, the US made clear its 
intention to withdraw from the treaty. 
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2011 Yes Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START) 
Strategic nuclear disarmament 
2017 No Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons, also known as the Nuclear 
Weapon Ban Treaty (NWBT) 
Disarmament 
NA No Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) Prohibition of militarized fissile 
material production 
NA No Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START III) 
Arms control 
1974 Yes Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Nonproliferation and fissile 
material export control 
1987 Yes Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) 
Nonproliferation and missile 
technology export control 
1957 Yes International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) 
Nonproliferation and disarmament 
NA Varies Nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) Nonproliferation and prohibition 
on testing and deployment 
 
 
While many of these tools are toothless, they represent a growing consensus in the international 
community that nuclear weapons are outside acceptable international standards of decency. The 
nonproliferation norm is largely a product of non-realist recognition of nuclear weapons’ 
destructive capability. Essentially, deterrence does not play into the nonproliferation regime’s 
calculus; rather, the utilization of these tools comes from the normative position that using 
nuclear weapons is unacceptable.306 As Lüthi pointed out in the previous chapter, this norm is so 
pervasive that NPT states view it as their moral obligation to participate in the dialectic between 
nuclear weapons states and international verification agencies.307 
Presently, the IAEA operates between severely limited and approaching total jurisdiction 
within willing member states. Outside this spectrum the IAEA has no jurisdiction. For example, 
                                                
306 Tannenwald, 433. 
307 Lüthi, 98. 
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it has no authority to verify the safety and non-militarized use of nuclear materials in North 
Korea.308  
According to the IAEA’s “Safeguards and verification” website and sub-websites, 
accessed June 2018.309 IAEA safeguards evolve alongside technological improvements and the 
commissioning or decommissioning of facilities, which increase the number of individual 
verifications of materials. As of 2015 the IAEA has safeguard plans in effect for 181 states (and 
Taiwan) with APs in place for 127 states (and Taiwan), consisting of over 1,200 facilities. The 
AP covers enough nuclear materials to build about 200,000 nuclear weapons. To verify this 
quantity of materials, in 2015 the IAEA conducted over 2,000 in-field inspections, over 600 
verifications of design information, and over 60 complementary facility accesses, generating 
almost 800,000 reports and totaling over 13,000 calendar days’ worth of work. This work 
requires a staff of almost 900 employees (including about 90 contractors) and an annual budget 
(in 2015 rates) of about €175,000,000. In 2014 the IAEA retained 89.5% of its pledged 
payments.310 
IAEA safeguards are set up to ensure safe and peaceful use of nuclear components, 
systems, and materials. They are tools to verify states’ legal obligations and go through an 
annual cycle311 consisting of four processes. First, safeguard-relevant information is collected 
and verified for consistency. Second, a safeguards approach is developed. Third, the IAEA 
conducts the evaluation to identify potential inconsistencies. Finally, the IAEA draws up its 
                                                
308 Although, it can be argued that the IAEA maintains its authority because the DPRK’s 
withdrawal did not completely abide by the provisions of NPT Article X. 
309 “Safeguards and verification,” International Atomic Energy Agency, last modified February 
2018, https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification. 
310 Yukiya Amano, Technical Cooperation: Report for 2014 (Vienna: International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 2015), 
https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/GC59InfDocuments/English/gc59inf-3_en.pdf. 
311 This annual cycle is captured in the when section. 
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safeguards conclusions. After this cycle is complete the IAEA releases its report to the UN 
General Assembly, and, if necessary, the Security Council, as well as a version to the general 
public. 
In order to collect and verify information, the IAEA relies on three primary methods: 
state-provided information, self-collected information, and information received via other means, 
such as through third parties or open sources (represented in the how section). Over 170—or the 
majority of—agreements between states and the IAEA are Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreements (CSA), meaning these states agree to allow relatively robust verification of their 
nuclear energy programs.312 In these states any anomalies with their self-reported information 
can be dealt with through legal measures. The P5 fall under voluntary offer safeguards 
agreements, which means these states can decide without IAEA input which facilities can be 
monitored. Three nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT—Israel, India, and Pakistan—
have item-specific agreements with the IAEA, often only on imported materials. 127 countries 
have signed the Additional Protocol, a development seen as necessary to strengthen the IAEA’s 
ability to ensure materials are not diverted to weapons programs.313 The IAEA deemed this 
necessary after safeguards failures in Iraq and North Korea during the early 1990s. 
To develop a safeguards approach, the IAEA looks at state-specific systems, capabilities, 
and materials and attempts to determine any viable avenues for using these items to develop 
weapons, an approach referenced later, called the acquisition pathway analysis (APA). These are 
usually technical in nature and require technical expertise. 
                                                
312 It needs to be noted here that “comprehensive” does not mean the IAEA holds a monopoly 
over the individual state’s nuclear program. Defection is possible even under the CSA. For 
example, a state could sign the CSA, declare sites, and merely maintain clandestine sites away 
from IAEA scrutiny, which was the method Iraq used prior to the Persian Gulf War. 
313 The P5 each have APs in place; however, the AP does not provide the IAEA with CSA-like 
authority in the P5 states. A description of how the AP works is provided in the how section. 
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To develop a safeguards and verification plan, the IAEA builds off the individual 
safeguards approach, using a variety of tools for in-field and off-site inspections and analyses. 
These include bookkeeping similar to the banking industry, environmental sample analyses, 
destructive or non-destructive assays of nuclear materials,314 and containment and surveillance 
techniques, among others. Combined, these efforts help build a “continuity of knowledge” over 
the state’s nuclear materials. Furthermore, these techniques provide some measure of detection 
of undeclared materials, facilities, or operations because anomalies in the continuity of 
knowledge emerge. 
Finally, each year the Board of Governors releases its Safeguards Implementation Report, 
a detailed analysis and conclusions drawn from information collected from safeguard plans. The 
conclusions drawn are state-specific and vary according to the state’s individual safeguard 
agreement. These are detailed in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: IAEA Safeguard Conclusions (quoted in their entirety)315 
Safeguards 
Agreement Type 
Conclusion Type 
CSA with 
Additional 
Protocol 
• If the IAEA's Secretariat has completed all evaluations and found 
no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from 
peaceful activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material 
or activities for the State as a whole, the Secretariat concludes that 
all nuclear material remained in peaceful nuclear activities; and 
• If the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared 
nuclear material from peaceful activities, but evaluations regarding 
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities remained 
ongoing, the Secretariat concludes, on that basis, that declared 
nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. 
CSA without • If the IAEA's Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of 
                                                
314 These are radiation measurement techniques. Destructive assays destroy the sample but 
provide results with much higher confidence. 
315 “Drawing safeguards conclusions,” International Atomic Energy Agency, last modified 2017, 
https://www.iaea.org/topics/drawing-safeguards-conclusions. 
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Additional 
Protocol 
declared nuclear material from peaceful activities the Secretariat 
concludes that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful 
nuclear activities. 
Under Item-
Specific Safeguard 
Agreement 
• If the IAEA's Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of 
nuclear material or of misuse of the facilities or other items to 
which safeguards had been applied, the Secretariat concludes that 
nuclear material facilities and other items to which safeguards had 
been applied remained in peaceful activities. 
Voluntary Offer 
Safeguard 
Agreement 
• If the IAEA's Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of 
nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied, the 
Secretariat concludes that nuclear material to which safeguards 
had been applied in selected facilities was not withdrawn from 
safeguards, except as provided for in the agreements, and remained 
in peaceful activities. 
No Agreement • For States with no safeguards agreements in force, the IAEA 
Secretariat cannot draw any safeguards conclusions. 
 
 
Additionally, the IAEA has other agendas for preventing malicious nuclear programs. For 
example, it provides states with radiological detection capabilities and training to identify illicit 
movement of radiological materials across their borders. When a state’s safeguards and detection 
equipment needs updating the IAEA provides member states with necessary upgrades. 
These techniques exemplify the problem. The IAEA could operate with guaranteed 
efficiency in a world where the IAEA was a Hobbesian and monolithic agency with perfect 
jurisdiction over all member states. In reality the P5 and other nuclear weapons states can simply 
deny the IAEA access to materials or systems they do not wish the IAEA to see. Indeed, all 
member states can simply withdraw from the IAEA, reducing its jurisdiction to zero. Not 
desiring defection from the regime, the IAEA must balance the needs of its mission with member 
states’ individual needs under legal sovereignty. In other words, how much cooperation with the 
IAEA is necessary to maximize international nuclear safeguards and governance, and how much 
are states willing to cooperate? To illustrate this problem, the 2011 nuclear incident at the 
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Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant sparked a debate about how much jurisdiction the IAEA 
should have over nuclear materials. While all parties, including the Japanese Diet, desire stronger 
safeguards to mitigate the risk of another event like the one at Fukushima, some states wish to 
nationalize, rather than internationalize, jurisdiction over nuclear reactors,316 meaning 
cooperation has not been maximized. 
 
Table 6.3: Problem 2 Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Description 
NWs states Nuclear-armed states as unitary actors, comprising the P5. 
International 
verification and 
compliance agencies 
These are international organizations that encourage peaceful use of 
nuclear materials, administer safeguards to ensure compliance, and work 
to prevent nuclear proliferation (for example, the IAEA). 
NGOs and activists These are groups of civilians that actively promote nonproliferation and 
disarmament (examples include ICAN, Greenpeace, etc.). 
Media These are groups or individuals that spread information through various 
communication methods (e.g., television, radio, print, social media). 
NPT states These are signatory states in good standing in accordance with the NPT, 
which includes most recognized states not previously identified as 
nuclear weapons states317 and major UN voting blocs, such as the non-
aligned movement318. 
Religious leaders These are influential individuals of various faiths that can sway public 
opinion from the pulpit. 
Outlier States These are the four remaining nuclear-armed states, including the DPRK, 
India, Israel,319 and Pakistan. 
 
 
 
                                                
316 For an in-depth discussion on the debate see Norbert Pelzer, “Safer Nuclear Energy through a 
Higher Degree of Internationalisation?: International Involvement versus National 
Sovereignty,” Nuclear Law Bulletin, no. 1 (2013): 43-88. 
317 At the time of writing, South Sudan is the only non-signatory and non-nuclear weapons state.  
318 Excluding Pakistan, India, and North Korea (as members of NAM), as well as China (as an 
observer state). These are nuclear weapons states. 
319 Little is known about Israel’s nuclear weapons program. Israel might fall under the Nuclear 
Weapons States category. 
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6.2 Problem 2: Who? 
In this section the same methodology applies from Problem 1. Stakeholders in the mess 
and its constituent problems are identified in Table 6.3. Table 6.4 identifies stakeholder wants. 
 
Table 6.4: Problem 2 Stakeholder Wants 
Stakeholder Want 
NWs states Maximize sovereignty 
International 
verification and 
compliance 
agencies 
Maximize cooperation 
NGOs and activists Oversight 
Media Stories that sell 
NPT states Participation 
Outlier states Prestige320 
 
 
 
Each nuclear-armed state has two broad verifiable components: nuclear weapons and 
other nuclear material programs. While on the one hand they want to maximize their sovereignty, 
they also have interest in other states’ increased cooperation in verification and compliance. For 
the purpose of this section, NPT states are inherently compliant321 and seek nuclear equality 
among states (disarmament and the right to technology). The NPT states therefore seek serving 
as directors or deputy directors general, in policymaking, in oversight, in legal, in technical, and 
in other services, including onsite inspection teams. NGOs desire oversight. The media maintains 
its desire to find stories that sell. International verification and compliance organizations want to 
                                                
320 In this sense, Outlier States are asserting that the international community cannot tell it what 
to do and that they desire to be seen as equal to the nuclear powers.  
321 Some states cannot be compliant in the real world system; however, their present situation 
precludes them from participating. Syria, for example, is presently out of good standing with the 
IAEA, but Syria does not have the resources to take part in the IAEA’s mission. 
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maximize their ability to verify compliance. The IAEA’s mission, for example, is to ensure the 
peaceful civil use of atomic materials. In order to accomplish this, states must cooperate with 
inspectors. Production firms, religious leaders, and the environment are excluded from this 
section; however, their role is not null; they take on a minor level of ownership along the edges 
of Problem 2 (for the Environment, their role becomes clearer later). Finally, a new stakeholder 
must be introduced; Outlier States are states that possess nuclear weapons, are largely inactive 
(they tend to ignore the problem), demonstrate potential to threat, and fall under less-than-
average IAEA jurisdiction. These states include India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. While 
this project seeks to follow realist tenets as much as possible, outlier states cannot be ignored, 
and this project therefore continues to adopt the “realist plus” position, as exemplified by Sagan, 
where less-secure states face higher threat for losing control of nuclear arsenals.322 
 
Table 6.5: Problem 2 Stakeholder Classification 
Stakeholders Power Legitimacy Urgency Prominence Class Classification 
NWs States 1 1 1 1.00 Definitive Definitive 
International 
verification 
and 
compliance 
agencies 
1 1 1 1.00 Definitive Definitive 
NGOs and 
activists 
0 1 1 0.67 Dependent Expectant 
Media 0 1 0 0.33 Latent Discretionary 
NPT states 1 1 1 1.00 Definitive Definitive 
Outlier states 1 1 0 0.67 Dominant Expectant 
 
 
 
 
                                                
322 Sagan and Waltz, 49. 
   
 
161 
Table 6.6: Problem 2 Stakeholder Attitudes and Strategies 
Stakeholders Threat Cooperate Support Attitude Strategy 
NWs States 1 1 0 Mixed Collaborate 
International verification and 
compliance agencies 
0 1 1 Supportive Involve 
NGOs and activists 0 1 1 Supportive Involve 
Media 0 0 0 Marginal Monitor 
NPT states 0 1 1 Supportive Involve 
Outlier states 1 1 0 Mixed Collaborate 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Problem 2 FCM Who 
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Stakeholder Management Plan 
Table 6.7: Problem 2 Stakeholder Management Plan 
Concept Strategy InDeg OutDeg Activity Popularity Engagement 
Priority 
Cooperation Involve 1.5 3 3.872983 2.44949 1 
Equality Involve 1.25 2.5 3.535534 1.936492 2 
Oversight Involve 1.75 1.5 2.738613 2.645751 3 
Sovereignty Collaborate 1.25 1.25 2.236068 2.236068 4 
Stories that 
Sell 
Monitor 2.75 1 2 3.708099 5 
Outlier 
States 
Collaborate 1.75 1 1 2.645751 6 
 
 
Table 6.8: Problem 2 Who Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
Sovereignty Nuclear 
Security 
-0.25 NWS do not relinquish sovereignty by merely signing 
IAEA agreements (hence IAEA Charter Article XVIII 
and NPT Article X); however, this negative relationship 
between states seeking sovereignty and the IAEA's goal 
of securitizing global nuclear programs is weak because 
member states, even NWS, are generally willing to 
participate and contribute. 
Sovereignty Oversight -0.25 NGOs are less able to function because states can simply 
ignore them; however, this relationship is weak because 
states and publics tend to work with them. It is only 
when national security becomes the issue that NGOs' 
goal of oversight is weakened. 
Sovereignty Stories that 
Sell 
0.25 Anything the state does for national security purposes is 
generally a news worthy event; however, this 
relationship is weak because the media reports on a wide 
range of topics. 
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Sovereignty Outlier 
States 
-0.5 NWS national security goals moderately reduce Outlier 
States' goal of prestige because of sanctions or other 
actions that treat Outlier States as pariahs. This 
relationship does not graduate to 'strong' because the 
behavior is not universal. Israel's NWs program has not 
been heavily scrutinized, and the US amended its law to 
allow civil nuclear trade with India. 
Nuclear 
Security 
Sovereignty -0.5 The IAEA moderately diminishes NWS sovereignty by 
design; however, it cannot impose order over states 
(they can simply withdraw). 
Nuclear 
Security 
Oversight 0.75 Much of what NGOs do requires access to unclassified 
state-level information. The IAEA, through its 
inspections and communications, makes much of this 
information available for public scrutiny. 
Nuclear 
Security 
Stories that 
Sell 
0.5 The IAEA moderately increases the media's goal 
through public communications. This relationship is 
larger than NWS ability to increase the media's goal 
because the IAEA is purposely communicating with an 
international audience. 
Nuclear 
Security 
Equality 0.75 This relationship is strong because the IAEA collates 
and redistributes technology and knowledge to 
developing nations that desire to build non-militarized 
nuclear programs. 
Nuclear 
Security 
Outlier 
States 
-0.5 The IAEA moderately diminishes Outlier States goal of 
prestige by communicating its inability to confirm 
activities. Further, the IAEA's mission is according to 
the NPT, which no Outlier State has signed, violating 
international norms. 
Oversight Sovereignty -0.25 NGOs diminish NWS ability to function as desired by 
involving itself in politics and pressuring states and 
constituents. This relationship is weak because even 
democratic states can simply ignore them. 
Oversight Nuclear 
Security 
0.25 NGOs can supplement small portions of the IAEA's 
mission by acting as a surrogate between the IAEA and 
states (political pressure to take the IAEA seriously) and 
involving itself as nuclear watchdogs. This relationship 
is weak because NGOs do not have large resources. 
Oversight Stories that 
Sell 
0.5 This is a moderate relationship because NGOs generally 
depend on the media to disseminate their message; 
however, the relationship is not strong due to the media's 
ability to decide what to report 
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Oversight Equality 0.25 NGOs can support NPT states' goal of equality by 
publicly stating their support or actively working with 
developing states; however, this relationship is weak due 
to limited budgets. 
Oversight Outlier 
States 
-0.25 This relationship is similar to the relationship between 
NGOs and NPT states, but it is a negative relationship. 
Stories that 
Sell 
Sovereignty -0.25 The media can sway how NWS interact by publicizing 
domestic and international behaviors to domestic and 
international audiences; however, this relationship is 
weak because much of political maneuvering happens 
behind closed doors. 
Stories that 
Sell 
Nuclear 
Security 
0.25 The media plays a small role in the IAEA's mission by 
acting as a conduit between the IAEA and audiences. 
Stories that 
Sell 
Oversight 0.25 The media plays a small role in NGOs' mission by 
providing information to the NGOs and by transferring 
NGOs' messages to audiences. 
Stories that 
Sell 
Equality 0.25 The media tends to support NPT states; however, this 
relationship is weak because it can ignore NPT states, 
depending on news stories of the day. 
Stories that 
Sell 
Outlier 
States 
0 This relationship is null because the media equally 
reports on positive and negative information about the 
states. 
Equality Sovereignty -0.25 NPT states place pressure on NWS to promote equality; 
however, ultimately, NWS cannot be compelled. 
Equality Nuclear 
Security 
0.75 This relationship is strong because ultimately the IAEA 
cannot function without a preponderance of international 
support, which, as the largest voting bloc, the NPT states 
provide. 
Equality Oversight 0.5 This relationship is moderate because NPT states can 
provide information to NGOs and support NGO 
missions. 
Equality Stories that 
Sell 
0.5 This relationship is moderate because NPT states' 
activities provide a wealth of stories to the media. It is 
not strong because the media can report on other matters 
at its discretion. 
Equality Outlier 
States 
-0.5 This negative relationship is moderate because NPT 
states create a norm that Outlier States violate by not 
fully participating in the NPT and the IAEA; however, 
Outlier States are not strongly diminished by failing to 
participate. 
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Outlier States Stories that 
Sell 
1 Regardless of whether or not the stories are positive or 
negative, Outlier States are regularly in the headlines 
(e.g. no matter what the story is about, the media enjoys 
reporting on the DPRK). 
 
 
Problem 2 Stakeholder Management 
The results are counterintuitive, as will be seen below. Generally, especially given realist 
logic, state interests should precede non-states’ or intergovernmental agencies’ interests. These 
results suggest international verification and compliance agencies are very active and are facing 
low external stakeholder pressure. Their interests take precedence to states’ interests. As 
supportive stakeholders these agencies, NPT states, and NGOs involvement should be 
prioritized. Media should be monitored for stories that will increase support from non-supportive 
states. States, including Outlier States, must be involved because involvement creates a sense of 
urgency and increases future cooperation toward resolving the nuclear weapons dialectic.  
 
6.3 Problem 2: What? 
 
Problem 2 Objective Narrative 
Recalling that international verification and compliance agencies are the prioritized 
stakeholders, the problem is that there is debate about how much cooperation is necessary to be 
in good standing with the agencies. The IAEA, whose authority to verify compliance comes 
through Article III of the NPT, does not have the power to compel compliance beyond publicly 
exposing uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, as identified in Problem 1, running afoul of the 
NPT (such as North Korea defecting) merely runs the risk of sanctions, while regaining total 
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nuclear sovereignty if IAEA membership is withdrawn. Therefore, the IAEA needs to find a 
universally acceptable balance between zero verification and total verification. 
International verification and compliance agencies’ primary goal, as identified in the 
previous section, is to maximize cooperation with the NPT states and IAEA member states and 
that they are in compliance with safeguard provisions of the NPT that prevent peaceful nuclear 
materials from being diverted to non-peaceful nuclear programs. Alternately, the IAEA seeks to 
balance objectives to promote peaceful nuclear programs and prevent proliferation. Taken 
together these goals can be called, for the purpose of this project, nuclear security. 
 
Problem 2 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy 
As identified above, international verification and compliance agencies’ primary goal is 
nuclear security, which is the promotion of peaceful nuclear energy programs; such as energy, 
medical, agricultural, and other programs; and the prevention of military uses of nuclear 
technology (often called “dual use”). The fundamental objectives hierarchy reveals that to 
promote peaceful nuclear programs, the IAEA can and does invest in science, provide resources, 
and provide training. To prevent proliferation of militaries or non-state actors, the IAEA can and 
does institute safeguards that are more or less verifiable, provide securitizing technology to 
states, and make requirements to use non-coercive techniques. These are illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Problem 2 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy 
 
 
 
Problem 2 Means-Ends Network 
Ensuring nuclear security has two fundamental objectives: Promotion of peaceful nuclear 
programs and prevention of proliferation. Promotion of peaceful nuclear programs means 
investments in research and design programs and providing materials, services, equipment, 
facility access, scientific training, and technical training to member states desiring to participate 
in nuclear programs.323 Preventing proliferation means promoting bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, tight control and supervision over nuclear materials, and conducting safety and 
security checks (or inspections) of facilities. An important means to ensuring nonproliferation is 
                                                
323 From the perspective of developing states within the NPT, this has the added benefit of 
serving as a means for wealth redistribution, thus progressing the goal of equality among nations. 
See Benjamin Schiff, “Dual Mandate: Safeguards and Technology Transfer in the International 
Atomic Energy Agency,” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1982): 2. 
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to make all agreements non-binding. States should be free to withdraw from any agreement 
without consequence.324 Coercive treaties and agreements are not as attractive to potential 
signatories as non-binding treaties or agreements. Finally, preventing proliferation is a means by 
which to promote peaceful nuclear programs because proliferation can beget proliferation. These 
tools are reflected in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Problem 2 Means-Ends Network 
 
 
                                                
324 For example, sanctions against the DPRK following its defection might have reinforced its 
belief that the West cannot be trusted, making it more difficult to get them back to international 
norms. 
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Table 6.9: Means-Ends Network Node Identifiers 
Promote peaceful 
nuclear programs 
This is a goal for which the IAEA strives. 
R&D The IAEA, alongside individual states’ safeguards programs, conducts 
research and design in order to develop better detection, monitoring, 
and analysis capabilities. 
Provide materials Materials are nuclear materials necessary to run nuclear programs that 
are beyond the indigenous reach of some member states. 
Provide services Service is administrative assistance covering member states’ 
indigenous R&D, training, and accounting of materials and technology. 
Provide equipment Equipment is the physical technical components necessary to run 
nuclear programs. 
Provide facilities Facilities are areas designated by the IAEA and member states that 
serve to provide R&D, training, and other activities. 
Scientific training Scientific training is advanced-level training that enables scientists to 
engage in R&D. 
Technical training Technical training is advanced-level training that enables engineers, 
scientists, and other practitioners to engage in R&D. 
Prevent proliferation This is a goal for which the IAEA strives. 
Bilateral agreements These are agreements between two states. For the purpose of this 
research, these agreements are security related but do not necessarily 
fall under the purview of the IAEA. 
Multilateral 
agreements 
These are agreements between three or more states, usually security-
related, falling under IAEA purview. 
Control Export control is the regulation of materials and components that have 
dual use capability. 
Supervision Supervision is the regulatory oversight of nuclear material site design, 
construction, and operation. 
Safety checks Safety checks include safeguards inspections, as well as the testing, 
maintenance, and inspection of facilities, materials, and practices. 
Non-binding 
agreements 
Non-binding agreements are included as a means by which to attract 
member states to the regime. These agreements, such as NPT Article X, 
assure member states that continued cooperation is not compulsory and 
therefore encourages participation. 
 
 
Problem 2 What FCM 
Applying the means-ends network and international agencies’ updated problem statement 
to Problem 2’s FCM shows emergence of new links between who and what. Most noticeably is 
that production firms, stockholders, and NPT states benefit greatly from the scientific knowledge 
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and resources provided by the promotion of peaceful nuclear programs. Research and design 
negatively affects the environment to a moderate degree.325 On the proliferation prevention side, 
safety checks moderately increase the environment because they help prevent the release of 
materials that can be detrimental to the ecosystems. Bilateral and multilateral agreements have a 
moderate positive effect on media’s ability to sell stories. Finally, control and supervision over 
nuclear materials and components as well as safety checks have a moderate negative effect on 
nuclear weapons states’ goal of maximizing sovereignty. 
An additional point, here Nonbinding Agreements should positively and strongly affect 
Problem 1’s Re-Proliferation Capabilities. This is reflected along the edges of the problem. 
 
Figure 6.4: Problem 2 FCM What 
 
 
 
 
                                                
325 Identifying the Production Firms’ and Stockholders’, as well as the environment’s, links also 
exposes overlap between Problems 1 and 2, which is therefore modeled along Problem 2’s edges. 
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Table 6.10: Problem 2 What Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
Nuclear Security 1 This relationship is very strong. As states seek 
technology, they become wedded to the IAEA's 
mission if they are working through IAEA 
channels. This helps perpetuate non-nuclear 
proliferation. 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
Maximize 
Profits 
0.75 As states decide to build, maintain, or expand 
peaceful nuclear programs, production firms and 
stakeholders benefit from contract awards and 
increased stock prices. 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
The environment -0.5 Increased production is moderately harmful to the 
environment. 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
Nuclear Security 1 This is self-explanatory. An increase in 
proliferation prevention has a commensurate 
increase in nuclear security. 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
Promote 
Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 This relationship is moderate. By putting into place 
mechanisms to prevent proliferation, the IAEA 
acknowledges that states have an inherent right to 
peaceful technology. 
R&D Promote 
Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 R&D moderately increases peaceful nuclear 
programs by decreasing the costs associated with 
high tech systems. 
Provide 
Materials 
Promote 
Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 The IAEA, through member states, can provide 
materials to states seeking peaceful nuclear 
programs. This relationship is moderate because 
not all states choose to adopt nuclear programs. 
Provide 
Services 
Promote 
Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 See above. 
Provide 
Equipment 
Promote 
Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 See above. 
Provide 
Facilities 
Promote 
Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 See above. 
Scientific 
Training 
Promote 
Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 See above. 
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Technical 
Training 
Promote 
Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 See above. 
Bilateral 
Agreements 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.5 By helping to facilitate bilateral technology 
transfers, the IAEA can oversee nuclear programs 
to ensure the technology is only being used for 
peaceful purposes. 
Multilateral 
Agreements 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.5 See above. 
Control Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.5 Export control moderately increases proliferation 
prevention. It does not graduate to strong because 
states can circumvent control measures. 
Supervision Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.5 By supervising the design, construction, and 
operation of facilities, proliferation prevention is 
moderately increased. It does not graduate to 
strong because states can have clandestine sites. 
Safety Checks Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.75 Inspections increase proliferation prevention by 
deterring states from clandestine operations or 
material diversions; however, it does not graduate 
to very strong because inspections are not perfect. 
Nonbinding 
Agreements 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.5 These agreements moderately increase 
proliferation prevention by enticing states to join, 
giving them a future opt-out ability. It is not strong 
because states can join, refrain from withdrawing, 
and still pursue nuclear weapons (see Libya and 
Iraq, for example) 
Nonbinding 
Agreements 
Re-proliferation 
capabilities 
0.75 This relationship is strong because states can enter 
agreements to disarm, withdraw, and re-proliferate 
under legal frameworks. This node is not a part of 
Problem 2 and is only included along the edges 
because it exposes overlap between Problems 1 
and 2. 
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6.4 Problem 2: Why? 
 
Problem 2 Motivation and Feedback Analysis 
The first thing that becomes immediately obvious is a triadic closure between the Nuclear 
Security, Stories that Sell, and Prevent Proliferation nodes. That is, as Prevent Proliferation 
increases, Nuclear Security increases. As Nuclear Security Increases, Stories that Sell increase 
(the IAEA makes a press release). Finally, as Stories that Sell increase, Prevent Proliferation 
increases (would-be cheaters are—to some degree, however large or small—deterred). 
Therefore, a new causal moderate link between Stories that Sell (sender) and Prevent 
Proliferation (receiver) is included. 
The second change is feedback loops between Equality and Promote Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs, as well as Equality and Prevent Proliferation. While taken together, these concepts 
make up the IAEA’s goal of Nuclear Security, each independently and moderately affects the 
NPT states’ goal of equality and vice versa. As states become more equal, states have better 
access to peaceful nuclear technology, and as access increases, equality increases. Likewise, 
equality increases the likelihood that proliferation will be prevented, and increased proliferation 
prevention increases equality. 
These changes are reflected in the updated FCM. 
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Table 6.11: Problem 2 Why Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
Stories that Sell Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.5 The media can report to different audiences the 
findings of the IAEA, which helps deter states from 
proliferation. It does not graduate to strong because 
states can decide the cost of detection does not 
outweigh the gains of cheating. 
Equality Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 This relationship is moderate. NPT states can decide 
whether or not to seek peaceful nuclear programs. 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
Equality 0.5 This relationship is moderate. NPT states can decide 
whether or not to seek peaceful nuclear programs. 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
Equality 0.5 See above. 
Equality Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.5 This relationship is moderate. Generally, NPT states 
will not withdraw from the NPT or clandestinely seek 
nuclear weapons; however, NPT states cannot 
prevent others from withdrawing or seeking weapons. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Problem 2 FCM Why 
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6.5 Problem 2: Where? 
As in Problem 1, this section identifies the sources of motivation, power, and knowledge. 
 
Problem 2 Boundary Articulation 
Based on further analysis of the problem’s boundary, the following boundary critique is 
provided. The IAEA wants nuclear security. This is its motivational source; however, its ultimate 
function is to help nuclear weapons states navigate towards an end state where nuclear weapons 
are no longer necessary to increase the states’ security (Problem 1) and in keeping with the 
provisions under NPT Article VI. Therefore, there is a need to assist all states with their 
respective nuclear technology programs, while being mindful of the big picture—disarmament. 
The primary stakeholders in this problem have relatively high levels of power—more than 
nuclear weapons states would prefer. This is exemplified by the fact that nuclear weapons states 
are not simply ignoring the problem. If non-state actors and intergovernmental organizations 
were powerless, nuclear weapon states could ignore them. Instead, they acknowledge power 
beyond the sovereign state. The IAEA and the NPT states, through mechanisms of their own, 
have some ability to get nuclear weapons states to do things they would not otherwise do. 
Nuclear weapons states, therefore, appear receptive to at least a limited amount of international 
cooperation, even at the cost of some measurable amount of sovereignty. 
 
Problem 2 Context Articulation 
Following the same format in Problem 1, the following elements are identified for 
Problem 2. 
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Table 6.12: Problem 2 Context Articulation 
Category Elements 
Circumstances Requirement to comply with 
international agreements 
Factors Uncertainty, Anarchy 
Conditions Need to bring new systems online, 
limited budgets 
Values States are not expected to give up 
sovereignty 
Patterns Established processes for verification 
 
 
Table 6.13: Problem 2 Force Field Diagram 
Driving 
Force 
Strength 
as-is 
Strength 
ought-
to-be 
Problem Restraining 
force 
Strength 
as-is 
Strength 
ought-to-be 
International 
Agreements 
0.5 0.75 Present State: 
States operate 
under anarchy 
and uncertainty, 
which hinders the 
ability of the 
IAEA to 
complete its 
mission.  
 
Idealized State: 
Nuclear weapons 
states and outlier 
states should be 
willing to work 
towards 
upholding their 
commitments 
under NPT 
Article VI in 
transparent ways, 
but should not be 
required to give 
up total nuclear 
sovereignty 
Uncertainty -0.75 -0.25 
Verification 
Processes 
0.5 0.75 Anarchy -0.5 -0.25 
   Expectation
s of 
Sovereignty 
-0.75 -0.25 
   Safeguards 
Costs 
-0.5 0.5 
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Similar to Problem 1, there are several competing elements in this problem. The 
circumstances—the requirement to comply with international regulations—and the established 
processes for verification work in favor of bringing this problem to solution. On the other hand, 
the factors of uncertainty and anarchy, as well as limited budgets, new systems coming online 
(which further stretch budgets), and the expectations of sovereignty hinder simple solutions.  
 
Proposed Ought-to-Be Changes 
 
Nuclear-armed states, while presently adding to uncertainty, should exhibit more 
transparent behavior with the IAEA so that their nuclear systems can work towards upholding 
their commitments to Article VI of the NPT in a publicly verified fashion. This proposal does not 
call upon nuclear-armed states to give up nuclear sovereignty; rather, it seeks a decrease in 
uncertainty by working with the IAEA in manners similar to member states falling under some 
form of comprehensive, rather than voluntary offer, agreements to complement their APs. 
Furthermore, outlier states should follow suit (mindful that security concerns are addressed in 
Problem 1). All states should likewise work under IAEA guidance and observation under 
increased budgets to reduce existing fissile stockpiles and weapons. In short, there should be 
multilateral efforts made to adhere to NPT Article VI. 
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Table 6.14: Problem 2 Where Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
International 
Agreements 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
0.75 This is a strong relationship because documents like 
the NPT and IAEA charter set the stage for peaceful 
nuclear program promotion. 
International 
Agreements 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.75 See above. 
Verification 
Processes 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 Established processes for verification moderately 
increase the promotion of peaceful nuclear programs. 
Verification 
Processes 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.5 See above. 
Uncertainty Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
-0.25 This relationship is weak because states can choose to 
forego programs. 
Uncertainty Prevent 
Proliferation 
-0.75 This relationship is strong because states can choose 
to proliferate clandestinely. 
Anarchy Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
-0.25 This relationship is weak because states can choose to 
forego programs. 
Anarchy Prevent 
Proliferation 
-0.5 This relationship is strong because states can choose 
to proliferate clandestinely. 
Expectation of 
Sovereignty 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
-0.75 Ultimately, sovereignty as a norm means that states 
can proliferate as desired. 
Safeguards Cost Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
-0.5 The cost of internal safeguarding might be 
prohibitive to smaller states. 
Safeguards Cost Prevent 
Proliferation 
-0.5 See above. 
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Figure 6.6: Problem 2 FCM Where  
 
 
 
6.6 Problem 2: How? 
This section addresses the means by which the international system can move beyond its 
present state to reach its desired state—one with synthesis between stakeholder goals. Recalling 
the Cynefin framework’s five domains from Problem 1—known-knowns (simple), known-
unknowns (complicated), unknown-knowns (complex), unknown-unknown (chaotic), and 
disorder—this section analyses the problem’s Cynefin domain and mechanism. 
 
Problem 2 Cynefin Analysis 
Problem 2 appears to consist of order. It rests within the complicated domain and lacks 
unknown complexity and chaos. The problem is not, however, simple; like Problem 1 known-
unknowns—uncertainty and anarchy—continue to plague the contours of the problem. 
Additionally, and also like in Problem 1, these uncertainties make hedging or cheating ongoing 
problems. While cheating is more difficult to mitigate, nonbinding agreements turn hedging to 
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the IAEA and NPT’s advantage by providing assurances that states can re-proliferate, given a 
dramatic change in disarmed states’ security needs. In any case, stakeholders’ objectives should 
apply the appropriate mechanisms, as previously identified—human, abstract, and physical. 
 
Problem 1 Mechanism Analysis 
The primary mechanism is information gathering. That is, the IAEA, NPT states, and 
nuclear weapons states should have at their disposal the mechanisms necessary for continued 
information input. Given the uncertain effects of anarchy on the problem, more information that 
might highlight various states’ (especially outlier states’) intentions, particularly predictable or 
designed international developments, is necessary before action can be taken. This, like Problem 
1, requires continued human and financial capital. 
The information gathered, through inspections, open sources, or third party actors, should 
be vetted using scientific analysis in a transparent capacity. In other words, robust analysis 
should be made public. Therefore, two additional nodes are added: Scientific Analysis and 
Transparency (Transparency also exists within Problem 1, adding interaction along both 
problems’ edges). 
This information is subject to intelligence analyses by various states with interest in 
maintaining the non-proliferation regime or the status quo. Furthermore, the IAEA, conducts 
acquisition pathway analysis (APA). The APA is a “Structured method used to identity and 
analyze all technically plausible paths for a State to acquire nuclear material suitable for use in a 
nuclear explosive device”326 (emphasis mine). This analysis does not factor judgments of intent; 
                                                
326 Jill N. Cooley, “State-Level Concept Information” (presentation, Nuclear Nonproliferation, 
Safeguards, and Security in the 21st Century, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY, June 
2018), slide 25. 
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whether or not a state intends to use special nuclear materials for military purposes is outside the 
APA’s scope. The APA factors the state’s full nuclear fuel cycle: “existing facilities, quantities 
and types of nuclear material, knowledge and expertise, past [research and design], capacity to 
develop or import technology and/or expertise, resources,”327 etc. The APA, while not explicitly 
modeled, serves as underlying state-level and international analytical tools and help detect 
cheating or diversion of special nuclear materials. 
 
Table 6.15: Problem 2 How Qualitative Link Justification 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
Transparency Sovereignty -0.25 States have interest in being the least transparent as 
possible, but the negative relationship is weak 
because states choose to be transparent by signing 
multilateral agreements with the IAEA. 
Transparency Nuclear 
Security 
0.75 Transparency increases nuclear security significantly, 
but not perfectly. The more the IAEA knows about 
states, the better it can do its job, but states still 
practice some level of non-transparency. 
Transparency Outlier States -0.25 This differs from Sovereignty, but the relationship is 
similarly weak. The transparency norm compels 
states to cooperate, but Outlier States can choose 
which programs and to what degree they are 
transparent. 
Transparency Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.5 Transparency moderately increases proliferation 
prevention; however, this does not graduate to strong 
because states can choose how transparent they 
become without outsiders knowing the difference 
between varying degrees of transparency. 
Transparency Uncertainty -0.5 Transparency moderately decreases uncertainty. The 
more transparent, the less uncertain because 
knowledge about states' capabilities and intentions 
are revealed. 
Scientific 
Analysis 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
0.75 Science programs increase states’ ability to develop 
peaceful programs. 
                                                
327 Cooley, slide 25. 
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Programs 
Scientific 
Analysis 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
0.75 Scientific analyses strongly increase the IAEA's 
ability to detect cheating or diversion. This includes 
the APA, special radiation detection devices with 
isotope identification, and sampling, among others. 
Scientific 
Analysis 
Uncertainty -0.5 Scientific analyses moderately decrease uncertainty 
by revealing knowledge. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Problem 2 FCM How 
 
 
6.7 Problem 2: When? 
Recalling the inequality from the previous chapter max !"#"$%&
!"#$
≥ 1, this section seeks 
to assess when and if intervention is necessary. Again, what is the actual cost of intervening, 
compared to the benefit of intervening? In the system constructed for Problem 2, can the cost of 
finding a synthesis between actors seeking sovereignty maximizing and actors seeking more 
nuclear security be justified given the potential payout? 
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Given high participation among states with the IAEA, it is unlikely that international 
verification regimes will be replaced with something else in the near term. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely the system of sovereign states will disappear. Finally, given the structure of the problem 
and high participation, even among nuclear-armed states, it is feasible that there exists a solution 
that is mutually beneficial. On the other hand, Outlier States pose an enormous hurdle, and 
finding synthesis with this group will require a large amount of resources. Therefore, the 
inequality might not be satisfied.  
A final note before simulation: in Problem 1 the timescale was non-defined. In Problem 2 
a single iteration represents a calendar year because the IAEA releases its country reports yearly. 
Therefore, each tick should represent a year, which provides a baseline of understanding. The 
IAEA releases a report, which triggers the flow of information through the problem. Another 
way to think about time—which is not included in this model—is as a discrete event simulation. 
What would happen if a member state withdrew from the IAEA Charter? This would certainly 
weaken the IAEA’s ability to function and influence the problem’s outcome. 
 
Table 6.16: Problem 2 Popularity, Activity, and Feasibility328 
Concept Activity Popularity Engagement 
Priority 
Change 
Feasible? 
Equality 4.949747 3.354102 1 N 
Nuclear Security 3.872983 6.324555 2 Y 
Transparency 3.354102 0 3 Y 
Promote Peaceful 
Nuclear Programs 
3.316625 9.721111 4 Y 
Oversight 2.738613 2.645751 5 Y 
Stories that Sell 2.738613 3.708099 6 N 
                                                
328 Recall that popularity is a measure of links going into the concept in descending order, 
activity is a measure of links coming from a concept in descending order, and measuring the 
activity rank in ascending order and popularity rank in descending order sets the engagement 
priority.   
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Scientific Analysis 2.44949 0 7 Y 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
2.44949 12.32883 8 N 
Sovereignty 2.236068 2.738613 9 Y 
International 
Agreements 
1.732051 0 10 N 
Nonbinding 
Agreements 
1.581139 0 11 Y 
Verification 
Processes 
1.581139 0 12 Y 
Safeguards Costs 1.414214 0 13 Y 
Uncertainty 1.414214 1.414214 14 N 
Anarchy 1.224745 0 15 N 
Outlier States 1 3.162278 16 N 
Safety Checks 0.866025 0 17 Y 
Expectation of 
Sovereignty 
0.866025 0 18 N 
R&D 0.707107 0 19 Y 
Provide Materials 0.707107 0 20 Y 
Provide Services 0.707107 0 21 Y 
Provide Equipment 0.707107 0 22 Y 
Provide Facilities 0.707107 0 23 Y 
Scientific Training 0.707107 0 24 Y 
Technical Training 0.707107 0 25 Y 
Bilateral 
Agreements 
0.707107 0 26 N 
Multilateral 
Agreements 
0.707107 0 27 N 
Control 0.707107 0 28 Y 
Supervision 0.707107 0 29 Y 
The Environment 0 0.707107 30 N 
Maximize Profits 0 0.866025 31 N 
Re-proliferation 
Capabilities 
0 0.866025 32 Y 
 
 
Running the simulation by pegging sovereignty to 1 and setting an initial increase in 
nuclear security to its maximum 1, selecting the sigmoid transfer function with λ set at 5, and 
running the simulation for 50 iterations, it becomes clear that by the tenth year (considering all 
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else remains constant and no major international changes occur), most stakeholders end up better 
than before. In this simulation, sovereignty is maximized. No state has lost its ability to function 
independently of other states or intergovernmental bodies. The initial maximization of nuclear 
security simulates a significant cooperative event, such as the P5 signing the CSA and 
maintaining the AP, placing ongoing disarmament programs under the verification purview of 
the international community. This does not imply that the P5 are dismantling nuclear warheads 
universally, but rather they accept that nuclear transparency is necessary to beget international 
nuclear transparency. 
Under this regime, nuclear weapons states, NPT states, NGOs, and Production Firms 
benefit. On the other hand two outcomes call into question this kind of approach to Problem 2. 
First, uncertainty and anarchy remain unmoved. The constraining forces in international politics 
have not sufficiently been mitigated. Second, and most importantly, under this universal regime 
the Outlier States’ prestige is minimized to the maximum degree. States like the DPRK and 
Pakistan no longer receive the respect they get under the status quo. Particularly the DPRK, 
which is small and insignificant, relative to the major powers, both in terms of military and 
economic power, might be forgotten about under this outcome. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that Outlier States would choose to simply ignore any such agreements, which means 
this is not a feasible solution, given the structure of Problem 2 alone. That stated, the scenario is 
stable and complicated. 
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Figure 6.8: Problem 2 Stability Analysis: International Verification 
 
 
At timestamp 0 Sovereignty is clamped at 1, while Nuclear Security has an initial value 
of 1. The weight of Sovereignty by timestamp 1, however, shows a significant but short-lived 
decrease of Nuclear Security, while other stakeholders, except Outlier States, experience 
tremendous benefit. Outlier States reach a permanent maximum decrease by timestamp 1.  
At timestamp 2 Nuclear Security is again increased to the max, while Oversight, Stories 
that Sell, and Equality decrease. The IAEA’s missions to Promote Peaceful Nuclear Programs 
and Prevent Proliferation experience a maximum increase.  
Timestamp 2 indicates that the IAEA and its Board of Governors is acting as a final 
authority over all things nuclear. NGOs/Activists, the Media, and the NPT States play a lesser 
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role. For NGOs and Activists, their roles have simply been usurped by the IAEA. For the Media, 
it becomes difficult to sell stories if the Board of Governors’ reports are predictable. NPT States 
face the largest loss because Equality is strongly undermined by the IAEA’s role. However, by 
timestamp 3 there is a dramatic turn for NGOs/Activists and NPT States. 
The aforementioned increase in the IAEA’s missions (Promote Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs and Prevent Proliferation) increase NGOs/Activists’ Oversight and NPT States’ 
Equality. While the simulation does not explain why NGOs/Activists receive their reward at 
timestamp 3, it might be due to having increased access to regimes’ nuclear programs through 
increased transparency. NPT States benefit from increasing their access to nuclear power, which 
makes them more equal to the rest of the world. The Media, at this timestamp remains 
diminished. This timestamp also sees a dramatic decrease in the IAEA’s mission to Prevent 
Proliferation. This is likely due to combination of timestamp 2’s increase in Promote Peaceful 
Nuclear Programs and timestamp 1 and 2’s decrease in Outlier States. In regards to the latter, we 
can imagine the DPRK ramping up their nuclear weapons program to deter its destruction by 
force. Finally, in timestamp 3 Production Firms’ profits are maximized, as anarchy under a non-
nuclear world require substantial efforts to maintain the BOP with conventional forces.329 
By timestamp 4 Nuclear Security declines due to movements made by the Outlier States 
in timestamp 3, as well as the reduction in Prevent Proliferation. On the other hand, 
NGOs/Activists and NPT States continue to benefit, while the Media dramatically increases its 
ability to sell stories, due to Outlier States’ behavior and failures to Prevent Proliferation in 
timestamp 3. Prevent Proliferation rebounds slightly by the end of timestamp 4. Profits continue 
to be maximized, and Promote Peaceful Nuclear Programs still performs marginally. 
                                                
329 In Chapter 8 I discuss why balancing with conventional forces is not the only way to maintain 
the BOP without nuclear weapons. 
   
 
188 
In timestamp 5 the IAEA’s Nuclear Security and its mission rebound completely, while 
NPT States, NGOs/Activists, and the Media continue performing well. Production Firms’ profits 
slow but are still climbing. 
By timestamp 6 equilibrium is reached. All stakeholder goals are maximized, with the 
exception of Outlier States. 
The above scenario is a Type IV error. Hypothetically assuming the international 
community adopts this solution, the Outlier States will simply hold onto their nuclear weapons. 
And if the P5 disarms, that will significantly shift the balance of power into the hands of states 
with relatively weak political bodies (with a probable exception of Israel). This might result in 
civil wars or territorial expansions. Needless to say, however, this hypothetical outcome is 
beyond the realm of possibilities simply because the solution is extraordinarily improbable 
without future developments that bring the Outlier States into the mainstream.330 
Therefore, it is necessary again to remind the reader that the preceding simulation is not a 
solution to the mess. The simulation is merely to determine system stability and to expose 
chaotic elements that would require more structuring or restructuring. The obvious Type IV error 
might disappear when Problems 1 and 2 are merged, but alone it is not a solution. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
330 If this model is accurate, it might therefore be reasonable to conclude that US President 
George W. Bush’s policy that legitimized nuclear trade deals with India simplified this problem 
by recognizing India’s prestige in the international community, thereby mitigating its contrast 
with the P5 states. 
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Table 6.17: Problem 2 Stability Analysis End States331 
Component End 
State 
Sovereignty 1 
Nuclear Security 1 
Oversight 0.999993 
Stories that Sell 0.998894 
Equality 1 
Outlier States -1 
Maximize Profits 0.998894 
Promote Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.999909 
Prevent Proliferation 0.999909 
R&D 0 
Provide Materials 0 
Provide Services 0 
Provide Equipment 0 
Provide Facilities 0 
Scientific Training 0 
Technical Training 0 
Bilateral Agreements 0 
Multilateral Agreements 0 
Control 0 
Supervision 0 
Safety Checks 0 
Nonbinding Agreements 0 
International Agreements 0 
Verification Processes 0 
Uncertainty 0 
Anarchy 0 
Expectation of Sovereignty 0 
Safeguards Costs 0 
Re-proliferation Capabilities 0 
Transparency 0 
 
 
 
                                                
331 Recall that a change of +1 means a maximum increase, -1 means a maximum decrease, and 0 
means the status quo. 
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6.8 Summary 
This chapter uses fuzzy cognitive mapping to confront the challenges preventing 
synthesis between cooperation and sovereignty. It first identifies stakeholders and their goals and 
how those goals interact with other stakeholder goals. It then abstracts the IAEA’s goal, as the 
prioritized stakeholder and finds the IAEA’s ultimate goal is nuclear security. Applying the 
boundaries, constraints, and mechanisms to the problem, this model then determines interaction 
is possible and that the system is stable. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE MESS 
 
7.1 The Messy Nuclear Landscape 
The “messy” nuclear landscape contains several familiar aspects of international being—
disagreements, varying degrees of power, costs, benefits, and problems with solutions thus far 
beyond the reach of practitioners—but at the center of the “messy” nuclear landscape is 
something wholly unique in international politics. The entire “mess” has built itself, through 
ever-evolving layers of complexity, around a bizarre development of technology not found 
elsewhere in the world (outside of science fiction novels and movies). That is, there exists a 
technology capable of curing diseases, sterilizing biological contaminants, and providing power 
to the entire world population at a cost far below the average, but this same technology can also 
cause the extinction of most earthly life.  
Compounding this already complex problem is the unholy realization that in dyadic and 
equal relationships, simply possessing nuclear weapons simplifies the world around us. If war is 
not an option, other, less-malignant bilateral behavior is less unlikely. 
Under the veil of ignorance,332 one might be forgiven for choosing a world without 
nuclear technologies. They might rationalize that the costs of nuclear war are so high that the 
costs of war are relatively acceptable in a world without MAD and the risk of escalation. Indeed, 
Chapter 2 attempts to make this connection. They might further rationalize, therefore, that non-
proliferation is a norm that must be upheld at any cost. Under these caveats, a lucky chooser 
might choose a world where every state—or at least almost every state—has nuclear weapons 
                                                
332 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1971). 
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and a second strike capability, while counting on the threat of guaranteed retaliation and certain 
death to maintain universal good nuclear stewardship. 
The reality of the present system of states under anarchy is that practitioners do not get to 
choose the world they inherit, but they can make changes to the way things are. And given the 
choice between doing something for the good of humanity or not if given the opportunity, most 
practitioners will choose to go the moral route—on a long enough timeline.333 Some of these 
changes might be radical, like the banning of slavery or the reunification of Germany, and others 
might happen sluggishly, so slowly that society never notice its passing. American pistol duels 
come to mind, where, although outlawed by many states by the 19th century, they continued 
occurring into the 20th century. No one noticed the day pistol duels met a timely demise, but, 
given today’s standards, it is an unthinkable way to settle scores. 
The point is that significant changes occur, despite seemingly structural forces 
maintaining the status quo, and often, as Müller points out, these changes occur through a social 
process.334 It would be foolish to assert without evidence that nuclear weapons programs are 
beyond the reach of change. And whether they inhabit the world out of necessity or habit, their 
existence poses fair questions. If these questions were truly unsolvable, then no one would be 
having these discussions. But the reality is that dismantling a nuclear weapon is easy. Finding a 
world where dismantling all nuclear weapons is not unthinkable; achieving it is merely 
sufficiently difficult. 
In the previous two chapters, two problems barred the path to global zero. First, nuclear 
weapon states are resistant to giving up nuclear weapons, despite agreements to disarm, 
according to Article VI of the NPT. This resistance comes despite significant international 
                                                
333 Pinker, see esp. chap. 1. 
334 Müller, 69-70. 
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pressure to disarm. International pressure is a moral imperative, even if disguised as issues of 
equality or cost. Second, the role that the IAEA plays in ensuring states are using their nuclear 
programs safely and refraining from weaponizing fissile materials is contrasted by an unfortunate 
effect of sovereignty. That is, despite signatures on international agreements, no state can be 
compelled into compliance without ultimately going to war. States have vested interest in 
protecting certain information. The largest thing working towards synthesizing this problem is 
the fact that the majority of the world believes that IAEA cooperation stabilizes the world. But 
this is wholly offset by the fact that it only takes one nuclear-armed state that wishes to disregard 
the rules to undermine the whole thing—and there are several of them. 
These two problems do not exist independent from one another. They share measurable 
levels of overlap, and solving one without regard to the other runs the risk of committing the 
Type IV error, where the disregarded problem is exasperated. Therefore, synthesis and solution 
is not problem-specific. It requires synthesis on two fronts, while special attention must be given 
to the interactions between the problems. Therefore, in order to analyze the mess—both 
problems at once—a meta-perspective must be developed. This is shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
The Nuclear “Mess” 
Figure 7.1, or the “mess,” appears to be too complicated to understand, but, if one 
followed along with the building of Problems 1 and 2 in the previous chapters, one can see that it 
looks somewhat familiar. Problem 1 inhabits the top fifty percent of the mess. Problem 2 sits 
below (nodes that exist in both problems only appear in the top part of the mess). Between them 
are various points of overlap. As one can see, there is a significant similarity between the two. 
The media has identical goals between both problems, meaning it is more active than most 
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stakeholders. This biases the media in measuring engagement priority. One could take note of 
this and run a simulation where the media’s goal is permanently maximized, but this is an 
unfeasible change. In order to make the media the happiest, unfortunate events would need to 
occur on a regular basis. 
 
Figure 7.1: The Mess 
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Figure 7.2: Updated Mess 
 
 
What also becomes apparent is that some nodal relationships exist but are not represented 
in the mess. This is due to insufficient information while modeling problems individually. 
Therefore, careful consideration must be given to potential hidden movements, and these links 
must be identified. In other words, the “mess” requires restructuring. For example, there is a 
feedback loop between the risk of nuclear terrorism and human error with the prevention of 
proliferation. That is, the risk of nuclear terrorism or human error increases resources devoted to 
proliferation prevention. Additionally, preventing proliferation decreases the threat of nuclear 
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terror or human error. These points of overlap and mess-level refinement are identified in Table 
7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Updates to Mess Link Justifications 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
Risk of Nuclear 
Terrorism and 
Human Error 
Promote 
Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.5 The risk of nuclear terror or human error increases 
attention paid and resources allocated to the 
promotion of peaceful nuclear programs. 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
Risk of Nuclear 
Terrorism and 
Human Error 
-0.75 The promotion of peaceful nuclear programs 
reduces the risk of nuclear terror or human error by 
placing materials under safeguards. 
Attraction Outlier States: 
Prestige 
0.75 Soft power strongly increases prestige, but it is not 
a perfect relationship because it is not within the 
practitioner's control. 
 
 
Recalling Hester and Adams’ TAO approach, further modeling often requires 
restructuring. With that end in mind, the “nuclear weapons” node can now be modeled more 
centrally. Therefore, moving forward nuclear weapons’ involvement in the model is reconsidered 
to determine how they interact with other components, and how the problems will change if 
nuclear weapons are removed from the system. If removing nuclear weapons has no ill effect on 
the problems, then it would be reasonable to conclude that disarmament is feasible in the long 
term and would not cause a Type IV error. 
As mentioned previously, Richardson’s arms race model is incapable of being reworked 
back to zero, particularly because 1) states cannot possess less than one weapon if the other side 
possesses more than zero weapons, and 2) the cost of being the second-to-last state to disarm is 
high. Diminishing weapons redundant beyond deterrence is simple when the stockpile is large. 
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The INF treaty can be viewed as simple posturing when both the US and the Soviet Union knew 
that total abolition was not within the set of possible end states. Dismantling 1,000 weapons is 
simple if one has 10,000 in deployment. Dismantling 100 is significantly more difficult if one 
has 1,000 warheads. The cost rises exponentially as each end line is passed. Terminus appears 
endlessly beyond reach. 
There is future work in this field, to be certain. The next mathematician might discover a 
psychological delta that can compel reductions from ten redundancies to zero. Or perhaps there 
is natural random variation, or the trembling of an actor’s hand, that enacts the abolition play 
when least expected. But that is not the point of this research. 
This research seeks to explore disarmament-ready end states. To find synthesis between 
realists, on the one hand, and abolitionist moral crusaders, on the other, is already a heavy burden 
to carry, and it is the narrow scope of this research. Modeling the political mine field, where 
nuclear options shrink with each step, is not within this research’s scope. Therefore, to save 
needless debate about what disarmament would look like, the best course of action is to examine 
pre- and post-disarmament scenarios. Is a disarmed world preferable to a world where some 
actors have nuclear weapons? If the scope of this research is not satisfying, Perkovich and Acton, 
among others, have already performed some of the legwork to analyze what happens when 
nuclear stockpiles diminish.335 For the sake of completion, a brief summary is necessary.  
Perkovich and Acton argue the problem with reducing redundant weapons is really a trust 
problem. How much verification is necessary to displace distrust? This pits technical 
considerations against political concerns, with significant overlap between the two. They call 
                                                
335 Perkovich and Acton, see esp. chap. 2. 
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these “political-technical” challenges.336 On the one hand, nuclear weapons states would require 
significant verification capability to allay concerns. They do not argue that perfect verification is 
necessary,337 but rather, there needs to be a universally acceptable threshold for confidence. On 
the other hand, the risk of breakout nuclear weapons programs in a disarmed world requires the 
political will to enforce maintenance of a universal nonproliferation regime.338 This necessitates 
verification of declared systems, detection of diverted or clandestinely hidden warheads, and the 
utilization of intelligence agencies to help ensure compliance. 
Verifying declared warheads, components, and facilities takes on processes similar to 
existing IAEA inspections—random sampling of containers holding warheads queued for 
destruction, tamper-resistant seals, continued monitoring of destruction facilities, comparisons of 
radioactive spectrums, among others.339 Accounting for potential hidden weapons requires 
accurate auditing with statistical analysis to reconcile past production with current holdings 
(which, they point out, would already be being undertaken in the verification of declared 
materials), nuclear archeology to reconstruct plutonium production levels in graphite-moderated 
reactors, and challenge inspections when the verification body has legitimate concerns that a 
state is conducting illicit nuclear activities, while the inspected state retains the right to access 
management.340 This also resembles IAEA complementary accesses under the AP. Intelligence 
agencies are useful compliance verification tools because, as Richard L. Garwin points out, states 
engaged in clandestine nuclear activities must engage in certain telltale behaviors, such as 
                                                
336 Perkovich and Acton, 107.  
337 Perkovich and Acton, 42. 
338 Perkovich and Acton, 107. 
339 Perkovich and Acton, 46-52. 
340 Perkovich and Acton, 52-54, 57. 
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informing certain personnel about clandestine nuclear weapons programs in confidence, building 
certain security and surveillance facilities, and transporting components in the open.341 
Once states can overcome these challenges with a high level of confidence, political will 
to offer transparency in good faith becomes simpler. Perkovich and Acton use the South Africa 
model to show how strong verification tools from the international community mixed with high 
levels of state transparency can increase international confidence that a state has completely 
disarmed and not retained significant quantities of nuclear materials.342 In other words, getting to 
zero is not unthinkable; one state has already forged the path.343 
Michael E. O’Hanlon also explores the means by which redundant nuclear stockpiles can 
be reduced to zero. His more conservative approach mimics Perkovich and Acton’s conclusion 
(identified in Problem 1344) that the solution is not to permanently abolish states’ rights to 
nuclear proliferation, but rather, to dismantle nuclear weapons.345 In other words, O’Hanlon 
makes clear that policymakers should strive towards a world where nuclear weapons, their 
components, and ready-to-use fissile materials do not exist, while keeping in mind that no 
                                                
341 Richard L. Garwin, “Technologies and procedures for verifying warhead status and 
disarmament,” in Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and 
Technical Dimensions, ed. Nicholas Zarimpas (Solna, Sweden: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
152. 
342 Perkovich and Acton, 61-62. 
343 On the other hand, a reasonable argument is the reduction of serious security concerns made 
South Africa’s disarmament possible—for example, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to 
significant threat reductions from Marxist revolutionaries fighting along the Northern border; the 
ceasefire in the South African Border War, which granted Namibia’s independence and created a 
buffer between South Africa and Angola; as well as the transition from apartheid to majority 
rule, which significantly reduced South Africa’s internal threat. Once South Africa had 
significant reason to feel secure, it was possible to disarm. This is coupled with South Africa’s 
nuclear- and apartheid-induced isolation, which curtailed South Africa’s access to international 
commerce. South Africa, feeling secure, merely used disarmament as a means to re-enter the 
global economy. This fits with the means ends network in Problem 1.  
344 Perkovich and Acton, 102. 
345 O’Hanlon, Kindle location 937. 
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international accord, particularly one seeking to ban an entire class of weapons, should or can be 
permanently binding. His reasoning follows Graham Allison’s. That is, states might need to 
periodically reconstitute nuclear weapons to contain threats and provide credible deterrence. 
Why is deterrence necessary? In a world where the rising power often militarily challenges the 
declining power, “[States] must think the unthinkable to credibly deter potential 
adversaries…”346 That is, as will be discussed in the next chapter, periodic re-armament might 
prevent tense situations from spiraling out of control. Threats to proliferate or threats of 
proliferation signal possible willingness to use nuclear weapons, preserving deterrence. 
O’Hanlon is skeptical that any country would agree to dismantle their bombs without a 
significant portion of a future treaty discussing how the treaty can be temporarily suspended 
under certain conditions.347 O’Hanlon would probably call for language similar to, but more 
robust than, the NPT’s Article X, which allows for withdraw if remaining party to the treaty 
severely jeopardizes states’ interests.  
Under O’Hanlon’s model, disarmament requires three steps. First, international disputes, 
such as questions over Kashmir, sea beds off the coast of China and Japan, and security alliances 
between the US and former Soviet states or satellites must be resolved. O’Hanlon does not call 
for a utopian end state before negotiations can begin, but rather that the list of ongoing 
international disputes be limited. Second, once many of these (and any intervening) issues are 
resolved, an accord can be drafted that requires all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile 
materials be destroyed under IAEA-like mechanisms, and states are provided re-proliferation 
                                                
346 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap,” Foreign Policy, June 9, 2017. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/. 
347 O’Hanlon, Kindle location 957. 
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capabilities.348 O’Hanlon furthermore argues re-proliferation capabilities must be in short order. 
Perkovich and Acton call this “virtual nuclear arsenals” and peg the re-proliferation capability in 
weeks, or possible months.349 
In neither of these models do the authors tackle the large question—how do states’ calculi 
change as warhead numbers decline? O’Hanlon avoids this problem and proposes a reduction in 
US-Russian forces to 1,000 while preserving second-strike, land, sea, and air capability350 and 
stops there (for now). The answer is not simple, and whatever the answer is must violate the 
arms race model. To reiterate a previous objective: This model does not answer that question. 
Rather, it seeks to determine what a post-disarmament world would look like, given that certain 
changes are made. 
Therefore, how do nuclear weapons (and conventional weapons) more broadly and 
directly impact the mess’ components?351 Moving nuclear and conventional weapons from 
tertiary components in the model to driving forces requires some contextual understanding.  
 
Table 7.2: Updates to Mess with Nuclear/Conventional Weapons Link Justifications 
Sender 
Component 
Receiver 
Component 
Link Reasoning 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
NGOs: 
Abolition 
-1 Non-state actors have no control over whether or 
not a state possesses nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Stories that Sell 0.5 The media can sell stories about proliferation, but 
they can also sell stories about non-proliferation 
and disarmament. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
-0.75 Ultimately, NPT states cannot compel 
disarmament, but they have some measurable 
                                                
348 O’Hanlon, Kindle locations 1036, 1040, and 1080. 
349 Perkovich and Acton, 101, 102, and 104. 
350 O’Hanlon, Kindle location 1261. 
351 Prior to this point in the model, the “Nuclear Weapons” and “Conventional Weapons” nodes 
fed the problems but were not affected by the problems. At this point, I examine both how they 
affect the “mess” and are affected by the “mess.” 
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power remaining. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
-1 Non-state actors have no control over whether or 
not a state possesses nuclear weapons. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Military 
Capability 
1 Nuclear weapons very strongly increase military 
capability. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Avoid Threats -1 Proliferating or possessing nuclear weapons can 
be very threatening. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Risk of Nuclear 
Terrorism and 
Human Error 
1 The existence of nuclear weapons defines this 
risk. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Outlier States: 
Prestige 
0.75 Outlier States use nuclear weapons to bolster 
their prestige. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
-0.75 This relationship is strong because peaceful 
nuclear programs can be used to proliferate, 
especially if the state withdraws from the NPT. 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
-0.75 If one state has nuclear weapons, it reduces the 
success of nonproliferation. This relationship is 
crucial because under the status quo, nuclear 
weapons exist. This relationship is therefore by 
design. 
NWS: Security Nuclear 
Weapons 
1 Nuclear weapons states decision to proliferate 
defines the existence of nuclear weapons. 
Maximize 
Profits 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0.25 This relationship exists because Production Firms 
can submit designs for new weapons, but it is 
weak because the ultimate authority comes from 
NWS. 
Int’l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.75 The IAEA plays a large role in the prevention of 
nuclear weapon proliferation; however, their role 
in convincing NWS to disarm is less pronounced 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.5 NPT States define abstention from nuclear 
weapon possession; however, this relationship is 
moderate because the NPT State can withdraw 
and proliferate if it chooses. 
Avoid Threats Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.5 Avoiding threats means abstaining from 
proliferation. 
Transparency Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.5 Being transparent shines lights on nuclear 
weapons programs. 
Attraction Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.25 Soft power through non-nuclear weapons states 
makes nuclear weapons less attractive. 
Conflict Nuclear 
Weapons 
0.5 Conflict increases the likelihood that a state will 
proliferate, but proliferation is rare, so the link is 
moderate for now. 
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Re-Proliferation 
Capabilities 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
1 Re-Proliferation Capabilities means nuclear 
weapons are possible by definition. 
Safeguards 
Improvements 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
-0.75 Improvements to safeguards significantly lower 
possible proliferations. 
Outlier States: 
Prestige 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0.5 This is moderate because prestige can be 
obtained through other means. 
NWS: Security Conventional 
Weapons 
1 This link is strong because nuclear weapons 
states tend to spend significantly on their 
conventional capabilities. 
Maximize 
Profits  
Conventional 
Weapons 
0.25 This relationship exists because Production Firms 
can submit designs for new weapons, but it is 
weak because the ultimate authority comes from 
the state. 
Defense Conventional 
Weapons 
0.5 Defense relies partly on conventional weapons. 
Conflict Conventional 
Weapons 
0.75 Increased conflict is going to increase the 
demand for conventional weapons greatly. 
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Figure 7.3: The Mess and Nuclear Weapons 
 
 
7.3 Modeling Nuclear Disarmament 
Figure 7.3 shows the updated FCM with nuclear and conventional weapons inhabiting 
space in the center of the model and highlighted in yellow. The figure also shows directional 
relationships. Of particular note is that nuclear weapons do not directly influence nuclear 
weapons states’ security, due to its preexisting influence on military capability, which influences 
defense, and which in turn influences security. This indirect relationship was previously 
identified in Problem 1 when the fundamental objectives hierarchy and means ends network 
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updated nuclear weapons states’ objective from maintaining nuclear weapons to maximizing its 
security.  
Additionally, the nuclear weapons node, as illustrated in Figure 7.3, is now the dominant 
node, with the highest engagement priority. It also becomes apparent that the “nuclear weapons” 
node interacts much more with Problem 1 than Problem 2. In other words, nuclear weapons are 
more likely to influence the security problem than the cooperation problem. To determine how 
nuclear weapons affect the outcome of the mess, emphasis should be placed on components from 
Problem 2. 
 
Table 7.3: Mess Popularity, Activity, and Feasibility352 
Concept Activity Popularity Engagement 
Priority 
Feasible 
Change? 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
9.21954
4457 
8.4557672
63 
1 Y 
Stories that 
Sell 
8.77496
4387 
11.618950
04 
2 N 
NWS: Security 6.63324
9581 
4.7696960
07 
3 Y 
NPT States: 
Abolition 
6.16441
4003 
9.3674969
98 
4 Y 
Transparency 5.12347
5383 
1.5811388
3 
5 Y 
Safeguards 
Improvements 
4.89897
9486 
0 6 Y 
Int'l 
Verification: 
Abolition 
4.74341
649 
8.1240384
05 
7 Y 
International 
Agreements 
4.33012
7019 
1.4142135
62 
8 Y 
Int'l 4.18330 6.3245553 9 Y 
                                                
352 Recall that popularity is a measure of links going into the concept in descending order, 
activity is a measure of links coming from a concept in descending order, and measuring the 
activity rank in ascending order and popularity rank in descending order sets the engagement 
priority.   
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Verification 
Agencies: 
Nuclear 
Security 
0133 2 
Uncertainty 3.53553
3906 
3 10 N 
NPT States: 
Equality 
3.53553
3906 
3.3541019
66 
11 N 
Anarchy 3.16227
766 
0 12 N 
Conflict 3.16227
766 
0 13 N 
Cooperation 3.16227
766 
0.7071067
81 
14 Y 
Attraction 3.16227
766 
0.8660254
04 
15 N 
Re-
Proliferation 
Capabilities 
3.16227
766 
0.8660254
04 
16 Y 
NGOs: 
Abolition 
3.16227
766 
4.7434164
9 
17 Y 
Prevent 
Proliferation 
3.16227
766 
13.910427
74 
18 Y 
Diplomacy 3 0 19 Y 
Military 
Capability 
2.73861
2788 
2 20 Y 
NGOs: 
Oversight 
2.73861
2788 
2.6457513
11 
21 Y 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 
2.64575
1311 
4.7434164
9 
22 Y 
Promote 
Peaceful 
Nuclear 
Programs 
2.59807
6211 
10.606601
72 
23 Y 
Scientific 
Analysis 
2.44948
9743 
0 24 Y 
Avoid Threats 2.44948
9743 
1 25 Y 
NWS: 
Sovereignty 
2.23606
7977 
2.7386127
88 
26 N 
Behavioral 
Norms 
2.12132
0344 
0.7071067
81 
27 N 
Outlier States: 
Prestige 
1.73205
0808 
4.9497474
68 
28 Y 
Nonbinding 1.58113 0 29 Y 
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Agreements 883 
Verification 
Processes 
1.58113
883 
0 30 Y 
Defense 1.58113
883 
7.9529868
6 
31 Y 
Reputation 1.58113
883 
8.4557672
63 
32 N 
Safeguards 
Costs 
1.41421
3562 
0 33 Y 
Risk of 
Nuclear 
Terrorism and 
Human Error 
1.22474
4871 
2.5980762
11 
34 N 
Conventional 
Weapons 
1 1 35 Y 
Maximize 
Profits 
1 2.7386127
88 
36 N 
Proper 
Response 
0.86602
5404 
0 37 Y 
Safety Checks 0.86602
5404 
0 38 Y 
Expectation of 
Sovereignty 
0.86602
5404 
0 39 N 
ROI Gains 0.70710
6781 
0 40 Y 
International 
Investments 
0.70710
6781 
0 41 Y 
R&D 0.70710
6781 
0 42 Y 
Provide 
Materials 
0.70710
6781 
0 43 Y 
Provide 
Services 
0.70710
6781 
0 44 Y 
Provide 
Equipment 
0.70710
6781 
0 45 Y 
Provide 
Facilities 
0.70710
6781 
0 46 Y 
Scientific 
Training 
0.70710
6781 
0 47 Y 
Technical 
Training 
0.70710
6781 
0 48 Y 
Bilateral 
Agreements 
0.70710
6781 
0 49 Y 
Multilateral 
Agreements 
0.70710
6781 
0 50 Y 
Control 0.70710 0 51 Y 
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6781 
Supervision 0.70710
6781 
0 52 Y 
Self-Restraint 0.70710
6781 
0.7071067
81 
53 Y 
Conformity 0.70710
6781 
0.7071067
81 
54 Y 
Proper 
Treatment of 
Citizens 
0.5 0.7071067
81 
55 Y 
 
 
There are several feasible concepts that can be changed. However, there are certain 
constraints on what will be tested. First, remembering that the new world must resemble the old 
world in terms of sovereignty and that realist assumptions about world order still apply, 
scenarios will not be run that give NGOs (for example) a preponderance of power, despite NGOs 
being relatively high on the engagement priority. Instead, non-state actor groups and 
intergovernmental organizations will be assessed more than changed. For the purpose of 
handling the mess, the state is the referent object, particularly the nuclear weapon state. If the 
state does not benefit then the state is not expected to participate in the discussion. Therefore, 
several scenarios will be run that focus on the state. Note: To save space, the End State reports 
will only include components that exhibit change, with the exception of sovereignty, where 
applicable. Concepts that remain at zero will be excluded from discussion unless there is reason 
to include them. 
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Table 7.4: Mess Scenario Exploration 
 Summary Performance 
Scenario 1 • NPT states Abolition set initially 
to 1, simulating universal 
acceptance of NPT 
• Nuclear weapons node clamped 
to -1 to simulate disarmament 
Stable and Complicated. NWS’ goals 
in both problems greatly reduced. 
Several key stakeholders are unhappy. 
Multiple error types possible. 
Scenario 2 • NPT states Abolition set initially 
to 1  
• Sovereignty clamped to 0 
(compelling no change in 
sovereignty) 
• Nuclear weapons node is 
clamped to -1 
Stable and Complicated. Multiple key 
stakeholders suffer greatly diminished 
goals. IAEA and NPT states are happy 
 
Potential Type IV error: NWS and 
Outlier States simply refuse to disarm, 
opting instead to continue to balance. 
Furthermore, this diminishes trust in 
future treaties 
Scenario 3 • Security is maximized by 
clamping security to 1 
• Nuclear weapons node is 
clamped to -1 
Stable and Complicated. This solves 
Problem 1, but maintenance requires 
NWS to give up substantial amounts 
of sovereignty 
 
Potential Type IV error: This strongly 
suggests future security dilemmas and 
potential militarized international 
disputes 
Scenario 4 • Sovereignty is clamped to 0  
• International verification has an 
initial setting of 1 
• Nuclear weapons node is 
clamped to -1 
Periodic and Complex. There is no end 
state that reaches equilibrium 
 
This requires further interaction with 
the problem 
Scenario 5 • Sovereignty is clamped to 0 
• Cooperation initially set to 1, 
denoting the successful signing 
of a disarmament treaty 
• Outlier States’ prestige is 
clamped to 0.25 
• Nuclear weapons node is 
clamped to -1 
Stable and Complicated. Solves both 
problems. 
 
Potential Type IV errors: Neither 
anarchy nor uncertainty are reduced. 
Therefore, if disarmed under this 
framework, potential clandestine 
defection can occur, shifting the BOP. 
Additionally, this might signal to less-
powerful states that proliferating and 
then agreeing to disarmament can be 
rewarding. Finally, a “security period 
of vulnerability” is identified. 
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In Scenario 1 the NPT states are prioritized. Their goal to maximize total adherence to 
NPT Article VI means the nuclear weapons states take their Article VI responsibility seriously 
enough that nuclear weapons states can disarm. There is no expectation that nuclear weapons 
states will enthusiastically accept this scenario’s outcome; however, it is reasonable to test if 
only to exclude this solution from future negotiations. This scenario is sparse and should 
exemplify the need to include solutions that benefit across stakeholder types. 
In Scenario 2, therefore, NPT States are given an initial setting of maximized adherence 
to the abolition provision in the NPT’s Article VI. In other words, the nuclear weapons states 
have sat down and agreed to take significant steps towards abolition; however, this agreement is 
not yet legally binding. They have agreed merely to start working towards their commitments—
gradual disarmament that is subject to the whims of international order or disorder. In order to 
satisfy nuclear weapons states that their sovereign goals outside of nuclear policy are taken 
seriously, the nuclear weapons states’ sovereignty node is clamped to its maximum state, which 
simulates an agreement that does not affect its sovereign abilities outside of the agreement. 
Finally, the nuclear weapons node is clamped to its maximum decrease, simulating the 
elimination of nuclear weapons. This scenario is likely to diminish nuclear weapons states’ goal 
for maximized security, but the scenario requires exploration to see if there exists a path towards 
abolition that naturally increases security. 
In Scenario 3 focus shifts to security. What happens if moving forward with a nuclear 
abolition accord, nuclear weapons states focused all of their attention on maximizing their 
security? This would be somehow compelled disarmament in a realist world. No other 
stakeholders matter. That is, security is clamped to its maximum increase and nuclear weapons 
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are clamped to their maximum decrease. This scenario is included because it is hypothesized that 
it will solve the nuclear weapons states’ first problem, but cause a Type IV error regarding their 
second problem—in this contradictory world, the nuclear weapons states would have to yield to 
the IAEA through treaty rather than through Müller’s social evolution. 
In Scenario 4 sovereignty is again maintained at the present-day status quo. No change 
will occur between timestamps. The IAEA’s ability to verify compliance is initially maximized 
but subsequently left up to nature (the sigmoid transfer function). Finally, nuclear weapons are 
clamped to their maximum decrease. It is hypothesized that without constant IAEA supervision, 
states, particularly the nuclear weapons states and the Outlier States will constantly vie for 
superiority against the IAEA’s continued need to manage nuclear affairs. In other words, the 
nuclear-armed states will likely disallow the IAEA from empowering itself beyond the power 
granted it by member states. It is unlikely this solution will solve the problem but is included 
because it will demonstrate present day assumptions about disarmament. Compelled 
disarmament, regardless of security needs will likely result in fierce debate between states and 
international organizations, diminishing the role international organizations play in future 
debates, particularly debates over nuclear weapons. 
Finally, in Scenario 5 the nuclear weapons states’ need for continued guarantees of 
sovereignty beyond a successful global disarmament accord is maintained. Rather than 
empowering the IAEA directly by setting it initially at its maximum, empowerment is shifted to 
the states through the signing of a treaty, including that nuclear weapons states accept the CSA in 
addition to their established acceptance of the AP. This is simulated by initially setting the 
“cooperation” node to its maximum value. In other words, the state is choosing to cooperate on a 
single item for a specific period of time (during the signing and ratification processes only), and 
   
 
212 
they are not agreeing to cooperate on any matter beyond the articles in a global disarmament 
treaty. As will be discussed later, this is merely symbolic and has no cause and effect relation 
with a successfully implemented (rather than merely signed) disarmament treaty. This is because 
states can sign the treaty, ratify the treaty, and make public statements about the treaty’s 
communal significance, but secretly hide nuclear hedging activities or even entire weapons 
unknown to inspectors. In other words, the signing of the treaty is meaningless outside of its 
cultural (in the nuclear context) meaning. Here, Outlier States too must be brought in. this 
scenario empowers the Outlier States’ prestige to a minor degree. It does not seek to empower 
the Outlier State to a maximum degree. That is, Pakistan and the DPRK are not empowered by 
being granted veto power at the UN Security Council, but their needs to be recognized as 1) a 
nuclear power and 2) an important actor in the international movement towards global zero. The 
Outlier State here is brought into the NSG, relieved of any ongoing nuclear (or other relevant) 
sanctions, and perhaps, as will be addressed later, temporarily forgiven for any human rights 
violations. Some progress has already been accomplished here. Israel, for example, has not 
suffered nuclear sanctions, despite its weapons program. India’s access to the NSG has been 
greatly increased, despite provisions in the NPT that likely prohibits India’s access. In other 
words, the international community might need to apply responses to non-NPT nuclear powers 
consistently, rather than calling some “rogue nations” and others Western allies. Further, it will 
likely require this consistent reaction to be more like the response towards Israel or India, rather 
than towards the DPRK. This is further explicated in a footnote below. Finally, as in Scenarios 1 
– 5, the nuclear weapons node is clamped to a maximum decrease, simulating global 
disarmament. This scenario will likely “solve” the nuclear weapons problems as defined in the 
two previous chapters, but it will likely not resolve the natural problems of uncertainty and 
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anarchy. Given the parameters of the “mess,” however, this might be the best path forward thus 
far.  
Running the simulations with the sigmoid transfer function for 100 timestamps (again, to 
ensure the scenarios are either stable or periodic), in the first three scenarios multiple error types 
are possible, especially the Type IV error this model seeks to avoid. In Scenario 4, there is no 
end state that reaches equilibrium following 100 timestamps. Finally, Scenario 5 reaches a stable 
equilibrium in which all stakeholders are satisfied. On the other hand, a “security period of 
vulnerability” exists (discussed below) that threatens to undermine a successful and lasting 
disarmament treaty. Scenario 5 requires the understanding that nuclear weapons states will not be 
burdened beyond the disarmament treaty. IAEA inspectors are not given free reign to investigate 
any suspected wrongdoing. Additionally, it requires understanding that the Outlier States must be 
brought into the fold.353 
 
7.4 Preliminary Results 
 
Table 7.5: Mess Scenario 1 NPT Signing End States 
Concept End State 
NWS: Security -0.99999995 
Maximize Profits -0.99990920 
Int'l Verification: Abolition 0.99999995 
NGOs: Abolition 1 
Stories that Sell -0.98648523 
                                                
353 Significant effort has already been made to include Outlier States in international nuclear 
policies. US Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama worked to include India in 
international nuclear trade deals, despite India being on the Nuclear Suppliers Group control list 
since 1974, preventing its inclusion in trade regimes. US President Donald Trump and ROK 
President Moon Jae In furthermore undid a decades old unofficial international policy to not 
recognize the DPRK regime as legitimate. This modeling seeks to capture that level of Outlier 
State inclusion without giving into Outlier State demands. 
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NPT States: Abolition 1 
Religious Leaders: Abolition 1 
Reputation -0.99999999 
Defense -0.99889494 
Military Capability -0.99999999 
Nuclear Weapons -1 
Conventional Weapons -0.99990920 
Avoid Threats 0.99990920
4 
Self-Restraint -0.98568521 
Proper Treatment of Citizens -0.98568521 
Conformity -0.98568521 
Attraction -0.99877657 
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism 
and Human Error 
-0.99999875 
Behavioral Norms 0.98661429
8 
NWS: Sovereignty -0.99893113 
Int'l Verification Agencies: 
Nuclear Security 
1 
NGOs: Oversight 0.99999277
5 
NPT States: Equality 0.99999990
1 
Outlier States: Prestige -1 
Promote Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.99999989
8 
Prevent Proliferation 0.85749143
5 
 
 
Table 7.6: Mess Scenario 2 NPT Signing and Recognition of Sovereignty End States 
Concept End State 
NWS: Security -0.99999996 
Maximize Profits -0.99990920 
Int'l Verification: Abolition 0.999999975 
NGOs: Abolition 1 
Stories that Sell -0.84571771 
NPT States: Abolition 1 
Religious Leaders: Abolition 1 
Reputation -0.99999999 
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Defense -0.99889494 
Military Capability -0.99999999 
Nuclear Weapons -1 
Conventional Weapons -0.99990920 
Avoid Threats 0.999909204 
Self-Restraint -0.97127275 
Proper Treatment of Citizens -0.97127275 
Conformity -0.97127275 
Attraction -0.99648773 
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism 
and Human Error 
-0.99999911 
Behavioral Norms 0.986614298 
NWS: Sovereignty 0 
Int'l Verification Agencies: 
Nuclear Security 
1 
NGOs: Oversight 0.999938261 
NPT States: Equality 0.999999951 
Outlier States: Prestige -1 
Promote Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.999999928 
Prevent Proliferation 0.926870161 
 
 
Table 7.7: Security Maximized 
Component End State 
NWS: Security 1 
Maximize Profits 0.99999995 
Int'l Verification: Abolition 0.999999946 
NGOs: Abolition 1 
Stories that Sell 1 
NPT States: Abolition 1 
Religious Leaders: Abolition 1 
Reputation 1 
Defense 0.999992509 
Military Capability -0.00045397 
Nuclear Weapons -1 
Conventional Weapons 0.999909204 
Avoid Threats 0.999909204 
Self-Restraint 0.986614298 
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Proper Treatment of Citizens 0.986614298 
Conformity 0.986614298 
Attraction 0.998894443 
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism 
and Human Error 
-0.99999938 
Behavioral Norms 0.986614298 
NWS: Sovereignty -0.99999254 
Int'l Verification Agencies: 
Nuclear Security 
1 
NGOs: Oversight 0.99999995 
NPT States: Equality 1 
Outlier States: Prestige -0.99890360 
Promote Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.99999995 
Prevent Proliferation 0.999992547 
 
 
Table 7.8: Mess Scenario 4 No Changes to Sovereignty, Signing of CSA 
Component End State 
No stable end state, periodic flux 
This scenario remains complex 
 
 
Table 7.9:Mess Scenario 5 No Changes to Sovereignty, Signing of CSA, Engaging Outlier States 
Concept End State 
NWS: Security 0.999992546 
Maximize Profits 0.99999995 
Int'l Verification: Abolition 0.999999946 
NGOs: Abolition 1 
Stories that Sell 1 
NPT States: Abolition 1 
Religious Leaders: Abolition 1 
Reputation 1 
Defense 0.999992509 
Military Capability -0.00045401 
Nuclear Weapons -1 
Conventional Weapons 0.999909197 
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Avoid Threats 0.999909204 
Self-Restraint 0.986614298 
Proper Treatment of Citizens 0.986614298 
Conformity 0.986614298 
Attraction 0.998894443 
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism 
and Human Error 
-0.99999938 
Behavioral Norms 0.986614298 
NWS: Sovereignty 0 
Int'l Verification Agencies: 
Nuclear Security 
1 
NGOs: Oversight 0.999999388 
NPT States: Equality 1 
Outlier States: Prestige 0.25 
Promote Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
0.99999995 
Prevent Proliferation 0.999992547 
 
 
Given the five scenarios explored, the most feasible solution is to take steps that ensure 
states’ rights under sovereignty are guaranteed, to bring the Outlier States into the fold, to seek 
the cooperation of nuclear weapons states through signing the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement and the Additional Protocol. Under such a paradigm, states will feel more secure 
about their neighbors’ intentions (however, uncertainty is an ongoing concern); Outlier States’ 
needs will be recognized in the international community, reducing the probability that they will 
deviate from norms; and sovereign decisions, including the right to withdraw from existing or 
future treaties will not be affected (indeed, this is a requirement for any successful international 
agreement under the tenets of political realism). Equilibrium is reached relatively quickly. This 
scenario is illustrated in Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4: Mess Scenario No Changes to Sovereignty, Signing of CSA, Engaging Outlier States 
 
 
The constraints of this model of the “messy” nuclear landscape lead the research to a 
radical conclusion. Bringing in India, Pakistan, and the DPRK (Israel already enjoys substantial 
prestige, relative to the other three) seems counterintuitive. Indeed, less-powerful NPT states 
might reconsider their nuclear options if they feel the DPRK is rewarded for its nuclear weapons 
program. However, this simply suggests continued monitoring (or the Observe step) is necessary 
to prevent a Type IV error along these lines. 
Paying closer attention to the needs of the Outlier States is not, however, as radical as it 
appears. When US President George W. Bush facilitated nuclear trade with India, it signaled a 
blow to nuclear safeguards and the NSG. On the other hand, the nuclear deal with India 
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benefitted safeguards in two ways. First, it brought substantial parts of India’s nuclear sector 
under IAEA purview, including militarized nuclear sectors. Second, it signaled to the other 
Outlier States that cooperation with the P5 and NPT states is possible. 
Additionally, paying closer attention to the Outlier States is not unreasonable. While none 
of the Outlier States are as powerful, as large, as near (not merely in the geographical sense) to 
the P5, or as nuclear as Russia, they are as demanding as Russia in other areas (in Problem 2 they 
were classified as expectant stakeholders). These states have unique needs that, under the status 
quo, are fulfilled by nuclear weapons as a proxy for what it wants most—a secure sense of power 
on an international stage,354 a sense of power they feel is unjustly monopolized by the P5 and 
foolishly abandoned by the NPT.355 Recalling that their priority in Problem 1 is identical to the 
nuclear weapons states (indeed, they were modeled with the nuclear weapons states) and that 
their divergence from nuclear weapons states in Problem 2 is a reticence towards following 
orders, the Outlier States have the capacity to follow trends as long as they feel like they are as 
equals in the driver’s seat with an equivalent capability to forge new paths. And if Outlier 
participation makes the world more secure and less prone to nuclear accident or war, then each 
stakeholder walks away better than before. 
On the other hand, and as mentioned earlier, continued monitoring is necessary to prevent 
NPT states seeking prestige. Nonproliferation might be a trend simply because few states believe 
the alternative is viable. If a small state not unlike the DPRK perceives DPRK inclusion as a 
reward for proliferating, then that small state can enact some level of gain by proliferating and 
                                                
354 Adapted from Simon Serfaty, “Moving into a Post-Western World,” Washington Quarterly 
34, no. 2 (2011): 10. 
355 Bull argues that resistance to the NPT by Outlier States is in part due to their needs not being 
addressed during negotiations; therefore, it is less likely they will agree to NPT revisions without 
taking part in the discussion. Headley Bull, “Rethinking Non-Proliferation,” International Affairs 
51, no. 2 (1975): 182. 
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then demanding status equal to the P5. Indeed, if the NPT regime’s goal is one of equality, then 
it would not be irrational for all NPT states to seek prestige, as each state that joins the nuclear 
club experiences a diminished return because influence in the system is spread from a maximum 
of 100 percent, making the system more equal. Therefore, each individual nuclear-armed state’s 
influence diminishes as additional states proliferate. This fits with the Waltzian model of 
horizontal proliferation, which, to the abolitionist, is not a preferred outcome. In fact, given that 
the NPT states’ goal in Problem 1 is abolition, this Type IV error has a low probability of 
occurring. 
At timestamp 0 nuclear weapons have been permanently reduced to -1. Sovereignty 
remains at 0. Outlier States are permanently lifted to 0.25. And Cooperation has an initial setting 
of 1. By timestamp 1 all stakeholders seeking abolition enjoy a maximum and permanent 
increase as a result of the signing of a disarmament treaty. Nuclear weapons states reputation 
significantly increase, due to their new role in the nonproliferation regime. Nuclear weapons 
states significantly increase their defense budgets, however, as a result of the massive defensive 
hole left when their nuclear deterrent was abolished, which is evident by the maximum and 
permanent decrease in military capability.356 On the other hand, this decrease in military 
capability is offset because these states have avoided threatening behavior, thereby avoiding a 
security dilemma. The IAEA’s twin goals to prevent proliferation and to promote peaceful 
nuclear capabilities enjoy a permanent maximization. The media’s ability to sell stories declines, 
likely due to cooperation being less-than thrilling. And finally, the risk of nuclear terrorism is 
permanently eliminated.357 
                                                
356 It is permanent because these states permanently lose their ability to use nuclear weapons. 
357 This is unless a terrorist group can build a weapon independent of a state. 
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At timestamp 2 nuclear weapons states have maximized their security, due to the 
previous timestamp’s threat avoidance and increased defense budgets. Production firms’ profits 
slightly decline, due to the loss of nuclear contracts. The media’s ability to sell stories continues 
to decline but stabilizes. Reputation and defense spending continue to rise. At this timestamp, 
however, previous nuclear weapons states suffer significant reductions in self-restraint, human 
rights, international conformity, and soft power, likely due to each states’ needs to reassert its 
previous position without a nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, behavioral norms reaches a 
permanent maximization (i.e., the nuclear taboo has permanently extended to merely possessing 
weapons). NPT states permanently enjoy maximized nuclear equality. On the down side, at this 
timestamp, NGOs and activists suffer a significant reduction in their goal of oversight, due to the 
international community and the IAEA increasing their roles. 
At timestamp 3 nuclear weapons states continue to enjoy maximized security. Production 
firms maximize profits due to previous increased defense spending. The previous timestamp’s 
decrease in self-restraint, human rights, conformity, and attraction have caused a significant 
increase in the media’s ability to sell stories and have significantly harmed former nuclear 
weapons states’ reputations. Defense spending continues to increase. Self-restraint, human rights, 
conformity, and soft power continue to decline, but they are stabilizing. NGOs enjoy a 
significant and permanent increase in oversight. 
At timestamp 4 a curious effect occurs. Nuclear weapons states’ security significantly 
reduces (this is discussed more at length at timestamp 5). Production firms continue to enjoy 
high profits. Reputations finally and permanently increase due to timestamp 3’s stabilizations of 
self-restraint, human rights, conformity, and attraction. Defense spending takes a large cut, 
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which might suggest former nuclear weapons states are slowing down defensive buildups. Self-
restraint, human rights, conformity, and soft power all enjoy a permanent increase.  
At timestamp 5 nuclear weapons states’ security continues to significantly decrease. This 
decrease, which began in timestamp 4, can be referred to as the “security period of 
vulnerability,” where former nuclear weapons states are vulnerable to the “Thucydides Trap” 
(discussed in the next chapter), due to previous timestamp’s major increases in conventional 
weapons and new posturing (in the South China Sea and Eastern Europe, for examples) due to 
previous timestamp’s reductions in self-restraint and conformity. This “period of security 
vulnerability” is highlighted in Figure 7.5. At timestamp 5 the disarmament treaty is in serious 
jeopardy, and at this point it might be reasonable for states to consider temporarily withdrawing 
from the treaty. Although this is not the desired outcome, it is preferable to World War III (and 
resultant nuclear proliferations anyway, which is also discussed in the next chapter). The model 
presented here, however, suggests the treaty will survive. Additionally in timestamp 5, 
production firms suffer a two-timestamp reduction in profits, caused by timestamp 4’s reduction 
in defense spending. On the other hand, defense spending at this timestamp increases 
significantly and permanently. 
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Figure 7.5: Period of Vulnerability under Disarmament 
 
 
By timestamp 6 nuclear weapons states have survived the threat of conventional war, and 
previous defense spending increases and abidance of various norms, such as self-restraint, human 
rights, and conformity (in addition to increased soft power), have permanently maximized the 
former nuclear powers’ security. Production firms’ profits continue to decline. 
Finally, at timestamp 7 production firms’ profits maximize, and the simulation reaches 
equilibrium by timestamp 8. As noted earlier, because the model is run according to the IAEA’s 
schedule, each timestamp represents a year. Therefore, barring an unidentified error in modeling, 
and given that the problems do not change significantly, it is reasonable to conclude that all 
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stakeholders, including Outlier States, will benefit from a disarmament treaty within eight years 
of signing. 
In this simulation the two primary objectives are achieved; security is maximized, and the 
IAEA achieves nuclear security. Of particular note is the null effect this simulation has on 
cooperation. The initial setting of cooperation to 1 has no lasting impact. Cooperation is not 
compelled; rather, it remains constant. Anarchy and uncertainty, too, remain unchanged. There 
are some added benefits. For example, states are better able to avoid signaling threat by mistake. 
On the other hand, military capability decreases for the simple fact that dismantling weapons by 
definition makes states incapable of using those weapons. This is countered by the very strong 
increase in defense, however, which suggests BOP politics will not end, but instead might 
become more pronounced, suggesting a possible Type IV error. 
The identified “security period of vulnerability” is a serious hurdle, perhaps the most 
profound and likely of the possible Type IV errors. This is a period of time when militarized 
international disputes are very likely, culminating in a rush to rearm nuclear forces and, perhaps, 
a nuclear first strike to cripple the other side’s nuclear capability. Therefore, I further 
hypothesize that the aforementioned re-proliferation capability be automatic and explicitly 
modeled in the simulation. In Scenario 6 I repeat Scenario 5 with “Re-Proliferation Capability” 
clamped at +1 to attempt to decrease uncertainty and shrink the period of vulnerability. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
225 
Figure 7.6: Disarmament Simulation with Re-Proliferation Capabilities Maximized 
 
 
Scenario 6 is stable and complicated. The end state is very similar to Scenario 5’s end 
state; however, some major differences exist. Transparency and the value of international 
agreements increase tremendously. This is largely due to the new significant reduction in 
uncertainty, which is itself caused by the knowledge that belligerence will be punished with 
automatic rearmament. This increase in certainty has an added benefit; it greatly reduces the 
security vulnerability, not in length, but in depth. This risk is not eliminated, but its intensity has 
been greatly reduced. 
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Figure 7.7: Reduced Vulnerability with Re-Proliferation Capability 
 
 
 
Table 7.10:Mess Scenario 6 No Changes to Sovereignty, Signing of CSA, Engaging Outlier 
States, Maximizing Re-Proliferation Capability 
Concept End State 
NWS: Security 0.999992542 
Maximize Profits 0.99999995 
Int'l Verification: Abolition 1 
NGOs: Abolition 1 
Stories that Sell 1 
NPT States: Abolition 1 
Religious Leaders: Abolition 1 
Reputation 1 
Defense 0.999908772 
Military Capability -0.00045401 
Significantly diminished vulnerability 
period 
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Nuclear Weapons -1 
Conventional Weapons 0.999909197 
Avoid Threats 0.999909204 
Self-Restraint 0.986614298 
Proper Treatment of Citizens 0.986614298 
Conformity 0.986614298 
Transparency 0.986614298 
Attraction 0.998894443 
International Agreements 0.986614298 
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism 
and Human Error 
-0.99999938 
Behavioral Norms 0.986614298 
Uncertainty -0.99990292 
Re-Proliferation Capabilities 1 
NWS: Sovereignty 0 
Int'l Verification Agencies: 
Nuclear Security 
1 
NGOs: Oversight 0.999999388 
NPT States: Equality 1 
Outlier States: Prestige 0.25 
Promote Peaceful Nuclear 
Programs 
1 
Prevent Proliferation 1 
 
 
In other words, this simulation thus far suggests that by recognizing existing sovereign 
rights, by bringing Outlier States into the fold, and by achieving universal adoption of the CSA 
and AP, disarmament will not disrupt the system, as designed.358 Acting to achieve goals is 
feasible in this scenario. On the other hand, this does not exclude a Type IV error in the guise of 
states scrambling to rebalance the international anarchical environment. 
 
 
                                                
358 It must be noted that the fidelity present in this model cannot pick up individual disputes as 
identified by O’Hanlon. Simulations using agent-based modeling are better adept at handling 
both individual disputes and the international system. This is discussed more in the next chapter. 
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7.5 Final Simulations  
Scenario 6 suggests there is a viable pathway towards disarmament by maintaining rights 
to govern the societies of their respective states, bringing in Outlier States to the negotiation 
process, signing the CSA and AP (as a measure of good faith, explained in more detail in the 
stability analysis), and substantially decreasing uncertainty by factoring into the solution 
rearmament capabilities that take effect automatically upon a former nuclear state’s belligerence. 
Moving forward, one might ask oneself whether or not nuclear weapons can remain at -1 if the 
modeler removes the peg. Therefore, two final simulations are performed to test if the nuclear 
weapons node can naturally remain at a maximum level of decrease if all other variables remain 
constant. 
In the first simulation, I clamp sovereignty, the Outlier States, and re-proliferation 
capability to their respective levels, per Scenario 6. All remaining components take on an initial 
value equal to their end state in Scenario 6 (shown in Table 7.9).  
 
Table 7.11: Scenario 7 Stability After Disarmament 
Component 
Scenario 6 
End State 
Scenario 7 
End State 
NWS: Security 0.999992542 0.999992546 
Maximize Profits 0.99999995 0.999999992 
Int'l Verification: Abolition 1 1 
NGOs: Abolition 1 1 
Stories that Sell 1 1 
NPT States: Abolition 1 1 
Religious Leaders: Abolition 1 1 
Reputation 1 1 
Defense 0.999908772 0.999991878 
Military Capability -0.00045401 0.241457613 
Nuclear Weapons -1 -0.95064491 
Conventional Weapons 0.999909197 0.999909197 
Avoid Threats 0.999909204 0.99985127 
Self-Restraint 0.986614298 0.986614298 
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Proper Treatment of Citizens 0.986614298 0.986614298 
Conformity 0.986614298 0.986614298 
Transparency 0.986614298 0.986614298 
Attraction 0.998894443 0.998894443 
International Agreements 0.986614298 0.986614298 
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism and 
Human Error 
-
0.999999388 
-
0.999998998 
Behavioral Norms 0.986614298 0.986614298 
Uncertainty -0.99990292 -0.99990292 
Re-Proliferation Capabilities 1 1 
Int'l Verification Agencies: Nuclear 
Security 1 1 
NGOs: Oversight 0.999999388 0.999999388 
NPT States: Equality 1 1 
Outlier States: Prestige 0.25 0.25 
Promote Peaceful Nuclear Programs 1 1 
Prevent Proliferation 1 1 
 
 
This scenario suggests the nuclear weapons node maintains a strong level of decrease. 
That is, by maintaining a strong commitment to not allowing the IAEA to grow too big, by 
maintaining a strong commitment to address the needs of the Outlier States, by continuing to be 
party to the CSA and Additional Protocol, which does increase the IAEA’s scope but only 
through power granted it by member states, and by maintaining a strong commitment to re-
proliferation when necessary, the role nuclear weapons play in our future scenarios will be 
significantly diminished (although not to the maximum degree possible). 
In the second simulation I assign all components their initial values equal to the end 
states in Scenario 6 (again, shown in Table 7.9). That is, I remove all clamped values. 
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Table 7.12: Scenario 8 Nuclear Stability after Disarmament at a Cost 
Component	
Scenario	6	
End	State	
Scenario	8	
End	State	
NWS:	Security	 0.999992542	 0.999992546	
Maximize	Profits	 0.99999995	 0.99999995	
Int'l	Verification:	Abolition	 1	 0.999999946	
NGOs:	Abolition	 1	 1	
Stories	that	Sell	 1	 1	
NPT	States:	Abolition	 1	 1	
Religious	Leaders:	Abolition	 1	 1	
Reputation	 1	 1	
Defense	 0.999908772	 0.99999251	
Military	Capability	 -0.00045401	 -0.00045091	
Nuclear	Weapons	 -1	 -0.99999938	
Conventional	Weapons	 0.999909197	 0.999909197	
Avoid	Threats	 0.999909204	 0.999909204	
Self-Restraint	 0.986614298	 0.986614298	
Proper	Treatment	of	Citizens	 0.986614298	 0.986614298	
Conformity	 0.986614298	 0.986614298	
Transparency	 0.986614298	 0	
Attraction	 0.998894443	 0.998894443	
International	Agreements	 0.986614298	 0	
Risk	of	Nuclear	Terrorism	and	Human	
Error	 -0.99999938	 -0.99999938	
Behavioral	Norms	 0.986614298	 0.986614298	
Uncertainty	 -0.99990292	 0	
Re-Proliferation	Capabilities	 1	 0	
NWS:	Sovereignty	 0	 -0.99999254	
Int'l	Verification	Agencies:	Nuclear	
Security	 1	 1	
NGOs:	Oversight	 0.999999388	 0.99999995	
NPT	States:	Equality	 1	 1	
Outlier	States:	Prestige	 0.25	 -0.9989036	
Promote	Peaceful	Nuclear	Programs	 1	 0.99999995	
Prevent	Proliferation	 1	 0.999992547	
 
 
Contrary to Scenarios 6 and 7, which suggest nuclear stability can be held as long as 
certain commitments are maintained, including a commitment to keep the IAEA from growing 
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too big, Scenario 8 suggests that following disarmament, the IAEA will be required to 
significantly increase its scope. While international compliance and verification naturally 
maintains their maximization under disarmament, and while nuclear weapons naturally maintain 
a maximum decrease (making them obsolescent) after disarmament, two costly effects are 
observed. Former nuclear weapons states’ sovereignty is required to take a significant loss to 
maintain a nuclear weapons free world. Additionally, the Outlier States are required to take their 
own significant losses. These are highlighted with bold characters in the table above. 
In other words, in Scenario 8, there emerges an IAEA that is more powerful than the sum 
of the power granted it by member states. This is approaching a Hobbesian solution, but built-in 
and automatic re-proliferation capabilities divorce it from the Leviathan. This capability is 
already built into both scenarios; therefore, Scenario 7 is far more feasible. IAEA empowerment 
should be limited to the scope of the milieu in which states find themselves. If disarmament is at 
any time preferable, states should work towards creating a milieu in which no one wants to 
possess nuclear weapons. 
 
“Cooperation” 
This model partially focuses on an initial maximum cooperative setting. Each subsequent 
timestamp allows the “cooperation” node to act according to the parameters of the model without 
user interference. What becomes obvious is that “cooperation” immediately falls to zero by 
timestamp 1. Therefore, this presents a good area to begin to test for sensitivity. While 
performing five sensitivity tests on “cooperation” according to Scenario 6 by varying the initial 
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state of “cooperation” to reflect all positive values “cooperation” can take, in addition to zero.359 
I note that varying the “cooperation” node has no observed effect. Rather, its inclusion is merely 
symbolic. To make the table simpler to read, I round all values. 
 
Table 7.13: Stability with or without Cooperation 
Scenario 
Cooperation = 
1 
Cooperation 
= 0.75 
Cooperation 
= 0.5 
Cooperation 
= 0.25 
Cooperation 
= 0 
NWS: Security 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximize Profits 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Int’l Verification: 
Abolition 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NGOs: Abolition 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Stories that Sell 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NPT States: 
Abolition 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Religious 
Leaders: 
Abolition 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Reputation 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Defense 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Nuclear Weapons -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Conventional 
Weapons 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Avoid Threats 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Self-Restraint 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Proper Treatment 
of Citizens 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Conformity 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Transparency 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Attraction 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
International 
Agreements 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Risk of Nuclear 
Terrorism and 
Human Error -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Behavioral Norms 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
                                                
359 I also ran these with “cooperation” set to negative values and noted identical results. It is not 
likely, however, that a successful disarmament treaty would show negative values of 
cooperation. 
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Uncertainty -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Re-Proliferation 
Capabilities 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Int’l Verification 
Agencies: 
Nuclear Security 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NGOs: Oversight 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NPT States: 
Equality 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Outlier States: 
Prestige 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Promote Peaceful 
Nuclear Programs 1 1 1 1 1 
Prevent 
Proliferation 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
There are two non-mutually exclusive ways to interpret this result: 1) Cooperation 
(signing the treaty) is meaningless in the short and long term. It is merely a symbol of what is 
possible at a specific point in time. 2) Cooperation holds no possession value for nuclear 
weapons states (or other stakeholders) but rather holds tremendous milieu value for stakeholders. 
These possession and milieu goals are discussed later. For now, states seek to attain possession 
goals to enhance national interest at the exclusion of others. In this case, security through nuclear 
capability is certainly a possession goal. Milieu goals are also for the enhancement of national 
interest, but not to the exclusion of others.360 Participation in the signing of a disarmament treaty 
is a milieu goal; all international parties participating receive some benefit.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
360 Wolfers, 72-73. 
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7.6 Stability and Validation 
 
Stability 
To determine model stability, I re-ran several scenarios with varying new assumptions, 
one factor at a time. That is, I would tweak the end-state output of variable A to a different value 
along the Likert-type scale, searching for unexpected or expected emergence, as well as 
unexpected or expected non-emergence. If, for example, a minor change of a value from 0 to 
0.25 has significant impact on the model, this might intensify uncertainty in the model. While 
running various scenarios I noted a few interesting developments, which will be discussed in 
turn. 
First, I tested Outlier State prestige, holding constant all variation from Scenario 6, 
varying the Outlier State’s prestige by values of 0.25 along the Likert-type scale. I noted that the 
model ran as expected. Minor variation does not affect the model’s outcome. This is 
understandable because the Outlier States, according to the model’s parameters, seek some level 
of prestige increase. Therefore, so long as the nuclear weapons states are paying attention to the 
DPRK and Pakistan, the model will perform the same. Additionally, if prestige is reduced to a 
negative value, then by no means has the nuclear “mess” been resolved, and the Outlier States 
will likely simply ignore a proposed resolution. 
Next, I varied nuclear weapons. What happens if nuclear weapons’ value increases by 
some number according to the Likert-type scale, but still retains a negative value? That is, what 
happens if nuclear weapons caches are simply reduced?361 These scenarios performed as 
expected. As the nuclear redundancies are increased (nuclear reductions instead of abolition), 
                                                
361 For example, O’Hanlon posits a successful treaty will probably limit total nuclear warheads to 
1,000. O’Hanlon, Kindle location 1249. 
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military capability increases dramatically. Movement from -1 to -0.75 (meaning 75% of 
warheads have been eliminated retained 84% military capability. Removing 25% of warheads 
retained 99% military capability. Running a scenario where nuclear weapons are not varied by 
initial state or clamping, I noted increased complexity, resulting in periodic flux. Under this 
scenario, equilibrium could not be reached and nuclear weapons alternate from ~1 to ~-1 from 
timestamp to timestamp. Therefore, discussion might be better shifted from arms control to 
disarmament. 
From here I shifted to varying degrees of sovereignty. What would happen if sovereignty 
were reduced or, somehow, increased? The simulations show there is no increased amount of 
sovereignty that affects the model in a negative way. That is, re-establishing sovereign capability 
through withdrawal from various non-disarmament treaties does not affect the disarmament 
treaty. Decreasing sovereignty does not affect model performance either; the IAEA, NPT States, 
and NGOs certainly would benefit from reductions in nuclear weapons states’ abilities to 
function independently of the international environment. On the other hand, sovereignty, 
according to the model, only maintains its status quo through clamping it to zero. If left to its 
own devices according to the parameters of Scenario 6, the IAEA will assume total jurisdiction 
in the former nuclear-armed states, resulting in greatly diminished ability to govern as one sees 
fit. 
I then ran two simulations where I greatly reduced the IAEA’s influence in the model or 
greatly increased it. That is, if there was a link between the IAEA and another component, the 
IAEA’s abilities were either erased (zeroed out) or maximized to +1 or -1. Zeroing out the links 
resulted in, as expected, increased complexity without model equilibrium. Without the IAEA to 
verify compliance through increased technological and legal mechanisms, leaving disarmament 
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up to the whims of anarchy greatly destabilized the system. Maximizing the IAEA’s affect along 
already-established links was offset by the nuclear weapons states’ unchanging goal of sovereign 
right. 
Re-proliferation is, as expected, a key variable that increases security through diminished 
uncertainty. For example, reducing automatic rearmament capability to 0.5 requires reduced 
transparency. If the scenario is run with re-proliferation clamped to -1 (meaning, somehow 
nuclear know-how has been erased from human memory), then there are significant reductions in 
state security, profits, the IAEA’s missions (which makes sense), NGOs ability to influence 
problem resolution, equality within the international system, defense, military capability, 
conventional weapons stockpiles, self-restraint, human rights, conformity, transparency, soft 
power, and the value of international agreements. 
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Figure 7.8: Instability without Re-Proliferation Capability 
 
 
 I finally tested what effect disarmament would have in the status quo. That is, what 
would happen to security if we attempt to rid the world of nuclear weapons without dealing with 
the half-dozen or so ongoing international geopolitical disputes? I clamped “conflict” to 1, 
finding equilibrium (in the model) is reached, but it requires significant decreases in security, 
defense, military capability, and conventional forces. In other words, the model performs as 
expected; under this scenario and the one preceding it, I have created World War III. 
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Validation 
In the stability tests, the model performed as expected. There are no overly sensitive 
links, and sensitivity exists where it is anticipated. The IAEA is not too empowered, and the re-
proliferation capability emerges as a key variable towards security, which complicates the 
IAEA’s mission towards permanent abolition. This sensitivity test goes hand-in-hand with 
validation. That is, there are no surprising results that reality disputes. The question before us 
now is: To what degree does the model reflect the “mess” and its constituent problems? 
Lewis F. Richardson noted that human behavior “cannot be properly described by linear 
equations.”362 Human behavior is multitudes. It is contradictory, often random, and too 
generalized to be solvable by computable numbers.363 To that end, Sterman is correct when he 
writes, “All models are wrong.” He argues, 
 
Because all models are wrong, we reject the notion that models can be validated 
in the dictionary definition sense of ‘establishing truthfulness’, instead focusing 
on creating models that are useful, on the process of testing, on the ongoing 
comparison of the model against all data of all types, and on the continual 
iteration between experiments with the virtual world of the model and 
experiments in the real world.364 
 
 
                                                
362 Lewis F. Richardson, “Linear Theory of Two Nations,” in Collected Papers of Lewis Fry 
Richardson, ed. Oliver M. Ashford, H. Charnock, P. G. Drazin, J. C. R. Hunt, P. Smoker, and Ian 
Sutherland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 268. 
363 Adapted from Turing, 246. 
364 John D. Sterman, "All Models Are Wrong: Reflections on Becoming a Systems Scientist," 
System Dynamics Review 18, no. 4 (2002): 521. 
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A useful model, he adds, “must address a specific problem and must simplify rather than 
attempting to mirror in detail an entire system.”365 It is for this reason that model design does not 
attempt to capture the entire international system in which the nuclear “mess” exists; rather, it 
attempts to resolve the interactions between specific problems within the system. A better 
question might be: To what degree will this model teach practitioners about the nuclear “mess”? 
Because this model attempts to be useful to current or future practitioners rather than a 
valid representation of the system in which the practitioners operate, it must not merely represent 
the problems and the “mess;” it must interact with the actual problems and the actual “mess.” 
Therefore, “validation” comes from how useful it is in the real system. Proving its use is to prove 
it is not invalid rather than to prove it is valid. 
The model I present is a more-or-less simplistic representation of highly complex issues 
in international relations. Yet, it captures significant cause and effect, often only sacrificing 
fidelity to appease the Waltzian realists. More model complexity will certainly benefit model 
performance to some degree, but this requires model interaction with the real world, which has 
an unfortunate effect of undermining model validity. 
That is, in a perfect world I would have a large conference room on reserve for a week or 
two and accommodations made for dozens, if not hundreds, of global decision-makers, from 
presidents to the Director General of the IAEA, all manners of stakeholders, each with natural 
levels of influence to resolve the “mess.” I would ask them to help re-construct this fuzzy 
cognitive map, each mapping out his or her place within the problem, based on experiences to 
which they can attest. They would incorporate the FCM methodology laid out in the previous 
                                                
365 John D. Sterman, “A Skeptic's Guide to Computer Models,” reprinted from Managing a 
Nation: The Microcomputer Software Catalog, ed. Gerald O. Barney, W. Brian Kreutzer, Martha 
J. Garrett, W. Brian Kreutzer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1993), 209-229. 
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chapters completely. What is their goal? What forces are helping them achieve their goal? What 
forces prevent them from achieving it? This goes on until they are satisfied that their needs and 
influence are represented. But seated next to a British delegation is a delegation sent by 
Greenpeace. Each draws their FCMs, but one stakeholder holds more power than the other. 
Furthermore, each stakeholder has a different view of what reality is. As their FCMs come 
together and nodes between them identifired, they might disagree on the effect Greenpeace has 
on the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons program. This example might be less-than 
meaningful due to obvious differences in influence. What happens, therefore, when actors of 
similar influence compare FCMs? Certainly, NGOs and NPT States will disagree on who has 
more influence on the nuclear weapons states. NGOs can operate between states, and their 
lobbies are often powerful. NPT States and Outlier States might furthermore disagree on who 
holds more influence. In other words, simply put, 
 
The question of whether some cognitive maps represent reality better than others 
might not be possible because the reality with which the model outputs are 
compared is mediated through yet another understanding.366 
 
 
The mere fact that no two stakeholders understand the world identically means there is likely to 
be great variation between stakeholders’ views of how the model should work and what good 
output looks like. 
That stated, this problem with validity does not mean the model is less-than useful. In the 
aforementioned perfect world, the model constructed here is a simple demonstration of cause and 
                                                
366 Emphasis added. Uygar Özesmi and Stacy L. Özesmi, "Ecological Models Based on People’s 
Knowledge: A Multi-step Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping Approach," Ecological Modelling 176, no. 
1 (2004): 57-58. 
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effect that all stakeholders can understand, particularly if one goes beyond the model’s current 
parameters and includes costs levied by even a small nuclear war, as illustrated in Chapter 2. It 
furthermore invites debate between the stakeholders. The validity problem means that 
stakeholders involved in a future version of this model will have the ability to reason through 
their various levels of influence and the differences between them. They will be better able to 
critically evaluate their capabilities the components driving and preventing the attainment of 
their individual goals. 
Furthermore, the FCM is explicitly limited by present reality. As the situation changes, as 
new stakeholders emerge or established stakeholders decline, and as stakeholder capability 
varies, so too do the model’s assumptions. The FCM designed here is not merely subject to 
rigorous scientific standards; it is also subjected to ongoing rigorous changes to reality. Much 
like the real world around it, it evolves, unlike Lewis F. Richardson’s arms race model. 
Finally, due to its ability to evolve as real-world timestamps progress, and because a 
model within a perfect world will have real-world stakeholder input, a demonstration not unlike 
the one I make in this study should appease all stakeholders. All stakeholders receive some 
benefit from partaking, flexing their milieu goal muscles. 
 
 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter seeks to determine if the two problems from the preceding chapters can be 
solved simultaneously to avoid making a Type IV error. It identifies each of the “mess’” 
constituent problems, restructuring the “mess” so that interaction between them becomes more 
apparent. Several scenarios are run, and finally, a feasible solution is uncovered. 
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First, any future disarmament negotiation must respect that the IAEA cannot become too 
empowered. States still dominate the international system. Any states party to the treaty will not 
be intruded upon in areas outside of the agreement, and these states can furthermore choose to 
withdraw from the treaty if they later wish to do so. Second, special attention should be paid to 
the Outlier States, bringing them into the negotiation process, and treating them as equal to the 
P5. Third, security is best (and perhaps only) guaranteed through a guaranteed and automatic 
rearmament process to re-establish certainty in international affairs. Once these steps are taken, a 
symbolic treaty can be signed that weds the nuclear weapons states to the CSA, the AP, and 
Article VI of the NPT; the disarmament process can begin. 
This process is not without its potential problems, however, and these potential Type IV 
errors are identified and discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DEALING WITH THE UNKNOWNS 
 
8.1 Possible Type IV Error 
In the previous three chapters, I construct the “mess” by modeling two problems and the 
interaction between the problems. Running several scenarios, I determine that a feasible way to 
disarm is to prioritize the universal signing of an international treaty that weds states to the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with Additional Protocol; maintaining guarantees that the 
treaty will infringe on sovereign governance to the least degree possible; bringing in outlier 
states, such as the DPRK and India, during the negotiations for disarmament, and establishing 
automatic mechanisms to reconstitute nuclear capabilities if and when new international crises 
develop. Once these steps have been taken, international nuclear diplomats will have a stable, but 
complicated, landscape in which to begin the long process down to global zero. But the debate 
between nuclear realists and nuclear moral crusaders along nuclear security lines is filled with 
hazards, pitfalls, and structural forces that construct all manners of unfortunate complications. 
From security dilemmas to Hobbes’ and Thucydides’ traps, the constructed mess is—in reality—
a landscape where practitioners would be wise to tread very lightly. As students from almost 
every academic field learn, sometimes actors with good intentions cause catastrophe.367 
                                                
367 In 2000 New Mexican officials started a controlled burn to reduce fire hazards at the 
Bandelier National Monument. The controlled burn became uncontrolled, and the result was 
about 48,000 acres burned, the displacement of 400 families, and almost a billion dollars (in 
2000 US dollars) in damages. In April 1999 NATO forces targeted a railroad bridge near 
Grdelica, Serbia that was used to provide supplies to Yugoslavian fighters. A commuter train 
carrying dozens of civilians crossed the bridge at the precise moment the rocket intercepted the 
bridge. At least 20 civilians were killed, and the damage to the bridge (due to a train being in the 
way of the rocket) was minor enough that it was only out of commission for a few months. In 
1218 Shah Muhammad II of Khwarezm received notice from an envoy that Genghis Khan 
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Multiple error types often cause catastrophic accidents under the best intentions. Actors 
might have misinterpreted data, formulated wrong problems, or merely choosing the wrong 
solution. Often, the Type IV error is at least partially to blame.368 Simply put, actors can make 
their situations worse. In this study, supposing that the previous chapters have formulated the 
correct problems and “mess” as they stand today, a very real potential Type IV error is glaringly 
obvious. As discussed previously, O’Hanlon makes reference to this error when he insists that 
disarmament negotiations should wait until there have been significant reductions in specific 
international disputes, disputes that cannot be captured in this model’s fidelity; however, each 
dispute might benefit from practitioners’ use of FCM. 
If the world were rid of nuclear weapons by design before the end of 2019, what would 
happen in 2020 to—for example—security guarantees the US and NATO provide to former 
Eastern Bloc states? If Russia were no longer deterred from going further into Ukraine or 
Georgia, would Russia decide to annex territory? While I do not attempt to predict Russia’s 
behavior in a disarmed world, there are several side effects of the disarmed world that 
practitioners would be wise to take under consideration. Furthermore, if the world were suddenly 
void of nuclear weapons tomorrow, how close to parity would China be to the US in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                       
wanted to open bilateral trade. Believing this to be a ploy precipitating an attack, the Shah 
arrested the envoy. Khan sent a second envoy in an attempt to open up diplomatic negotiations. 
The shah had this envoy executed. Khan finally retaliated by attacking the Khwarezm, 
completely annihilating the society. In January 1969, in an effort to mobilize fellow 
Czechoslovak citizens to protest and rise up against the recent Soviet Occupation, Jan Palach, a 
young college student, set himself on fire, inspiring a violent uprising against the Soviet Army. 
The dissenters were outmatched, and the Czechoslovak middle class disavowed the protestors’ 
violence. Palach died in vain. In 1958 Communist Party of China Chairman Mao Zedong created 
a labor policy that favored industrial production over the agrarian economy. His effort to 
modernize China’s industry sector, along with drought and other poor weather patterns, 
contributed significantly to the Great Chinese Famine, which lasted two or three years and killed 
15 to 30 million people. 
368 To refresh, the Type IV error is when you correctly solve one problem but make another 
problem worse. 
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power? And how would the Chinese-US dynamic change under these new conditions? If one 
looks at these potential effects individually, they are huge. If these effects compound the other, 
they are astronomical. If Russia moved into Europe, and if China sought to dramatically expand 
its military presence in the South China Sea or to finalize its sovereign claims over the Senkaku 
Islands against Japan, or if the US worried China was making significant advances on its 
hegemonic position in terms of military power, it could be the rumblings of World War III, due 
precisely to the loss of MAD.  
In any event, O’Hanlon argues for a re-proliferation clause in a future disarmament treaty 
that will be immediately and automatically enacted to quickly reduce the risk of major war—
wars that might result in a rush to build new nuclear weapons, culminating in at least one side 
using at least one on the battlefield. In other words, O’Hanlon’s re-proliferation clause would be 
wise for at least two reasons: 1) It can mitigate major conflict, and 2) states are likely to re-
proliferate during the outbreak of major conflict anyway, which could have disastrous effects if 
not preemptively managed through the disarmament treaty. MAD is certainly preferable to 
WWIII and nuclear annihilation. 
Therefore, this section attempts to overcome the limits of the model by discussing why 
disarmament, even under conditions set forth by the model, is likely only viable given major 
reductions in international disputes and uncertainty. This section examines the theoretical 
implications in terms of disarmament of balance of power with a global hegemon, the roles 
presently-nuclear states might play in a disarmed world, the major disputes that must be 
overcome prior to a successful (and Type IV error-avoidant) disarmament treaty, the benefits of 
a re-proliferation clause (including a hypothetical scenario), and overcoming the Thucydides’ 
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Trap with the IAEA. Later in this chapter, I discuss lingering uncertainties and the model’s 
remaining limits. 
 
8.2 Thucydides and Power Balancing 
The foundational text on the logic of realism, power shifts, and war is Thucydides’’ The 
History of the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE). Thucydides, an exiled Athenian general during 
the Peloponnesian War, provides one of the war’s only historical, eyewitness369 accounts. 
Although he does not cover the war’s conclusion, he provides remarkable insight into a long and 
bloody war from antiquity—a war, we find from sources beyond Thucydides that resulted in the 
destruction of two kingdoms, Athens and Sparta, and culminated in the severely weakened 
Sparta claiming a short-lived victory. The spark, writes Thucydides, that set the whole Aegean 
Sea ablaze was a shift in the traditional balance of power. 
Sparta, a warrior culture and the dominant military power comprising the Peloponnesian 
League, maintained a tepid peace with Athens, a sea faring, trading nation. While Sparta was 
certainly the more powerful state, Athens had been enjoying significant growth, both 
economically and in terms of military power. In fact, Athens had accumulated, through purchase 
and alliance, a naval force consisting of hundreds of ships. This, along with Athens’ decision to 
rebuild its city walls following the Spartan-Athenian victory over the Persians, added stress to 
the fragile truce. Thucydides, desiring that future diplomats avoid costly wars, takes the reader 
through the difficult—and seemingly impossible—diplomatic crisis while everyone involved 
tried in vain to prevent an “inevitable” war. He writes, “The real cause [of the war] I consider to 
                                                
369 Thucydides’ finer points should be taken illustratively; it is unlikely he attended every 
meeting he claims took place. 
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be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and 
the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon [Sparta], made war inevitable.”370 
Thucydides, injecting mild hyperbole, picks up on a dynamic that has shaped 
international relations as far back as the human race can remember and as far forward as the 
human race can imagine. “Balance-of-power politics,” as Waltz puts it, “prevail whenever two, 
and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units 
wishing to survive.”371 Thucydides recognized a third requirement: Fear (or “alarm,” as it is put 
in Richard Crawley’s translation). I make few distinctions between (Thucydidean) classical 
realism and (Waltzian) neorealism. Rather, suffice it to say that both theories are compelling 
arguments. Realism, as a general definition, explains the world of politics around us. And if the 
Thucydidean trap is good prediction, therein lies trouble for the US and China in a world no 
longer ordered through nuclear deterrence. 
Allison Graham notes, “Intentions aside, when a rising power threatens to displace a 
ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the 
exception.”372,373 He calls this phenomenon the “Thucydides Trap,” a term since adopted by 
diplomats and academics, from General David Petraeus to Henry Kissinger to former Deputy 
Permanent Representative of China to the UN, Wang Xuexian. Graham notes sixteen cases of 
balance of power shifts during the previous five centuries. In twelve of those cases, the rise of 
the challenger resulted in war. In only four cases, the challenger rose in terms of power without 
                                                
370 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Richard Crawley. Kindle 
Edition (431 BCE), 10. 
371 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1979), 121. 
372 Allison, Kindle location 149. 
373 This Kindle edition is formatted unconventionally. Some pages are marked as “location,” 
which is not the page number, while others are marked with “page.” I have taken care to 
distinguish between the two by labeling locations as “Kindle location.” 
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disrupting the relative peace. In other words, all other things equal, war between a rising China 
and a declining US has 3:1 odds of occurring when the states reach power equilibrium, if history 
is any indicator. While China balances both in terms of traditional power as well as 
economically,374 the prior would be the main consideration in a world devoid of nuclear 
weapons. 
If nuclear weapons maintain the peace by defining cause and effect in no uncertain terms, 
then how much certainty would China have in the South China Sea or the Senkaku Islands if 1) 
nuclear weapons did not exist, and 2) two sides in dispute had robust conventional forces? More 
important, how certain could a US encroacher in these maritime regions be that a Chinese 
military buildup was not a precursor for a Chinese military campaign against the US or its allies? 
Another way to put it is: If nuclear weapons are abolished tomorrow, the difference of power 
between the US and China would be narrowed significantly, along with the expected costs of all-
out war. If we trust Thucydides, or more modern writers such as Powell,375 this would put 
tremendous stress on the US to reduce China’s military capability. And if the Peloponnesian War 
is an indicator, we can imagine a world where China and the US reduce each other’s power 
through a protracted war, and Russia gaining absolute advantage over both its adversaries. And 
because China and the US are aware of this possible future, it can, at the first hint of malicious 
intent, invoke re-proliferation, leading to a re-proliferation cascade. 
                                                
374 Blackwill and Harrison write, “Beijing is often correctly described as the world’s leading 
practitioner of geoeconomics, but it has also been perhaps the major factor in returning regional 
or global power projection back to an importantly economic (as opposed to political-military) 
exercise.” Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harrison, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics 
and Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 11. 
375 Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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Allison notes, through examination of the power shifts that did not result in war, a rising 
China does not necessarily mean there will be war with the US. The states can avoid this war; 
given both states acknowledge two difficult truths. First, the current trajectory is leading to war. 
Second, war is not necessarily a resultant conclusion of power shifts.376 Furthermore, the US and 
China must increase dialog, engage in constant dispute resolution, and, most important, seek to 
change attitudes and actions.377 While Allison is writing about the status quo—a world where 
both China and the US have nuclear weapons378—these acknowledgements and actions are even 
more necessary in a world where neither have nuclear weapons. 
The role of the US and NATO in Europe is another potential for major war in a non-
nuclear world. In 2008, following increasing unrest from Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
separatists, Russian military forces invaded Georgia and occupied these territories. In 2014 the 
Russian Federation annexed Crimea from Ukraine, following a violent Ukrainian revolution that 
ousted the pro-Kremlin president. Of particular note are the strong Russian links between Russia 
and the annexed or occupied territories. Crimea’s population, for example, was over 65% ethnic 
Russian in 2014. This contrasts with Ida-Viru County, Estonia, with an ethnic Russian 
population at over 73%. What differentiates Ukraine from Estonia is Estonia’s membership in 
NATO, which, on paper, guarantees Estonia’s security through Article V, also known as the 
collective defense article in which NATO member states will militarily defend all of its member 
states. Ukraine and Georgia have no NATO membership or collective security guarantees. In a 
nuclear world Russia’s cost of going to war with NATO by invading or attempting to annex Ida-
Viru greatly outweighs its benefit. If the cost of a nuclear attack is removed from Russia’s 
                                                
376 Allison, Kindle location 190. 
377 Allison, Kindle locations 224-230. 
378 Where, “Chinese and American leaders know they cannot let [nuclear war] happen.” Allison, 
155. 
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calculus, it might feel the benefit of annexing Ida-Viru outweighs the cost. If Russia invaded any 
neighbor following global disarmament, particularly a NATO member, NATO, or more 
specifically the US, would be left with either accepting the new status quo, thus rewarding 
Russia for deviant behavior, or entering a costly war. Again, this scenario does not rule out the 
possibility of re-proliferation. Therefore, the resolution of this dispute takes high precedence 
before any disarmament treaty can be signed. 
The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan,379 two nuclear weapons outlier states, 
is another dispute requiring immediate resolution. This became apparent in the previous chapter 
when the needs of Outlier States became a necessary consideration. This dispute has been 
ongoing for over seventy years, with periodic wars and skirmishes (some of which have occurred 
after both India and Pakistan proliferated nuclear weapons380). This dispute is further 
complicated and has become more important to resolve due to the entrance of non-state actors 
and jihadist groups, such as al Qaeda and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. These non-state actors could 
inherit nuclear weapons programs if they grew strong enough to pose a credible threat to existing 
or future regimes. 
Three other ongoing disputes need attention, but their resolutions might not be necessary 
prior to disarmament treaty negotiations. First, Israeli-Arab/Iranian disputes in the Middle East 
complicate satisficing capability. On the one hand, Israel’s nuclear weapons program provides 
the Jewish state with negotiation leverage that Arab states and Iran do not possess. Furthermore, 
Israel’s nuclear weapons program is not necessarily viewed as a guarantor of its survival but 
rather a dead man’s hand in the event that it feels its existential security is about to be reduced to 
                                                
379 In February 2019, this conflict reached crisis heights, demonstrating that February 2019 is not 
the correct time to have an India-Pakistan disarmament discussion. 
380 This should insinuate that both India and Pakistan are willing to fight wars, despite the threat 
of escalation.  
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zero. Its program, while the ultimate deterrent, is also means of revenge in the case of defeat. 
This does not imply that negotiating Israel’s disarmament is impossible. Israel could follow the 
South African model, identified in the previous chapter. In the event that Israel achieves a true 
and lasting peace with its neighbors, finds reconciliation with Palestinians with legitimate land 
claims within Israel’s borders and along the West Bank and Gaza, and enters into a legally 
binding collective security arrangement with the US (or, albeit unlikely, a collective security 
regime within the Middle East) then it is reasonable to hypothesize that, like South Africa 
following its threat relief, Israel could find that nuclear weapons no longer serve its needs.381 
Another area of concern in the Middle East is the possible proliferation of Arab states or Iran. 
Several of these states, including Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya have had bona fide nuclear 
weapons programs that have been curtailed or halted. Therefore, a disarmament treaty should 
address these states’ security needs. 
Second, there is the issue with Taiwan’s security. It is not difficult to imagine that, with 
the US losing its nuclear deterrent, China moves significant conventional forces to the island and 
self-fulfills its territorial claims. Because Taiwan is aware of this threat, it might consider its own 
nuclear deterrent, particularly if the US reduces its commitment to Taipei as part of negotiations 
with China. 
Finally, the ongoing dispute between the ROK and the DPRK is the last major area of 
concern. Recent events, however, suggest that Kim Jong Un is willing to discuss disarmament if 
its security concerns are alleviated. The environment of the post-2018 Winter Olympics in 
PyeongChang, ROK is skeptically optimistic. Kim and ROK leader Moon Jae In have made 
significant progress, relative to the preceding decades. US President Trump has furthermore 
                                                
381 Unlike South Africa, however, Israel’s nuclear weapons do not face universal condemnation. 
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brought the DPRK into the spotlight382 and demonstrated that the West takes its needs seriously, 
which, as Problem 2’s modeling indicated, is a requirement for a successful treaty. 
At a minimum the major issues need to be addressed.383 Beyond that, resolution of 
secondary issues makes the “mess” less messy, which would benefit future practitioners. 
Because the model in the previous chapters cannot account for these international disputes, it 
does not consider them while determining if max !"#"$%&
!"#$
≥ 1 has been satisfied. Therefore, 
borrowing from O’Hanlon, “The right time horizon for seriously pushing a new nuclear accord is 
when most of the world’s half dozen or so major territorial and existential issues are resolved—
and this cannot be set to a calendar as precisely as the Global Zero movement would like.”384 In 
other words, while the previous chapter’s models suggest intervention is warranted and possible 
in the present, a more holistic view of the problems reveal serious hurdles that could result in one 
or more error types if action is taken prior to their resolution, particularly a Type IV error—
World War III (followed by systemic re-proliferation). 
In summary of the above, Allison agrees with O’Hanlon in prescription.385 Preexisting 
disputes must be resolved before disarmament treaties can be negotiated.386 Although this level 
of fidelity does not appear in my model, it must be implicit. 
 
 
                                                
382 Trump is the first US president to meet with and acknowledge the legitimacy of a DPRK 
leader. 
383 O’Hanlon writes, “Once these contentious matters are largely resolved, the plausibility of 
great-power war over any imaginable issue that one can identify today will be very low.” 
O’Hanlon, Kindle location 985. 
384 O’Hanlon, Kindle location 117. 
385 Recalling O’Hanlon’s concern about Kashmir, the South China Sea, and NATO-Russia 
relations. O’Hanlon, Kindle locations 1036, 1040, and 1080. 
386 Treaty negotiation must not be clouded with unnecessary stipulations; therefore, it is unwise 
to attempt to settle these disputes as part of the disarmament negotiation process. 
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8.3 The Type I Error and the Benefits of Re-Proliferation 
Thucydides’ observation on human behavior is, at its core, that humans are inclined to 
commit the Type I error (a false positive) due to evolutionary pressures selecting individuals that 
take precautions. As mentioned in earlier, committing the Type I error can be costly, but 
committing the Type II (the false negative) error can be deadly. While Sparta suffered great cost 
by incorrectly assuming Athens had malicious intent in building fortifications and its naval 
forces, Sparta could have lost significantly more if Athens continued to build its power, 
unchecked, until it could easily defeat Sparta (for example, through a naval blockade and 
scorched earth tactics). 
Realism, both classic and new, is also the proposition that states are more likely to make 
the Type I error than they are the Type II error. Both variants of realism are concerned with 
survival, but the former focuses on fear as a driving force towards the Type I error, while the 
latter focuses on cost-benefit calculations. 
Suspecting danger is a natural condition in human affairs. Early morning joggers often 
cross the street to avoid the unfamiliar dog taking her morning walk, despite its tether. Police 
officers must constantly choose between making the Type I and Type II errors when facing 
belligerent suspects (a Type I error might result in criminal charges against the officer, while a 
Type II error might result in a flag-draped coffin). In international politics, the US committed the 
Type I error when it erroneously assumed Saddam Hussein had a weapons of mass destruction 
program. Iraq committed a Type II error when it erroneously assumed the US would not retaliate 
against insubordination towards IAEA inspectors. If it had risked the Type I error, Saddam might 
have remained in power until his natural death. Most profoundly, the US committed a Type I 
error when it erroneously believed Nazi Germany was actively seeking atomic weapons during 
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WWII.387 And the belief that another state might harm you with nuclear weapons is a good 
reason to seek nuclear weapons of your own. 
In this sense it can be surmised that, given the model parameters, and given holistic 
treatment of the system (solving ongoing disputes prior to acting), then periodic nuclear 
reconstitution can be a good thing. This self-fulfilling prophecy tests the problem’s limits and 
quickly restores order in the event of crisis. The following hypothetical scenario illustrates the 
point. 
I imagine that in the distant (but not too distant) future, major disputes in international 
affairs have been resolved or largely mitigated. The nuclear weapons problem remains structured 
as it was in the 2010s. Ukraine has little reason to worry about further Russian encroachment. 
Kashmir is satisfied with its new arrangements. Iran has enjoyed years of economic and nuclear 
diplomacy—expanding the BRICS to the BRIICS—and poses no major threats to Israel, which 
also enjoys new peace arrangements with the Western-backed regimes to arise from the ashes of 
the Arab Winter. China, following tense negotiations, and after overtaking the US as the most 
dominant economic power in terms of power purchasing parity and actual gross domestic 
product, has agreed to a maritime treaty that benefits all stakeholders (using fuzzy cognitive 
mapping, of course). The US has spent years investing in computer science and has emerged as 
the global network security provider. The Koreas have been engaging in ongoing peace talks. 
Kim Jong Un’s heir apparent has just finished her first year at university in Geneva. Although 
few new democracies have entered the community, at the moment the international environment 
                                                
387 And it may have narrowly avoided the Type II error by assuming Japan was not seeking 
atomic weapons. 
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begins to resemble Francis Fukuyama’s thesis.388 Conflict has largely declined in the Northern 
hemisphere. The IAEA has increased its budget commensurate to the size and scope of its 
mission and for years has found compliance is the norm. The United Nations has largely turned 
to humanitarian missions, focusing on women’s rights in developing nations, access to potable 
water and food in areas affected by natural disasters, and developing coed soccer-based missions 
along historically disputed borders. Next year is the NPT Review Conference, and there is talk 
that the NAM, led by the Republic of South Sudan since its ascendency to the NPT, is going to 
push for a universal disarmament treaty. 
The P5 objects. Although major international disputes have been resolved, the memory of 
conflict still lingers. The Outlier States object on different grounds. They view the P5’s objection 
as hypocritical and worry that a disarmament treaty will exempt legal nuclear weapons states, 
according to the NPT. The Outlier States will not agree to a treaty that punishes them and 
rewards the major powers. At the NPT states’ urging, UN Secretary General Malala Yousafzai 
calls a session between key stakeholders and introduces a necessary clause that allows current 
nuclear weapons states and any state currently in possession of nuclear weapons to re-proliferate 
in the span of six weeks in the event that those individual states’ national security needs 
substantially change. This requires two things: 1) withdraw from the treaty takes effect 
immediately after announcement, and 2) states are legally permitted to store under safeguard 
enough special nuclear material and technologies to proliferate within six weeks. After tense 
negotiating, the P5 agrees to the treaty’s terms. The Outlier States agree on condition that they 
                                                
388 Fukuyama placed emphasis on liberal and social democracy’s victory in the ideological 
struggle against communism. In a world comprised of democratic states, conflict becomes 
unnecessary. Because I am interested in studying the problems as they are, I cannot compel 
democracy into the simulation. Therefore, let us just agree that the decline of disputes has made 
the world less interesting. See Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, 
no. 16 (1989), 3-18. 
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play a larger role in verification. At the NPT Review Conference the treaty is signed and, over 
the next year, all existing nuclear weapons, special nuclear materials, and components are 
dismantled, destroyed, mothballed and/or placed under safeguards. There is now universal 
adherence to the NPT and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Additional Protocol. 
A few years later Japanese fishermen suffer navigation system failure and head towards 
the closest land, which is a man-made island presently occupied by the Chinese Navy. The 
fishermen are accused of being Japanese spies, intent on testing the limits of the maritime treaty 
in hopes that China will back down and chip away at the treaty. Japan vehemently denies this 
accusation and calls upon the UN to intervene and return the fishermen to their native lands. 
Fearing further encroachments in China’s territorial waters, China deploys twice as many Naval 
vessels to police the South China Sea, de facto expanding China’s sea claims with a fifty-mile 
buffer zone. A US-led coalition with Japan and several South East Asian nations deploy forces to 
counter the new Chinese threat and to protect free navigation as part of the maritime treaty. A 
few small skirmishes between trawlers and the Chinese Navy ensue, leading to US-led 
countermeasures. China mobilizes its reserve forces, which sparks worry in India. India deploys 
standby forces to the border. China, fearful that its national security is at stake, expels IAEA 
inspectors and threatens to invoke the re-proliferation article of the disarmament treaty. 
The US, India, and Russia immediately view this threat as a ploy to become a global 
military hegemon. Pakistan worries that India will invoke re-proliferation to counter the Chinese 
threat. The entire world hears the rumblings of WWIII. Satellite images capture US teams 
funneling resources to its enrichment facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the IAEA 
is concerned that the US will break the tamper-proof inspection seals on canisters containing 
safeguarded plutonium in New Mexico. Attempting to deter the US from clandestinely 
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proliferating, an event that could have catastrophic results, the IAEA makes an emergency 
statement condemning the US’s movements. Russia and China read the statement, and, fearful 
they will be attacked without a nuclear deterrent, invoke the re-proliferation article. Within 
months nuclear re-proliferation has cascaded through the international system. At least six states 
now have the ability to inflict a second strike on any aggressor, while England, France, Japan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Australia reconsider their nuclear options. 
We might assume this would demonstrate the infeasibility of universal disarmament. On 
the contrary, it demonstrates that disarmament is possible when the system demands it. In 
addition to avoiding WWIII by using nuclear deterrence as a buffer against war, the treaty 
successfully dismantled all existing nuclear weapons and provided a known pathway towards 
future disarmament. During the ensuing years while the international community deals with 
newly emerged disputes that threaten global war, diplomats can once again use preexisting 
frameworks to address the nuclear weapons problem. 
But more important, this escalation of military violence that compelled re-proliferation 
serves to strengthen my central argument. That is, Perkovich and Acton’s Abolishing Nuclear 
Weapons offers some insight. Nuclear deterrence can give way to deterrence through 
proliferation threats. By offering previously proliferated states the option to proliferate in short 
order, deterrence of even small wars is maintained because the calculus demands the outcome be 
identical to MAD.389 In other words, MAD is replaced with the threat of MAD against states 
behaving belligerently (Threaten). Figure 8.1 highlights this. 
 
 
                                                
389 Perkovich and Acton, 102. 
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Figure 8.1: Maintaining MAD without Nuclear Forces: Extended Form Game 
 
 
This game illustrates how two states in conflict seeking to maximize security can be 
deterred by the potential threat of MAD, The purpose of this game is for either side to maximize 
security along the lines of realist schools of thought. Four assumptions are given. First, in the 
scenario illustrated in Figure 8.1, two former nuclear powers are in a competitive and conflictual 
relationship. Neither their histories nor their present arrangements leave either side completely 
trusting of the other. Second, this is not a fictional universe where the knowledge of fission has 
been erased: nuclear know-how exists. Third, both sides have the ability to produce a second 
strike capability within a relatively short timeframe (six weeks is sufficient). Fourth, both sides 
have stated their resolve to resume their nuclear weapons programs if the other side resumes 
theirs. Finally, if the game progresses to the final stage, where MAD is reestablished, then 
neither side can move. The payouts for attack under MAD is, as the name implies, assured 
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destruction. Therefore, MAD is secure, but it is costly, given both sides must resume their 
weapons programs and engage in counter attacks. 
In other words, Figure 8.1 illustrates a scenario where two sides in conflict with nuclear 
know-how—and with perfect information about the other side390—must choose between 
behaving according to the new status quo—global powers without nuclear forces—and behaving 
according to the former status quo under MAD.  
Player 1’s payout are listed first, followed by a comma “,” and Player 2’s payout, except 
in the final round along Player 1’s “d” move, where both sides receive the same payouts under 
MAD and are therefore combined into a single payout. 
Working backwards with a payout of MAD, Player 1, at movement “d,” has the option of 
proliferating and receiving MAD (which requires the costs of a limited war LW and the costs of 
proliferation PC) and insecurity ~S. MAD is preferable to insecurity. It is also stable, and any 
preceding war will be limited once nuclear weapons are added, due to the longstanding reasoning 
that nuclear weapons erase uncertainty of the other’s capabilities, thus compelling conflict de-
escalation.391 As previously mentioned, MAD’s stability applies an equal payout to both players 
1 and 2.392 
From there, Player 2, at its “b” position, gets to move only if Player 1 has attacked it. Its 
payouts include proliferating and achieving MAD and not proliferating and leaving the resolution 
                                                
390 Both sides know that the other is capable of proliferating retaliatory nuclear forces within a 
short timeframe due to carefully scripted arrangements within a disarmament treaty. 
391 Waltz (1981), 7. 
392 Skeptics might charge that if either side proliferates first, the calculus shifts, and the side with 
nuclear weapons can circumvent MAD with a preemptive strike. This would certainly be a 
concern if the world looked as it does today; however, in the world I propose, each side’s short 
lead time towards proliferation means simultaneous re-proliferation is likely. Additionally, the 
fear that one side might proliferate first is precisely the reason why this game’s equilibrium 
includes no paths towards either side proliferating first.  
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of the war up to potential attrition. In other words, its payout is security S minus the costs of a 
limited war LW and the costs of proliferation PC against inevitable security393 minus the costs of 
a total war that is uninhibited by proliferation. Considering it prefers a limited war to a total war, 
and that proliferation costs are sufficiently low, due to onsite Plutonium reserves and immediate 
access to mothballed weapons components, Player 2 will choose the route that achieves MAD. 
At Player 1’s “c” position, Player 2 has previously defected D from the nonproliferation 
agreement, prompting Player 1’s next movement. Player 1 knows that if it attacks, Player 2 will 
proliferate, and if Player 2 proliferates, Player 1 must proliferate, or else it risks annihilation. At 
this stage, if Player 1 does not attack it receives security S minus some reputational cost. Player 2 
receives security S minus some undefined costs δ due to violating international norms relating to 
decency. The calculus is not perfect here. It is reasonable to assume most states would prefer 
reputational costs to the costs of limited wars, but this is not always the case. For example, it can 
be argued Saddam Hussein preferred the costs of a limited war to reputation costs during the 
1990 – 1991 Gulf War. Indeed, Baudrillard argues the war was carefully scripted to maximize 
Iraq’s and the coalition force’s reputation, while both sides willingly inflicted war costs on Iraq’s 
civilians.394 Furthermore, reputational costs might also be associated with sanctions or other 
punishments. Therefore, one can assign some probabilities to this round. It is reasonable to 
assume Player 1 will choose to back down and not attack with probability p and will attack with 
probability 1-p. P can be set to 0.25 for the sake of illustration, but p’s value does not affect the 
game’s ultimate outcome. 
                                                
393 Considering future wars are not zero-sum. 
394 Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War did not take place (Sydney: Power Publications, 2018): See 
esp. Chap. 4. 
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Considering that Player 2 instead chose to continue to cooperate C with the 
nonproliferation agreement, Player 1, at its position “b” must choose between attacking Player 2, 
despite Player 2’s continued nuclear cooperation, and receive eventual security S minus the costs 
of total war CW and receiving security S minus some reputational costs RC due to its belligerent 
actions taken at its position “a.” 
At Player 2’s position “a,” Player 1 has violated international standards of decency by 
threatening its former nuclear neighbor. Player 2 must choose between continued cooperation C 
and defection from the nonproliferation agreement D. If it chooses D it knows it is setting in 
motion a cascade of events that will culminate in MAD. On the other hand, if it chooses C, it has 
some probability of achieving and maintaining a payout of security S based on Player 1’s 
preferences between reputational costs RC and the costs of a total war CW. Therefore, this game 
cannot determine with certainty Player 2’s movement at its position “a.” 
Finally, at Player 1’s position “a,” it can continue to be in good standing with the 
nonproliferation agreement and refrain from threatening behaviors ~T or it can threaten its 
former nuclear neighbor T. An example might be a maritime power asserting dominance over 
shipping lanes previously agreed to be international waters. If it plays T, it knows it will lose 
something. It will eventually achieve security, but will suffer some costs. It would be a limited or 
total war, there could be reputational costs, and there could be the additional costs of 
proliferation. Otherwise, Player 1 can play T and continue to enjoy security S without any 
additional costs. 
In order for this game to be accurate, any disarmament accord and nonproliferation treaty 
must make certain steps immediate, and they must have high probabilities of detecting 
clandestine defection. This includes IAEA monitored cameras in plutonium and uranium storage 
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areas and electronically monitored seals that can alarm if tampered with. Additionally, it might 
require IAEA inspectors under diplomatic privilege live in country so that they can visit and 
inspect any anomalies within twenty-four hours. Without these provisions, clandestine defection 
might be preferable, rendering the game irrelevant. 
Figure 8.2 illustrates how this game is solved. The unbroken green line from the first 
round to a final payout is the desired path. 
 
Figure 8.2: Maintaining MAD without Nuclear Forces: Solved 
 
 
This game’s outcome suggests the logic set forth by Perkovich and Acton; in a world 
where nuclear weapons have been abolished, maintaining the relatively peaceful nuclear-free 
world requires an understanding of Mutual Assured Proliferation, as negotiated in a future 
disarmament treaty, as a means for reestablishing MAD. That is, simply threatening a belligerent 
actor with proliferating can maintain relatively peaceful relations between nations. And because 
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the cost of proliferating is MAD, and because MAD is costlier than the status quo, proliferation 
contradicts each side’s preference to maximize its utility. The costs of proliferation are high and 
the benefits are zero if one cannot use the weapons they proliferate. In short, Mutual Assured 
Proliferation in a disarmed world can be as effective as MAD was during the Cold War. 
 
8.4 Dealing with the Remaining Uncertainties 
This final substantive section identifies three remaining major areas of concern pertaining 
to the model developed in earlier chapters. First, Outlier States remain a foremost area of worry, 
particularly because recent history has not treated many Outlier States well. Second, there is a 
reasonable assumption that not all negotiations will occur in good faith. Some stakeholders, 
particularly individual states, might misrepresent their preferences in order to avoid a worst-case 
scenario outcome. Finally, the model’s data is user defined along a Likert-type scale. This 
presents several points culpable to flaw during the “knowledge capture” phase of modeling. 
These uncertainties demonstrate a need to tread lightly when attempting to negotiate to global 
zero. 
 
Outlier States 
IAEA safeguards failed twice in Iraq. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, the IAEA and the 
international community incorrectly believed Iraq was in compliance with the IAEA and the 
NPT (a Type II error). Although Iraq was party to the NPT and the IAEA, it secretly funded a 
nuclear weapons program without the IAEA’s or the international community’s notice. 
Following the 1991 war, the IAEA discovered Iraq’s burgeoning militarized nuclear program, 
which included enough nuclear material to build a weapon (although many technical hurdles still 
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existed). After this discovery, the international community held Iraq to higher scrutiny. Saddam 
Hussein, however, slowly decreased IAEA inspectors’ access to facilities under safeguard, 
culminating in Iraq’s complete refusal to allow inspections. US President George W. Bush 
viewed Saddam’s refusal as a tacit acknowledgement that Iraq had resumed its weapons of mass 
destruction programs. In February 2003, shortly before the war, Saddam sat down for an 
interview with Dan Rather, an American news anchor for CBS Evening News. Among other 
things, Saddam insisted Iraq was not manufacturing or in possession of weapons of mass 
destruction. He also insisted he would not step down. After this interview aired, Bush decided to 
invade Iraq and force a regime change. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the IAEA and other 
inspectors found no evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs (in other words, 
they committed a Type I error). Saddam fled, was captured several months later by US forces, 
stood trial for war crimes, was convicted, sentenced to death, and subsequently handed over to 
Iraqi officials a few months shy of his seventieth birthday. Had the US forces held onto Saddam 
until he reached seventy, he would have been ineligible for capital punishment under Iraqi law. 
Saddam was executed by year’s end. 
Saddam’s ouster over its WMD program signaled to Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, 
the extent to which the US was prepared to curb nuclear proliferation. Libya had a long-standing 
desire to proliferate, although its attempts to build weapon components, enrich uranium, or 
purchase weapons on the black market were usually unsuccessful. But following the US’s 
response in Iraq, Gaddafi changed course. He sought to work with Bush, the IAEA, and 
international organizations in exchange for sanction relief. The disarmament of Libya was a 
strong success, and Gaddafi spent the next decade increasing his international image as 
Chairperson of the African Union. By early 2011, however, the Arab Spring had broken out, and 
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Gaddafi’s Libyan regime swiftly faced a civil war. US President Barack Obama and NATO 
backed the Libyan rebels, viewing this as an opportunity for regime change in Libya. NATO 
forces attacked Gaddafi’s convoy in October 2011. The leader was quickly captured and 
assassinated. 
Following a lengthy war with Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran sought to acquire a 
nuclear deterrence. Being a revolutionary government founded upon the overthrow of a Western-
backed monarchy, Iran inherited many of the tools necessary for uranium enrichment. For the 
next three decades—during which time Israeli strikes, cyber-attacks, and international sanctions 
were imposed—the international community viewed Iranian proliferation as an immediate area 
of concern. By 2005 the nuclear standoff reached its apex when Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad removed monitoring devices the IAEA had installed on materials placed under 
safeguard. For the next decade the international community and the IAEA engaged Iran with 
sanctions and diplomacy in hopes of bringing Iran back into good standing with the IAEA and 
the NPT. The results of years of maneuvering was the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
which eased Iran’s sanctions in exchange for robust nuclear safeguards that effectively stopped 
Iran from proliferating in the short- to mid-term. The agreement was signed by leaders from the 
P5, Germany, the European Union, and Iran. While this agreement demonstrated that nuclear 
nonproliferation was still viable as a product of diplomacy, the agreement’s future is uncertain. 
At the time of  this writing (January 2019), the US, under President Donald Trump, is no longer 
party to the plan and has announced its blueprint for re-imposing Iranian sanctions. 
These developments highlight the effects of uncertainty and the need to understand that 
states might be apprehensive to engage with the major powers out of fear of being punished. 
Saddam Hussein was executed. NATO attacked Muammar Gaddafi, which led to his 
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assassination. The US sanctioned Iran. All of these developments occurred despite these leaders 
and countries changing course and abandoning nuclear weapons programs.395 Therefore, it is 
reasonable that Outlier States might approach negotiations with trepidation, particularly the 
DPRK. 
Recalling Richardson’s arms race model, where a state’s military spending is a function 
of its adversary’s military spending, we can see that modeling human behavior is far from 
perfect. Richardson himself acknowledges this limitation, writing, “Such a psychological effect 
[holding a grievance] cannot be properly described by linear equations.”396 In other words, it is 
necessary that we understand the history between the two nations that led to hostilities, 
especially because nations might not balance against their adversaries. In this model, 
understanding international history, particularly what happened to leaders who abandoned their 
programs and paid the ultimate price anyway, takes place outside of modeling, but is essential to 
the success of a nuclear disarmament treaty. Would Kim Jong Un agree to total nuclear 
disarmament and strict IAEA jurisdiction if doing so would remove all deterrent from NATO 
strikes designed to help overthrow the Kim Dynasty? Would Pakistan trust that Western allies 
would protect Pakistani leaders during civil unrest if there are no nuclear weapons to keep out of 
the hands of non-state actors? 
There is some hope for the DPRK and Pakistan. The India-Nuclear Suppliers Group 
agreement between India and the US under George W. Bush contradicts US activities against 
Iraq, Iran, and Libya. India was rewarded with increased access to the nuclear energy market, 
despite India being a non-recognized nuclear weapons state. And given that it cannot be 
guaranteed that components sold to India will not be used in its weapons program, the Bush deal 
                                                
395 In Iraq’s case, Saddam was playing by the rules, but he appeared to be breaking them. 
396 Richardson (1993), 268. 
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could be in violation of NPT Article I, which prohibits states from assisting states in their nuclear 
weapons programs. In other words, there is no necessary cause and effect between proliferation 
or nonproliferation actions and reward or punishment.  
Furthermore, this model does not reflect other wants, goals, or capabilities not explicitly 
part of the problem. Outlier States seek prestige in this model, but they also have other interests, 
both domestic and abroad. These apply to all states and include internal stability, access to 
international markets, alliances with friendly neighbors against neighborhood threats, and others. 
Non-state actors have other interests as well, including prosperity, security against disease, and 
access to potable water and food, etc. While these interests do not have a substantial effect on 
decisions to proliferate or disarm, the impact is not zero. 
These uncertainties, however, which exist even in the presence of binding international 
law, do not offer the model’s results considerable strength. I would recommend that states tread 
lightly when negotiating a future global disarmament treaty, but the Outlier States will already be 
highly skeptical, at best. 
 
Good Faith Goals and Negotiations 
Brazil’s proposed late 2020s nuclear-powered submarine, the French-designed SN Álvaro 
Alberto, presents a unique conundrum for future nuclear safeguards negotiations. IAEA 
safeguards agreements and the NPT were negotiated at a point in time when nuclear weapons 
already existed, and the nuclear haves were not ready yet to become nuclear have nots. 
Therefore, exempt from IAEA safeguards inspections are nuclear technologies for military 
purposes. The logic of these agreements is straightforward along two lines: First, the recognized 
nuclear weapons states already have nuclear weapons and therefore do not need to divert 
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materials to clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Inspections would be a waste of energy and 
resources. Second, inspections of military capabilities risks the inspected state being forced to 
divulge secret military information to the international community, a violation of state 
sovereignty. Therefore, at the time it was reasonable to include provision prohibiting the 
inspection of militarized nuclear technologies. Furthermore, at the time of negotiation, nuclear 
have nots were more interested in securing their current and future rights to nuclear energy for 
civil purposes, rather than nuclear energy for military purposes. The problem facing the IAEA at 
the present is that Brazil has a right to nuclear submarines, and once it secures a nuclear 
submarine (which carries with it a reactor capable of producing plutonium), the IAEA will be all 
but powerless to prevent Brazil from proliferating.397 
The scenario above illustrates conflicting goals. On the one hand, some states desire 
nuclear propulsion for their navies; on the other hand, many states, as active members within the 
IAEA, want to safeguard all points along the nuclear fuel cycle to prevent proliferation. These 
are not the only conflicting goals. Some states (namely New Zealand) presently take the position 
that even nuclear power is dangerous.398 In other words, there are several competing goals, and 
synthesis between them falls under the domain of social choice theory or collective choice 
theory. This is also certainly true for the problems defined in earlier chapters. 
                                                
397 The IAEA is not completely powerless because, as Costa points out, safeguards agreements 
for military equipment cover nuclear material presently being used for military purposes. Spent 
fuel will fall under safeguards once removed from the submarine. See Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti 
Diniz Costa, “Brazil’s Nuclear Submarine: A Broader Approach to Safeguards Issues,” Revista 
Brasileira De Política Internacional 60, no. 2 (2017): e005. 
398 The discussion on global warming has begun to shift this position. See “Nuclear Energy 
Prospects in New Zealand,” World Nuclear Association, last modified April 2017, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/new-
zealand.aspx. 
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In a non-dictatorial international community, where future nuclear weapons states 
negotiate under the assumption that a disarmament treaty is binding, the logic of realism is not 
displaced. Rather, given competing goals and the ability to cast a (very weighty) vote, nuclear 
weapons states can partake in strategic voting, where it changes its preferences in order to secure 
a non-worst-case-scenario election outcome. 
The concept of strategic voting was first independently formulated by Gibbard in 1973399 
and Satterthwaite in 1975.400 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem holds that in an election that is 
non-dictatorial and has non-limited alternatives, possible outcomes are susceptible to strategic 
voting. Using Brazil and the nuclear submarine as an illustration, strategic voting might occur 
when the IAEA brings Brazil to the negotiating table as the late 2020s launch date approaches. 
The future Brazil might prefer to maintain the same level of sovereignty over its military forces 
as the P5 (we will call this A). In other words, its submarine is off limits to inspectors, during 
fueling, operation, and refueling, and at no point during the nuclear fuel cycle are inspectors 
allowed. Its second preferred state might be to remain in good standing with the IAEA and the 
international community to avoid costly sanctions (B). Its least preferred state might be to incur 
sanctions costs (C). 
Therefore, Brazil’s preferences are 
 
A > B > C 
 
                                                
399 Allan Gibbard, “Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result,” Econometrica 41, no. 4 
(1973): 587-601.  
400 Mark Allen Satterthwaite, “Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and 
correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions,” Journal of 
Economic Theory 10, no. 2 (1975): 187-217. 
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And assuming there are several other voters, it might be the case that many future states are 
members of Nuclear Free Zones and therefore take the New Zealand position and strongly 
support sanctions for states that violate the taboo against nuclear propulsion. That is, they 
strongly prefer C to B or A. A considerable chunk of the international community supports 
strengthening the IAEA’s ability to conduct inspections while ensuring NPT states’ right to 
nuclear technology. That is, they prefer B over A or C. Facing the threat of sanctions, Brazil 
might change its vote from A to B. In other words, this hypothetical future Brazil has engaged in 
strategic voting in order to prevent the worst outcome. 
Strategic voting might also mar a FCM’s outcome, particularly if one expands the P5 and 
Outlier States into individual stakeholders. In a model where the US and the DPRK are 
negotiating the DPRK’s nuclear disarmament, it is reasonable to question whether or not, for 
example, US President Donald Trump and DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un are negotiating 
in good faith or whether or not either or both of them are misrepresenting the order of their 
preferences in order to attain a better outcome. 
Taking this into a larger context (the “mess”), uncertainties grow. Future practitioners 
and modelers should be aware of these uncertainties and work on ways to mitigate them. While 
uncertainty can never be eliminated, understanding that uncertainty exists can help satisfy 
Sterman’s requirement for a more “useful” model.401 
 
Knowledge Capture 
Despite Outlier State involvement and overcoming strategic voting, useful models need 
to accurately represent the world in which they are operating. The model shown in the preceding 
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chapters contains 55 components with 166 non-zero links between them.402 If one includes the 
zero (or non-links), the number of possible combinations is quite large. This leaves nontrivial 
space for modeler error. Indeed, using the sigmoid transfer function and not limiting it with a 
Likert-type scale, the number of possible variable value combinations reaches infinity. 
In a perfect world this study would have been created with input from government 
leaders, particularly the P5, the International Atomic Energy Agency, non-governmental 
organizations, and other relevant stakeholders. This is not a perfect world, however, and there are 
major limitations to my ability to secure meetings with leaders like Kim Jong Un. These 
limitations have the potential to translate directly into the study. Therefore they must be 
addressed. 
Jetter and Kok identify three sources for knowledge: the modeler, documents, and expert 
survey. This study relied on the first two solely without expert input. Certainly, expert 
involvement would increase the model’s fidelity, but its contribution at this phase—when the 
international community has not yet resolved major international disputes—is not likely to 
change much of the model’s performance. 
Due to the application of the Likert-type scale, variation is subjectively defined. This 
limits potential inaccuracies and increases robustness when real-world scenarios change by small 
amounts. For example, as the model stands, the IAEA can moderately increase nuclear weapons 
states security. If the IAEA increases its budget by 10%, this needn’t translate into a precise 
value; rather, the Likert-type scale might still define its ability to increase security as moderate. 
Therefore, while future models, particularly those used in practice rather than study, will 
benefit from increased participation of experts, especially if these experts are relevant 
                                                
402 Accurately defining no relationship between components is just as important as accurately 
defining a relationship. Refer back to the discussion on the Type I and Type II errors. 
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stakeholders. For the purpose of an exploratory study, however, it is reasonable that experts are 
not necessary at this time. 
 
8.5 Summary 
The preceding chapters carefully build a model of the nuclear weapons “mess” and its 
constituent problems. This chapter attempts to acknowledge areas of remaining concern and to 
address possible ways to mitigate some of this concern. It cannot be stressed strongly enough, 
however, that future leaders should approach global disarmament negotiations according to the 
realists before them: With a strong dose of skepticism. But this does not mean future negotiations 
are futile. 
The threat of war can be moderated. Leaders most likely will not be able to even have 
disarmament talks if there are remaining major international debates, such as the South China 
Sea and Crimea. While it is not impossible for these international problems to flare up again 
following successful disarmament talks, especially if Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap 
accurately points to pattern, it is also likely that successful disarmament talks would be the 
resultant and perhaps necessary conclusion of successful resolution of areas of global concern. 
Additionally, disarmament in the twenty-first (or beyond) century is not to harken back to a time 
before fission was discovered. A disarmed world cannot appear unrecognizable; therefore, 
former nuclear weapons states, either by design or by default, will have the capability of re-
proliferating and reviving their second-strike capabilities in a matter of weeks. These 
capabilities, instead of making a disarmed world less likely, will benefit the disarmed world by 
maintaining MAD with a small tweak; MAD will be amended with the threat of MAD, or mutual 
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assured proliferation, which must result in the revival of MAD. In other words, the disarmed 
world is not as uncertain as realists might assume. 
Finally, there are less major (but not minor) uncertainties still remaining. Outlier States 
have no guarantees, especially if history is a good indicator, that they will not be punished after 
dismantling their nuclear weapons programs. Western states have a growing history of 
supporting regime change in states that have changed course from rogue to team player. 
Therefore, Outlier States with current or burgeoning nuclear deterrents will understandably 
approach disarmament negotiations with healthy levels of suspicion. On the other hand, there is 
no discernable cause and effect; other Outlier States have been rewarded by the international 
community, despite having gone rogue. Finding the cause behind the reward might allay Outlier 
States’ distrust.  
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 We Cannot Get to Disarmament Now 
The preceding chapters highlight an obvious truth; disarmament is not a feasible outcome 
in the present, despite what the simulation suggests. This study opens with an undeniable fact 
that I do not intend to conceal. There exist too many ongoing geopolitical disputes to undermine 
the realist position on nuclear weapons. Namely, while realism cannot explain the lack of 
horizontal nuclear proliferation, it explains perfectly why nuclear weapons states fail to live up to 
their expectations in the NPT Article VI. To do so would, for example, substantially lessen the 
power gap between the US and China in the South China Sea and remove most disincentives for 
war. The ultimate Type IV error in global disarmament is World War III and a resultant race 
towards rearmament, an outcome that does not preclude the possibility of a nuclear war. The first 
side to rearm would require a demonstration of their nuclear deterrent, and they might be 
persuaded to attempt to destroy another side’s nuclear facilities to prevent it from gaining its own 
deterrent. This study does not attempt to ignore reality or place the reader in another universe, 
and therefore it accepts that disarmament is neither easy nor likely in the short term. 
On the other hand, recent history has witnessed the elimination of Libya’s nuclear 
program (2003), the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that abolished Iran’s nuclear program 
(2015), and, most notably, the DPRK-ROK-US ongoing peace and disarmament talks (beginning 
in 2018). These demonstrate that significant progress can be and is being made. Therefore, the 
abolitionist must not worry that global zero is perpetually out of reach, as my study reveals. But 
the abolitionist would be wise to refrain from pushing too hard now; doing so might convince 
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nuclear weapons states to withdraw from treaties they feel undermine their national interest, 
pushing global zero further into the future, a Type IV error. 
But the realism in international relations scholarship that holds us to our nuclear arsenals 
also faces anomalies from within. On the one hand, we have the Waltzes and Mearsheimers who 
claim that simple cost-benefit calculations under the perfect certainty nuclear weapons provide 
make it not just rational for states to possess nuclear weapons; they strongly imply or explicitly 
state that possessing nuclear weapons is the preferred state, even when speaking in terms of our 
foes. On the other hand we have the Sagans and Booths who accept the balance of power and 
anarchy as dominant ordering mechanisms, but reach a radically different conclusion, despite 
working with the same bank of evidence.403 They argue it might actually be preferable to rid the 
world of nuclear weapons and that this conclusion can be reached without violating the basic 
tenets of political realism. 
Chapter 2 highlights this study’s urgency. Although the risk of nuclear war is low, 
following realist logic, the costs of even a small nuclear war are sufficiently high to warrant a 
sincere discussion about the role nuclear weapons play in international affairs. These costs 
include not only the loss of human life, but major psychological, economic, and social stresses 
that play against global meteorological consequences, reducing resources and leading to chaos in 
some regions. Additionally, the simple fact that capability matters more than intent requires that 
we accept that any country with nuclear weapons has the capability to use them, despite their 
intent to deter and be deterred. The fact that nuclear deterrence can break down, and the fact that 
a resultant nuclear war—whether limited or total—would be catastrophic, including the 
                                                
403 Sagan notes that states are likely to make both the Type I and Type II errors when comparing 
their neighbors’ capabilities to their own, and that these errors increase the likelihood of nuclear 
conflict. Sagan and Waltz, 115-116. 
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possibility of the human extinction, means it is, for many, a moral obligation to work towards 
nuclear abolition. For others, it might be simply a different calculation of survival dressed up as 
morality. It is rational to take action that prevents the human extinction. 
Jonathan Schell, in his 1984 essay, “The Abolition,” stumbled upon an alternate structure 
to realism, seemingly by accident. He notes that human beings tend to be altruistic, willing to 
contradict the very sanctity of their mortality. Every now and then, an individual is called upon 
to lay down his or her life in exchange for the well being of a loved one or a community. And 
often this individual answers that call. These are not people suffering from depression or other 
risks associated with suicide. Often these are parents sacrificing their lives to save their children. 
The child’s future is worth more than the parent’s future to the community. Indeed, their 
communities often shame parents that eschew this moral obligation. Schell carries this to a likely 
conclusion in nuclear affairs. If we are able to rationally sacrifice our lives for a single other 
person, and because a major nuclear war means likely extinction, which means the death of the 
individual for whom we are ready to sacrifice our lives, then we can rationally seek the abolition 
of nuclear weapons—to prevent extinction and save lives.404 Indeed, the abolition of nuclear 
weapons is the only cause that can necessarily prevent human extinction. Altruism means 
abolition, otherwise our altruistic sacrifice is meaningless. 
In this sense, realist authors face a serious external challenge to overcome. Do emotions 
such as love matter? Is love a guiding force—a structure in the system of human behavior? Does 
love overcome the cost of death? Human beings are altruistic, but is altruism a choice or a 
necessary conclusion? If altruism is a choice, then realism tells us altruistic suicide is irrational. 
Émile Durkheim struggled with this in the nineteenth century, ultimately contradicting realist 
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rationalism, arguing that, “Now, when a person [commits altruistic suicide], in all these cases, it 
is not because he assumes the right to do so but, on the contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails 
in this obligation, he is dishonored and also punished...”405 If duty is a structural force, then 
realism needs to account for it. Altruistic suicide is also not as rare as one might imagine. The 
US Congress often awards its highest military award, the Medal of Honor, posthumously to 
military personnel who deliberately end their own lives to save their fellow soldiers. Durkheim 
also implies that spending one’s life being labeled a coward is worse than death. Therefore, at the 
very least, it is possible realist logic has miscalculated human preferences.  
Altruistic suicide means that human beings are not necessarily calculating to maximize 
their power in an environment where there is no acceptable alternative to survival; as individuals 
we are willing to accept death under certain conditions, and according to Durkheim, death under 
these conditions is rational and preferable to one or more alternatives. In other words, there are at 
least two non-mutually exclusive alternatives to Waltzian realism if individual behavior 
translates to international decision-making: our desire to see our loves ones survive, even at our 
own expense, and the fear of dishonoring our communities and failing to live up to their 
expectations. These two alternative considerations do not attempt to erase realist considerations. 
The balance of power in international relations still dominates our ways of thinking, but it is not 
the only thing we think about. And overcoming the balance of power is not outside the realm of 
possibilities or observed human behavior.  
Schell argues our morality is a viable alternative to the balance of power because, as I 
demonstrate in Chapter 2, law does not bind deterrence. The failure of deterrence necessitates a 
                                                
405 Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1951), 219. 
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“moral deterrence” that guides our behaviors, despite the consideration for our foes’ 
capabilities.406 
Schell is aware of longstanding realist tradition governing nuclear weapons. He is under 
no illusion that utopia is simpler than deterrence. But he likens the moral obligation towards 
abolition to an awakening. Slavery, he writes, once a normal US institution, is now considered 
abhorrent following a global awakening against it.407 Wartime rape, gladiator death matches, 
torture, and pistol duels all met similar fates to social awakenings (more or less), what Wheeler 
and Booth might call “confronting the unthinkable.”408 And if we accept that each of these 
former institutions benefitted human beings in some way, thus helping to maximize utility for 
someone at some particular point in time, then we can make a reasonable hypothesis about 
torture, for example. We can reasonably hypothesize that torture existed on a massive scale 
simply because people received benefit from torturing people. If this is true, we can also 
reasonably hypothesize that states resist efforts at nuclear abolition merely because at some level 
those states benefit from possessing and possibly using nuclear weapons.409 But this benefit can 
be erased not merely through deterrence breakdown, but also by a social awakening. This 
elementary argument basically follows lines of thought offered by social constructivists. In other 
words, states have nuclear weapons simply because it is normal to have them. Their value is 
constructed before, after, or both before and after they are proliferated and by the possessor and 
                                                
406 Schell, 6. 
407 Schell, 8-9. 
408 The overnight German reunification was “unthinkable” until it happened. This compels us to 
consider that the “unthinkable” is not impossible. Wheeler and Booth, 24. 
409 Press, Sagan, and Valentino argue Americans, for example, are only averse to launching 
costly first strikes, but if the risk of retaliation is low enough, Americans support first strike/first 
use. That is, under certain circumstances, Americans benefit from using nuclear weapons. Press, 
Sagan, and Valentino, 188. 
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the rest simultaneously.410 In short, nuclear weapons have meaning because we give them 
meaning. Constructivist reasoning does not deny the balance of power; it only challenges the 
idea that it is structured into the international system. Human beings, contrary to Waltz, have 
agency and free will insofar as they can choose to balance or not. Altruistic suicide, therefore, 
appears both a duty and a choice. 
Therefore, while we are stuck with nuclear weapons in the present, it is not unthinkable 
that states will be willing to give up nuclear weapons in the future. As argued in Chapter 2, this 
process will likely be greatly accelerated if deterrence ever fails. The survivors of nuclear war 
will likely take disarmament efforts very seriously in order to avoid a recurrence of nuclear war. 
They will have a moral-realist obligation to disarm—moral to protect society and realist as a 
result of calculations that maximize the likelihood of survival. On the other hand, we do not need 
to suffer a nuclear holocaust. If we accept that the costs of nuclear war will be sufficiently high 
that our preferences will change in the event of nuclear war, then we can begin thinking about 
our preferences now while we work diligently towards resolving the half dozen or so ongoing 
international geopolitical disputes identified by O’Hanlon that inhibit disarmament. My model 
demonstrates that this is ultimately feasible in the long-term. 
 
9.2 How Can We Get to Disarmament? 
The model I construct concludes that future disarmament is feasible, given three steps are 
taken during disarmament negotiations: first, a global disarmament agreement must not 
                                                
410 For example, consider Alexander Wendt’s reminder that “500 British nuclear weapons are 
less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British 
are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not…” If the situation reverses itself, 
so too will the US’s view of North Korea and Britain. Alexander Wendt, “Constructing 
International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 73. 
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unreasonably affect states’ sovereign rights outside of the agreement; second, states outlying the 
NPT must be brought into the negotiations (as well as being made to feel as a part of the 
international community instead of as “rogue” or “hermit” states); and third, present states with 
nuclear arsenals adopt the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Additional 
Protocol as a measure of good faith. Additionally, states’ rights to the technology inevitably 
means states should have an ability to re-proliferate in the event of future international instability 
that threatens global security. 
But up until now I have deliberately avoided ongoing international geopolitical disputes 
that stop the disarmament process dead in its tracks.411 This gives this study an unfair advantage. 
It creates a tautology underneath the highly complex workings of the nuclear “mess”: If we make 
it easy to disarm, it will be easy to disarm. I would like to bring this study back down to earth 
and offer insight into ways it is possible to get to the disarmament process, rather than simply 
beginning at the disarmament process. But first I’d like to point out that the tautology is not a 
fairy tale. A footnote in Chapter 7 discusses reductions in major South African security concerns 
that made the post-Apartheid state’s disarmament possible. Reducing realist security concerns 
are key, a starting point, and not necessarily a circular argument. 
The disputes O’Hanlon identifies include international disputes around Eastern Europe, 
the South China Sea, Kashmir, Taiwan, the Middle East, and Korea. Solving the first three is 
necessary, and solving the last three is helpful. These are the six geopolitical disputes that hinder 
or completely prevent efforts towards global zero. 
If Chapters 3 – 7 are good indicators, then a good candidate for conflict resolution is 
fuzzy cognitive mapping using input from living stakeholders. If our goal is to satisfy the realist, 
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then this method should suffice. Realism suggests states are cost-benefit calculators. If option A 
benefits the state while option B imposes costs on the state, then the state will always choose 
option A. If we accept that the realist constantly wants to upgrade its position (or at the very least 
not downgrade it), and if, as I’ve demonstrated, fuzzy cognitive mapping is a good way to 
determine paths towards mutual upgrade, then the realist will often be satisfied with the outcome. 
The Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy might be of use, as it updates stakeholder goals. 
In Problem 1 I updated nuclear weapons states’ goals from simply possessing nuclear weapons to 
maximizing security. If one applies this approach to Russia and Eastern Europe, one can say the 
same. Russia’s attempted territorial annexation of part of Georgia (2008) and its actual territorial 
annexation of part of Ukraine (2014) is an example of security maximization. This follows realist 
thinking. Russia’s goal was not simply to gain land; the gaining of land served a security need. 
Once we identify what Russia’s actual goal is, then we can begin to talk about alternative ways 
that maximize security without annexing territory. By taking seriously Russia’s actual needs, the 
international community can find ways to accommodate it in a mutually beneficial way. We can 
apply this method to the other five disputes. 
On the other hand, the 2019 geopolitical climate might make nuclear weapons states 
skeptical. While conflict resolution might make China gain, China might fear gaining less than it 
would have if it did not engage in dispute resolution or if it believed it was being required to 
resolve a dispute the wrong way. Therefore, the relevant stakeholders (i.e., the states) must be 
enticed by the high probability that their interest will be maximized. 
Additionally, steps towards disarmament are usually thought to include negotiated arms 
reductions or adherence to various test ban treaties; however, the geopolitical concerns above 
demonstrate the robustness of realist theory. US and Russian non-compliance with parts of the 
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Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the subsequent February 2019 bilateral US-
Russian suspension of the treaty is a direct result of these ongoing disputes. Russian missile 
testing and US missile defense systems in Europe, while on paper for national defense, are 
certainly offense-capable, and the US withdrawal allows it to balance against Chinese missile 
systems, a very realist move. 
But this helps to bolster the argument. Because the geopolitical disputes are at least partly 
about nuclear problems, solving them requires taking steps towards disarmament. This does not 
dismiss the fact that geopolitical concerns obstruct the signing of the CTBT and help facilitate 
cheating on and the undoing of the INF Treaty. That is, cause and effect go both directions. In 
order to stop the cycle, work towards resolution should also go both directions. 
What this study illuminates, however, is how many variables are involved in international 
political problems and “messes.” This study identifies 55 nodes with 166 non-zero links between 
two nuclear problems, and it acknowledges in Chapter 8 that the possible number of links 
(including zero links) is very large.412 Therefore, getting to global zero is far more of a complex 
issue than abolitionists assume. Although after disarmament, former nuclear weapons states 
achieve quick maximized security, due to the other sides not having nuclear capability, and 
although this study ultimately concludes with maximized security without nuclear weapons, the 
simulation revealed a “security period of vulnerability” (Figure 7.5), where the drop in military 
capability, the buildup of conventional forces, and new strategic posturing to maximize security 
leads to a security dilemma where the former nuclear powers are worse off than they were prior 
to disarmament. This “security period of vulnerability” is ultimately overcome, due to increased 
conventional military spending, increased adherence to international norms, more conformity 
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between the major powers, and maximized verification by the IAEA, but the risk of defection or 
war is remarkably high during the vulnerable period. 
This study also reveals that the international system is far more complex than the realist 
assumes. It is complex enough that states can gain more security by multilaterally eliminating 
nuclear weapons than by keeping them, particularly if one considers the reality that deterrence is 
not a foregone conclusion. This is because realists assume a lot of things simply do not matter. 
This model explicitly demonstrates that this assumption is incorrect. Realism can recover if it 
accepts that it can maximize its security with international components it previously assumed 
were irrelevant. 
In short, it is possible to get to a disarmament treaty. Even though we are not there yet, 
global zero might be just beyond the horizon, and, indeed, global zero does not belie realism 
because, as my model shows, it is possible to maximize security more without nuclear weapons. 
 
9.3 Disarmament and the Milieu 
A major question remaining is: What does this study inform? The results of the 
simulation suggest that realist states can achieve more through interacting with the social 
environment, rather than merely focusing inward at their own possession goals. The simulation 
shows not only maximized security along realist lines, it also shows that by participating in the 
disarmament negotiations and subsequent treaty, and despite increased conventional military 
spending, former nuclear powers have avoided the security dilemma, thereby collapsing Lewis F. 
Richardson’s arms race model. But also multilateral self-restraint increases, human rights 
violations decrease, international transparency increases, states begin to conform, the values we 
place on international agreements increases, agreement on behavioral norms converges, and 
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uncertainty decreases tremendously. None of these are possession goals; rather states still seek 
these goals, even if it means giving up something, because these goals increase states’ abilities to 
shape the social context of their environment. Being transparent, while a concession to the state 
opening their doors to international inspectors, fosters increased transparency. Being transparent, 
therefore, shapes the environment and serves as a model of acceptable behavior. These social 
goals do not necessarily undermine realism; seeking social goals serves the self-interest of the 
state. 
Arnold Wolfers is sympathetic to the realist. He acknowledges that states “place 
exceedingly high value on the so-called possessions of the nation—above all, on national 
survival, national independence, and territorial integrity—and to react in fear against any threats 
to these possessions.”413 That is, states seek to increase their national interest because doing so 
increases their chances of survival in an anarchical environment. But he also notes that states can 
increase this national interest in another way—by interacting in social contexts. He writes, 
“actors can be said to act under external compulsion rather than in accordance with their 
preferences.”414 South Africa’s decision to unilaterally disarm in 1989 illustrates this compulsion 
to act according to the environment to serve self-interests. Seeing nuclear weapons as merely 
possession goals would mean South Africa would maximize its deterrence, but other goals 
served its self-interest, and these goals were external in nature. South Africa desired to re-enter 
the international community, gain access to international markets, and to, perhaps, remove 
incentives for the newly formed Namibia to seek a nuclear deterrence of its own. By acting 
unilaterally against its self-interests, South Africa increased its prestige in the social environment 
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in which it found itself. Further, it was able to influence the environment to reward the post-
Apartheid state by seeking this milieu goal. 
Wolfers, therefore, goes beyond the basic assumptions of realism, turning realism on its 
head. Yes, states are cost-benefit calculators, but these states are not merely comparing its power 
to its neighbors; it is also interacting with the social context, shaping it, influencing the way in 
which states behave. Wolfers identifies these goals, writing, 
 
One can distinguish goals pertaining, respectively, to national possession and to 
shape the environment in which the nation operates. I call the former “possession 
goals,” the latter “milieu goals.” In directing its foreign policy toward the 
attainment of its possession goals, a nation is aiming at the enhancement or the 
preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value. […] 
 
Milieu goals are of a different character. Nations pursuing them are out not to 
defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim 
instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries. […] 
 
Milieu goals often may turn out to be nothing but a means … toward some 
possession goal. A nation may hope to increase its prestige or its security by 
making sacrifices for the establishment and maintenance of international 
organizations. But this need not be its exclusive aim. Instead, the nation in 
question may be seriously concerned about the milieu within which it operates 
and may expect such organizations to improve the environment by making it more 
peaceful or more conducive to social or economic progress.415 
 
 
In other words, possession goals increase our sense of security directly. Milieu goals increase our 
sense of security by making the environment less uncertain. The milieu goal can be altruistic, 
utopia seeking, but often seeking milieu goals is to seek selfish goals. 
Wolfers, therefore, understands the balance of power, but he shows that states will often 
go beyond balancing, emphasizing that interaction within the social setting is a means by which 
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states can alternatively increase their security needs by making the world more predictable on 
their own terms. 
This study emphasizes that states seeking to maximize security can do so better through 
social interaction, increasing global transparency and other multilateral goals, by diverting our 
attention away from solely power as a means towards security. This is not to say that we will 
always supersede our primary possession goals. 
Wolfers notes that if a state faces nuclear annihilation, it will cede to the state threatening 
it because keeping its citizens (and itself) alive is more important than any other goal (including 
other possession goals).416 In Chapter 2 I make the case for this study’s urgency. But it also notes 
that, if for no other reason outlined in the rest of this study, states will take disarmament very 
seriously in the event of even a small nuclear war. The demonstration of the existential threat 
nuclear weapons pose and the global aftermath of nuclear exchange will give states the options 
to possess nuclear weapons without the certainty of deterrence or world to eliminate them at the 
global level in a way that is—more or less—certain, depending on how much authority with 
which the states wish to empower the IAEA. That is, working to shape the milieu in this setting 
better serves the national interest than its possessions. 
None of this means, however, that disarmament is inevitable given the development of an 
international reality where Colin Gray would say disarmament is possible only because it is 
possible for the time being. Nuclear weapons are firmly embedded in the international structure. 
Even if Mueller is correct that nuclear weapons have served their purpose and are obsolescent, it 
could be simply that shining a light on them during dismantlement makes them very relevant 
again. States will continue to endow their possession goals with more important when necessary. 
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9.4 What about the Outlier States? 
Outlier participation is key. Although the model does not maximize Outlier States,417 and 
although it merely weakly increases their prestige (permanently), the model does not function 
without increasing our acceptance of the Outlier States. Various exploratory simulations during 
the early stages of the model revealed that there is unlikely a feasible way to satisfy Outlier 
States without directly engaging them. In this sense, it is not unreasonable that US President 
Trump parted ways with the longstanding tradition of not meeting with the Supreme Leader of 
North Korea in 2018. He instead chose to legitimize the Supreme Leader, something the DPRK 
has wanted for generations. This resulted in better relations between the US and the DPRK. 
Rather than isolation, states outlying the NPT are much more receptive when they are brought 
into the international fold. 
This does not mean merely including them in negotiations, although that is obviously 
very important. Rather, it means reducing or eliminating economic sanctions, bringing them into 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (with specific safeguards provisions for components and materials 
obtained), temporarily forgiving human rights violations until the treaty is ratified,418 and 
recognizing them as nuclear powers. This last step might require invoking Article VIII, 
paragraph 1 of the NPT, which gives Parties to the Treaty the right to propose amendments to the 
NPT. Specifically, the proposed amendment would update the text of Article IX, paragraph 3, 
which defines legal nuclear weapons states as any state with nuclear weapons prior to January 
1967. Updating this cutoff date to a future date would legitimize India’s (first weapon, 1974), 
Pakistan’s (1998), and North Korea’s (2006) nuclear programs, as well as Israel’s undeclared 
                                                
417 Maximizing the Outlier would be to focus solely on its needs. 
418 This might be particularly unpopular in democratic regimes, exacerbating the problem. It 
might be necessary, however, in order to remain nuclear focused and not become sidetracked by 
other humanitarian concerns. 
   
 
288 
weapons (likely 1979). This might be politically unpopular domestically, especially in states 
identified in my model as NPT States, which presents a new set of problems; however, it might 
be crucial to getting the Outlier States onboard with the NPT. Getting the DPRK, India, Israel, 
and Pakistan in good standing with the NPT also weds them to Article VI, which requires they 
make good faith efforts towards disarmament. Wedding the Outlier States to the NPT therefore 
has a legitimizing effect on Article VI. In order for the P5 states to call on the DPRK to disarm 
under Article VI, it requires that the P5 acknowledge that it also shares a duty to disarm. 
Furthermore, bringing in the Outlier States to the international fold vis a vis the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group for India, Israel, and Pakistan, or in general for the DPRK also legitimizes and 
reinforces the norm of international cooperation. In the same way that West Germany and Japan 
were included in rebuilding the international system following World War II, including the 
Outlier States, particularly the DPRK, demonstrates that the international community is sensitive 
to all of their needs, not merely whether or not they possess nuclear weapons.  
The adapted realism I use in this study, particularly in Chapter 2, suggests that the likely 
candidates for nuclear war are among the Outlier States. India and Pakistan have danced close to 
the brink a few times, and during summer 2017 the DPRK came too close for comfort to a 
nuclear attack by the US. Traditional realist logic tells us the DPRK would be foolish to give up 
its nuclear deterrent because it remembers General MacArthur almost overthrowing it in 1950, 
and it watched Iran, Iraq, and Libya all suffer recent punishments despite giving up their nuclear 
programs. On the other hand, this form of realism suggests the DPRK’s survival might be better 
guaranteed without nuclear weapons. The worst-case scenario is: with nuclear weapons it risks 
being completely annihilated. Surviving nuclear war offers the DPRK a probability of zero. 
Without nuclear weapons, it risks only a bloody conventional war. The probability of surviving a 
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conventional war is a non-zero number. Therefore, getting the DPRK to the negotiating table is 
not as difficult as one might imagine (indeed, we’ve already seen it). And once the Outlier States 
are at the disarmament-negotiating table, the P5 states are more likely to take their own 
obligations under NPT Article VI seriously. 
 
9.5 Can We Stay There? 
It would be foolish to assume that once we’ve arrived at global zero we can stay there 
permanently. The knowledge of fission is a permanent fixture in the minds of scientists, barring a 
global cataclysm that knocks human beings back to the Stone Age (perhaps a nuclear war). 
Although, as already acknowledged, this does not mean nuclear weapons are permanent fixtures, 
but it is (hopefully) unlikely human beings will ever forget how to split the atom. 
Because this knowledge has staying power, nations will have to live with a natural 
tendency towards nuclear bipolarity. Quester illustrates this using a mathematical notation with 
realist theory:419 
 
‘0’ > 1 < 2 > 3 > 4 …n 
 
where three nuclear weapons states are preferable to four, and two are preferable to three, but 
one is not preferable to two because then a single state would have the capability to dominate 
international politics, forcing another state to balance. And zero may be preferable to one, but 
states’ natural skepticism towards each other means that at some point, one state is going to 
preemptively balance against a perceived future proliferator, causing a balancing move by 
                                                
419 Quester, 205. 
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another state, self-fulfilling the prophesy towards two nuclear weapons states. Waltz argues this 
is the preferred state of international politics, writing the bipolar system compels bipolar focus, 
where the actions of one superpower dominate the attention of the other; the bipolar system 
makes small losses tolerable; and the bipolar system keeps pressure on both sides through 
continued crises, which causes both powers to exercise continued caution (with nuclear 
weapons).420 Quester and Waltz, taken together, imply that in the disarmed world a small crisis 
(such as the one I hypothesize in Chapter 8, which began with Japanese fishermen getting 
stranded on a manmade Chinese island that served as a small naval base) might spiral out of 
control until two sides reconstitute at least a first strike capability. Once rearmament has been 
achieved, the system will cease its spiral and stabilize. The war will likely de-escalate once 
nuclear weapons are reintroduced.421 
Traditional realist thought tells us that the disarmed world is only temporary and that 
there will be tremendous pressure to shift away from zero nuclear weapons states to at least two 
nuclear weapons states. O’Hanlon accepts this logic but adds that nuclear disarmament should be 
a goal, but not a permanent solution.422 What realists, including O’Hanlon, do not show us is 
what happens once a disarmament treaty is signed. Does the signing of a treaty violate realist 
thinking? It depends on what matters. 
Immediate cheating (i.e. hiding away a couple dozen or so weapons before opening your 
doors to IAEA inspectors423) notwithstanding, my model shows step-by-step effects on security. 
Most notable is the net gain in security without nuclear weapons, which defies realist thinking. 
                                                
420 Waltz (1964), 882-884. 
421 Waltz (1981), 5. 
422 O’Hanlon, Kindle location 937. 
423 Hopefully, the IAEA inspectors and treaty negotiators take this possibility very seriously and 
work out a solution before the treaty is sent for ratification. 
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Realists, however, might simply point to my “security period of vulnerability” as the point where 
the disarmament treaty falls apart. On the other hand, it is possible that realist thinking here is 
incorrect (or at least needs to be slightly altered) for two related reasons. First, as I write in 
Chapter 2, nuclear war is unlikely, but unlikely things happen all the time. Because the 
probability of a nuclear war between two nations is not zero, nuclear war between two nations 
will occur on a long enough timeline. It might be possible for states to look ahead far enough 
into the future and see that their survival is more guaranteed without nuclear weapons than with, 
as the model suggests at its end state. Second, if realists assume states are always calculating cost 
and benefit, and that they will act to maximize their security, then they will be better off under 
disarmament. If zero represents the status quo, and if the end state gives us a maximum increase 
in security, then realist thinking about nuclear weapons should be updated to reflect that a 
disarmed world is more secure than an armed world. 
 Additionally, mechanisms to prevent war are inherently a part of my model vis-à-vis the 
re-proliferation capabilities. Schell, Schelling,424 O’Hanlon, Acton, and Perkovich each 
understand the need for short order rearmament capabilities in order to stabilize developing 
international crises. O’Hanlon, Acton, and Perkovich do not appear concerned with small crises. 
They might not notice my anecdote of the Japanese fishermen, China’s response, and the former 
nuclear powers’ overreaction to China’s response. They might only notice once leaders begin to 
rethink their nuclear options and support that move in order to re-stabilize the system. Schell is a 
little more concerned with the small crises. He believes that the small crises are unlikely to spiral 
because former nuclear weapons states, enjoying a short-order re-proliferation capability, carry 
                                                
424 Schelling (2009), 126. 
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with them “weaponless deterrence.”425 Schell argues that in a world with short-order rearmament 
capabilities, the state of nature is proliferation deterrence, which guides states’ responses. In this 
case, Schell might notice when the former nuclear powers reacted, but it is likely it would have 
stopped there. Realist thinking implies the Japanese fishermen will likely meet an untimely 
execution by Chinese officials simply because it is not in Japan’s national interest to start a 
skirmish that leads to a nuclear China. Accordingly, even if Japan called on the superpowers for 
help, they, not wanting a nuclear China, would likely merely attempt to exhaust their diplomatic 
capabilities. If they could not get the Japanese prisoners freed using diplomacy, it would stop 
there. Wheeler and Booth support Schell’s assessment (with a subsequent short critique), calling 
it “an intellectual tour de force.”426 
My argument in Chapter 8, using the extensive form game, is that this is structural. States 
are cost-benefit calculators, and they know that every move they make either leads them towards 
security through MAD, which is a costly path to follow, or security through threat avoidance. 
China might have called on Japan’s ambassador to explain the situation, rather than escalating 
the situation. Because in my model the re-proliferation capabilities are automatic,427 there is little 
room for mistake in international affairs.  
The implication of this automatic re-proliferation capability is that it might compel 
peaceful relations, giving states usually hostile towards each other the ability to find alternative 
ways of living with one another. The Koreas might engage in trade simply because trade is a 
better alternative than war, leading to more trust. Trust begets trust. And on a long enough 
timeline, the realist edicts telling states to calculate cost and benefit might not even need to 
                                                
425 Schell, 158. 
426 Wheeler and Booth, 36. 
427 If policy-makers are paying attention. 
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assume the costs include war. Can there be perpetual peace through “weaponless deterrence”? It 
is unlikely, but it is also not beyond possibility. 
In other words, it is possible to stay at disarmament, but staying there requires automatic 
re-proliferation capabilities that discourage testing the re-proliferation rule. 
 
 9.6 Disarmament, Complexity, and the Hurdles 
This study began by analyzing two complex problems and then moved on to analyze 
known interactions between the problems. Movement in the mess takes us from less order to 
more order. Kurtz and Snowden phrase this movement as “shifting a system from complexity to 
order and maintaining it there in such a way that it becomes predictable.”428 This study 
illuminates that unknown-knowns existed within the mess. The knowledge was there, but we did 
not yet understand it. The interactions between problems and nodes within the problems and 
“mess” refine our understanding so that we are left with known-unknowns. In other words, the 
security dilemma during the “security period of vulnerability” is still a problem, but we can act 
towards disarmament in a way that is predictable and beneficial. 
As stated before, this study reveals the enormity of the “mess” complexity. It is far more 
complex than realist power calculations suggest. The realist, while focused on power capability, 
misses the net security increase offered by multilateral disarmament that erases nuclear weapons’ 
existential threat to the human species. It also misses the net security increases caused by 
increased cooperation and transparency (negotiated in the disarmament treaty). The realist might 
argue this is temporary, but that would require the realist to assume states are not security 
maximizers on a long enough timeline. It also illuminates that the “mess” is even more complex 
                                                
428 Cynthia Kurtz, and David Snowden, "The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-making in a 
Complex and Complicated World," IBM Systems Journal 42, no. 3 (2003): 465. 
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than the Sagans and Booths of realism. Yes, the international system can work towards 
disarmament, but it requires acknowledging several competing moving parts in a system. When 
problems get more complex than the realist assumes they can get, then the realist needs to 
expand his or her tool set. It finally illuminates that the issue’s complexity means that 
abolitionists need a better understanding of cause and effect. The “security period of 
vulnerability” is a very serious issue that could undermine the entire disarmament process, lead 
to conventional war, and maybe to a nuclear exchange, fulfilling the abolitionists’ nuclear 
holocaust hypothesis. The abolitionist needs to accept that periodic nuclear reconstitution is a 
good thing. 
The hurdles that are holding states to their nuclear weapons are not necessarily structural. 
If they are structural, then there is a competing structure working against them—human empathy 
for others. And if the hurdles are not structural, then realists need to admit that humans, and 
therefore states, have agency to choose to balance or to do something else. The disputes in 
Eastern Europe, the South China Sea, Kashmir, the Middle East, Taiwan, and Korea are 
manageable (perhaps using fuzzy cognitive mapping to maximize states’ security needs). The 
remaining known-unknowns are also manageable. Sovereignty and its resultant anarchy, security 
dilemmas, uncertainty, among others can all be mitigated through understanding the complex 
relationships between problem components and between problems. 
Once these known-unknowns are managed and a successful disarmament treaty is signed, 
two competing scenarios are possible (illustrated in Scenarios 7 and 8, respectively). First, long-
term disarmament under the threat of re-proliferation is viable as long as states take their 
international commitments seriously. If total nuclear security is a milieu goal, then these 
commitments enact some level of benefit. Second, a similar long-term disarmament is also viable 
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as long as the IAEA takes its responsibilities seriously at the expense of the former nuclear 
powers. In other words, either the states empower the IAEA to a degree commensurate to milieu 
goals or, if disarmament is still preferable without much state participation, the IAEA will decide 
states’ possession goals despite the states’ wishes. It is far more likely that a viable path forward 
requires that states shift their understanding of security beyond mere focus on the possession of 
power and towards creating a milieu where no one wants to possess nuclear weapons. IAEA 
empowerment should be limited by the scope of the milieu; otherwise, a disarmed world looks 
unrecognizable. 
To summarize this my findings, I propose that global nuclear disarmament is not 
unthinkable, but temporary disarmament is more viable than a permanent solution. This 
acknowledges that in addition to the milieu goals states possess, which compel them to work 
toward a world without the threat of nuclear war, states’ possession goals make permanent 
disarmament unlikely, unless, of course, the milieu changes significantly in the future. Therefore, 
I am skeptically optimistic. The path forward requires us to think less about our internal national 
security, and more towards how our national security can be gained through social interactions. 
But we must not forget that ultimately the balance of power and the threat of death are 
compelling and unalterable reasons it is a good thing we are stuck with nuclear knowledge. 
A final note that the realist either does not see or does not think is important: For the bulk 
of this study, I have viewed the nuclear problem as significant because the probability of nuclear 
war is not zero and the costs of nuclear war reach infinity (human extinction). But the problem is 
actually defined by a point made in Chapter 5 (Problem 1). That is, all stakeholders, including 
nuclear weapons states and Outlier States, agree that nuclear weapons are a problem and that 
abolishing them is a (milieu) goal. If nuclear weapons states and Outlier States did not view them 
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as a problem, they would simply ignore the problem. The fact that they have chosen to 
participate in this debate highlights that power is not the only concern states have. Security 
through MAD is not as reassuring as realists might believe. This study illuminates the 
complexities that make this a reality. This study shines a light on the way states shape the milieu 
and are compelled to act according to these external circumstances. 
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